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CHAPTER I 
SOCIAL REVOLUTION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
1. Introduction: The Rationale of This Study 
The ~~volution in Zimbabwe is an interesting case in 
its own right, if only for its curious ending. 1 After a pro-
tracted period of guerrilla warfare, the revolution culmi-
nated in, of all things, an election. 
Beyond this, the revolution in Zimbabwe raises the 
more general question: What kind of a revolution occurred 
in Zimbabwe and why? This is the key issue addressed in this 
study. In doing so, this study is informed by two theoreti-
cal traditions. The first is the theoretical literature on 
revolutions in general, particularly the literature that 
asks questions why certain kinds of revolutions occur. From 
this literature a theoretical approach can be selected to 
guide the examination of the events in Zimbabwe. The second 
tradition is the theoretical literature on African revolu-
tions, particularly the work of those scholars who argue that 
social revolutions in Africa are rare.2 These scholars point 
1 In the past, Zimbabwe was known as f.outhern Rhodesia, 
Rhodesia and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The name Zimbabwe will be 
used throughout this study. 
2For a review, see Ian R. Phimister, ''Zimbabwean Eco-
nomic and Social Historiography Since 1970" African Affairs 
78 (April 1979): 253-268. 
2 
out that revolutions in Africa are neither caused by nor 
lead to socio-economic transformations. They argue instead 
that African revolutions occur in the context of decoloniza-
tion and struggles against racial exclusivism. Thus the 
revolution in Zimbabwe brought a black regime to power but 
left much else intact. 
Thus, while this study is best seen as a case study, 
it is informed by general theoretical concerns. The remain-
ing sections of this chapter will explore these concerns by 
offering a working definition of revolution, a discussion of 
the theoretical conception of social revolutions, an exami-
nation of the theoretical literature, a summary of the theo-
retical approach, and an outline of the subsequent chapters 
and their content. 
2. Revolution: A Working Df!finition 
Studies of revolution have spawned a myriad of terms, 
definitions and associated typologies, reflecting and contri-
buting to confusion as to what constitutes a revolution. This 
proliferation has resulted in a situation where similar events 
are alternatively defined, and disparate sets of events simi-
larly defined. Indeed the definitions and terminology of 
revolutionary studies has become a study in itself. 3 
3 See Lawrence Stone, 
Politics 18 (January 1966): 
"Reflections on Revolution: 
Recent Scholarship," History 
26-63. 
"Theories of Revolution", World 
159-176; and Isaac Kramnick, 
Definition and Explanation in 
and Theory 11 (January 1972): 
3 
Yet definitional differences are useful insofar as 
they reveal the nature of and differences between accompany-
ing theoretical statements. Definitional differences are 
also useful insofar as they reveal that revolutions are 
multidimensional phenomena involving characteristic social, 
psychological, economic, political and military events that 
are intertwined on individual, group and societal levels, all 
of which are subject to international influences as well. 
Even if useful, definitional differences should nevertheless 
not be overplayed, for studies of revolutions also reveal 
4 two major areas of agreement. 
First, revolution is consistently connected with 
change in a causal and consequential sense. In its pre-
modern usage, this change was seen as a part of the cyclical 
order of human events, with no expectation that the change 
would cause a qualitative change in the condition of men or 
. t" 5 soc1e 1es. Since the 17th century, however, the cause and 
consequences of revolutions are associated with progressive 
socio-economic and political change. This modern concep-
tualization of revolution is 
4
see Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics of 
Violence: RE!Volution in the Modern World (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 3-9. 
5For a good study on the history of the notion of 
revolution see Peter Calvert, Revolution (New York: Praeger, 
1970). 
4 
inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of 
history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely new story, 
a story never known or told before, is about to unfold.6 
Qualitative changes on the order of societies are thus an 
integral component of revolutions, leading to much debate as 
to how much and what types of changes are necessary to pro-
duce a revolutionary situation. 
Most recent7 scholars do not insist that sweeping or 
fundamental change necessarily accompany revolutions. Davies, 
for example, defines revolutions as "violent civil distur-
bances that cause the displacement of one ruling group by 
another that has a broader popular basis for support."8 Gurr, 
similarly, de-emphasizes the change component of revolutions. 9 
The debate about the extent of change involved in revolutions 
has led some scholars to di~tinguish between social and 
political revolutions. A social revolution, in the words of 
one such scholar, 
6 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 
1965)' p. 21. 
7An exception in this regard is Samuel P. Huntington, 
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press, 1968). Revolution is a "rapid, funda-
mental and violent change in the dominant values and myths 
of a society in its political institutions, social structure, 
leadership, and government activity and policies." 
8James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution" in 
James C. Davies, ed., When Men Revolt and Why (New York: The 
Free Press, 1971), p. 338. 
9 Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 7-12. (Hereafter 
referred to as WMR). 
5 
is set apart from other sorts of conflicts and transfor-
mative processes above all by the combination of two 
coincidences: the coincidence of societal structural 
change with class upheaval; and the c£ancidence·of 
political with social transformation. 
A political revolution, "transforms state structures, but not 
,,11 
social structures. Mark Hagopian warns, however, against 
overdrawing the boundaries between social and political 
revolutions, since they are separated not by the amount or 
extent of change involved but as to when and how different 
12 types of changes come about. These differences are useful 
in distinguishing revolutions from non-revolutionary phenom-
13 
ena such as civil wars and coups, and between types of 
revolutions. 
10Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolution: A 
Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 4 (Hereafter referred 
to as States and Social Rf!VOl uti on). 
11 Ibid. 
12Hagopian states: "Marx' stipulation that social 
revolutions are ipso facto political revolutions helps to 
clarify the problem from one side. We can furthermore point 
out that a revolution which is primarily political will have 
great difficulty in refraining from intervention in the 
economic and status systems (i.e., in the areas usually term-
ed 'social')." Mark r-. Hagopian, The Phenomenon of Revolution 
(New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1975), pp. 105-106. 
13A civil war can be defined as "a formal, organized 
military clash between two competing governments or political 
authorities or armed factions within the same territory." 
Mostafa Rejai, The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy 
(New York: David McKay Company, 1977), pp. 21-22. 
IJII"'". 
6 
Second, the term revolution is consistently associated 
with overt conflict and violence. Some scholars, indeed, 
prefer to subsume revolutions under the general category. of 
violence or conflict rather than change. Gurr and Tilly, for 
example, see violence as the definitive property of revolu-
. 14 t 1ons, while the use of the concept internal war has gained 
f 1 t . 15 Th h 1 wide currency as a synonym o revo u 1on. ese sc o ars 
are nevertheless careful to point out that although revolutions 
are rare events, the violence accompanying them is not. To 
demonstrate this point, continua of violence are constructed 
reflecting the magnitude and intensity of violent incidents 
in the political life of societies. Revolutions are, then, 
typically seen as an extreme case of intense and widespread 
violence16 or conflict, 17 while less intense forms of violence 
(like riots and violent strikes) are more common. 
14 Ibid., pp. 7-12 and Charles Tilly, From Mobilization 
to Revolution (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1978), 
pp. 189-222. 
15Internal war has been defined as "any resort to vio-
lence within a political order to change its constitution, 
rulers, or policies." Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of 
Internal Wars," History and Theory 4 (1965): 133. 
16Gurr's requirement is "highly organized political 
violence with widespread popular participation, designed to 
overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied 
by extensive violence." Gurr, WMR, p. 11. 
17Tilly's requirement is that a revolution starts when 
"a government previously under the control of a single, 
sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, competing, 
mutually exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct 
Polities." Tilly, p. 191. 
7 
Although there is agreement that violence and conflict 
accompany revolutions a close identification of revolution 
with violence makes it difficult to distinguish revolutionary 
from non-revolutionary events like coups and civil wars: 
Left out of this definition is all that gives revolution 
its distinctiveness and its impact upon contemporaries. 
It lacks the sense of the profundity of the crisis in a 
society undergoing revolution. Of the stakes in revolu-
tion only· political power is considered; economic and 
status stratification seems beneath consideration. There 
is no inkling of what is to be done with power after the 
insurrectionaries take over.l~ 
Finally, a close identification of violence and revolution 
makes it difficult to distinguish between types of revolutions 
except on the basis of the strategic-instrumental considera-
tions in the struggle for power. 19 
In summary, it is easy to exaggerate definitional dif-
ferences, but such exaggeration neglects areas of substantive 
agreement about the change and violence characterizing revolu-
tions. Definitional differences can best be seen as the van-
guard of theoretical differences about the types of change 
and violence involved, its extent, timing and interrelation-
ship. In suspending the question of theoretical differences, 
a working definition of revolution then reads as follows: 
18Hagopian, pp. 71-72. 
19
see Sheldon S. Wolin, "The Politics of the Study of 
Revolution," Comparative Politics 5 (April 1973): 343-358 on 
tpe theoretical fascination with techniques of revolutionary 
violence. 
8 
Revolution is a form of change simultaneously affecting several 
societal dimensions. Since several societal dimensions - the 
economic, political, social and psycho-cultural - are affected, 
it is possible to speak of the change as "far-reaching," and 
since these dimensions together define society, it is possible 
to speak of the change as "basic" and "fundamental". Although 
these changes may occur over a period of decades, the process 
of change contains a violent struggle for national political 
control. Since the political groups seeking a transfer of 
power use violence and since their goals reflect many recent 
socio-economic changes, their actions can be described as 
"illegal". Finally, revolutions are marked by their "mass-
character", i.e. a significant amount of the population is 
affected by the process of societal change and the violent 
struggle for power is affected by popular participation. 20 
3. Social Revolution: A Structural Perspective 
As previously indicated, the multi-dimensional charac-
ter of revolutions has resulted in a vast array of theories 
attempting to explain revolutions. There are indeed so many 
20This working description of revolution closely resem-
bles that of Rejai. It is not identical to his definition, 
however, mainly because he holds a voluntaristic conception 
of revolution, that is, revolutions are fundamentally the 
Product of the will of determined revolutionaries. See Rejai, 
pp. 7-8. Throughout this paper, revolutions are seen as 
fundamentally the product of political and socio-economic 
relationships or structures. 
9 
theories that they can be divided into well-stocked cate-
gories. 
One categorization divides theories according to the 
questions raised about revolutions. Why men are willing to 
engage in violent behavior is addressed by Gurr, when men are 
willing to do so by Davies, and what the properties are of a 
revolutionary course of events after men have decided to do 
. 21 22 
so by Br1nton and Edwards. Another categorization focuses 
on the attributes of theories. Some use concepts of social 
psychology (Gurr), others that of political interaction 
(Tilly), and that of systems analysis (Johnson), 23 socio-
economic and political class analysis (Skocpol, Barrington 
Moore24 and Paige25 ), and utilitarian decision-making 
21
crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, revised 
and expanded edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1965). 
22
r.yford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). 
23 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1966). 
24Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictator-
ship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). 
25Jeffrey M. P~.ige, Agrarian Revolution (New York: 
The Free Press, 1975). 
10 
(Leites and Wolf). 26 Yet another categorization focuses on 
the setting of revolutions, with theories applicable to western 
settings (Brinton) and others to non-western settings (Sarke-
sian27 and Wolf). 28 Finally, a categorization can be made 
between theories focusing on the causes29 of revolutions (Gurr 
and Johnson), those focusing on the course30 of revolutions 
(Brinton and Tilly), and those attempting to explain the out-
comes31 of revolutions (Barrington Moore, Eisenstadt, 32 
Skocpol, Trimberger33 and Wolf). 
26Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr. Rebellion and 
Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: 
Markham, 1970). 
27 Sam C. Sarkesian, "Revolutionary Guerrilla W''.rfare: 
An Introduction" in Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., Revolutionary 
Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1975), pp. 
1-21. 
28Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1969). (Hereafter referred to as 
Peasant Wars). 
29The term cause typically refers to events before the 
outbreak of violence. 
30The term course is often used to denote the histori-
cal sequence of revolutionary events between the precipitants 
of a revolution (a violent strike, riots, or a defeat in war) 
and the cessation of violence (usually after there has been a 
governmental change) or Thermidor. The causal periods of 
revolutions are often called preconditions, i.e. they precede 
Precipitant events. These demarcations are, however, prob-
lematic because they depend not only on different views of the 
historical sequence of revolutions but also on the conception 
of the revolution overall. See Hagopian, pp. 194-250 and 
Tilly, 216-219. 
11 
This summary of theories is not exhaustive, but it 
does serve the purpose of pointing out that there are no 
complete theories of revolution, explaining the causes, 
course and consequences of revolutions in all dimensions 
with universal applicability. Theories typically attempt to 
explain a particular question or set of related questions 
about revolutions, the nature of which influences - if not 
determines - the focus of the theory. The question Why men 
rebel, for example, leads logically to a focus on individuals' 
state of mind in the presence of distressing socio-economic 
circumstances, as well as a focus on the early or causal 
31 Outcomes refer to the consequences or effects of 
revolutions. There are different types of outcomes, depend-
ing on the focus and concepts of the analyst. Gurr, for 
example, notes that a categorization exists between immediate 
outcomes and long-term outcomes. Immediate outcomes are often 
used to describe changes in the distribution of political 
power between groups, social classes or other organizations. 
Long-term outcomes are used to describe changes in larger 
societal features, such as growth rates, demographic patterns, 
distribution of societal resources and international position. 
Ted R. Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict" in Ted R. 
Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict (New York: The Free 
Press, 1980), p. 138. 
32s. N. Eisenstadt, Revolution and the Transformation 
of Societies (New York: The Free Press, 1978). 
33 Kay E. Trimberger, Revolution From Above: Military 
Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978). 
12 
period of the revolutionary process. The question why a 
particular kind of revolution occurred can lead to class 
analysis or to the analysis of the interaction between socio-
economic conditions and the use of political power as 
reflected in the work of Skocpol, Trimberger and Paige. 34 
It is to the work of this latter group of scholars, here 
grouped under the term of structuralists, 35 that this study 
refers in its analysis of social revolutions. 
3.1. The Causes of Revolution 
Analysts like Skocpol, Trimberger and Eisenstadt 
reject many of the presumptions and findings of earlier 
causal theorists, particularly those of Gurr and Johnson, 
while being more sympathetic - although not wholly so - to 
thoseof Tilly and Marxian analyses. Inequalities in an 
objective and subjective sense, the political offensives of 
ascendant classes, organizational theory, and the irreparable 
rupture of a society's value consensus are all rejected as 
adequate causal perspectives. Instead, analysts adopt a 
34
on the distinction between class analysis and the 
structuralism of Skocpol, see Theda Skocpol, "A Critical 
Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy'' Politic& and Society 4 (Fall 1973): 1-34. 
35The subsequent sections are strongly influenced by 
Jack A. Goldstone "Theories of Revolution: The Third Genera-
tion" World Politics 22 (April 1980): 425-453. 
13 
structural perspective36 on revolutions' causes, stressing 
the view that revolutions occur in societies with particular 
political and socio-economic features, both sets of which 
can be objectively determined. It is the relationship between 
political and economic forces that produces a crisis in a 
society's system of social control (that is, a political or 
governmental crisis) which renders that society revolution-
prone. 
What is the nature of the political-economic nexus? 
All the societies that have experienced revolution, scholars 
argue, were exposed to the historical forces of modernity, 
especially the intrusion of the international capitalist 
economy in domestic life and with resultant changes in 
political and socioeconomic structures and ideas. The shape 
36 In distinguishing structural analyses from other 
perspectives, Skocpol states: "Three major principles of 
analysis need to be established as alternatives to features 
shared by all the currently prevailing theories of revolution. 
In the first place, an adequate understanding of social 
revolutions requires that the analyst take a nonvoluntarist, 
structural perspective on their causes and processes •.• In the 
second place, social revolutions cannot be explained without 
systematic reference to international structures and world-
historical developments ••• In the third place, in order to 
explain the causes and outcomes of social revolutions, it is 
essential to conceive of states as administrative and coercive 
organizations - organizations that are potentially autonomous 
from (though of course conditioned by) socioeconomic interests 
and structures.'' Skocpol, State and Social Revolution, p. 14. 
By a structural perspective is meant an "impersonal ~nd non· 
subjective viewpoint - one that emphasizes patterns of rela-
tionships among groups and societies" or a focus simultaneously 
on "institutionally determined situations and relations of 
groups within society and upon the interrelations of societies 
within world-historically developing international structures." 
Ibid., p. 18. 
14 
of the intruding forces may take many forms; in the non-
western world, for example, it took the form of colonialism 
with its allied economic and political ideas and forms. 
Regardless of the differences in the shape of the intrusion, 
however, the results are broadly similar: these forces 
engender substantial economic, political and social changes 
in domestic structures and ideas. The introduction of 
colonialism, for example, leads to the introduction of the 
notion of private property in societies previously charac-
terized by communal systems of landownership. 37 It may also 
lead to a polarization between developed and underdeveloped 
sectors of societies, or to changes in the system of peasant 
production. 38 Collectively, these changes produce instabi-
bility. 
To move out of the realm of instability and into a 
revolutionary situation requires a consideration of the 
state's political structures. Here scholars view the states' 
political structure neither as the executive committee of a 
37
wolf, Peasant Wars, pp. 276-286. 
38
structural analysts are to a large extent in agree-
ment with many of the views of dependency theorists. See, 
for example, Andre G. Frank, "The Development of Under-
development" in Robert I. Rhodes, ed., Imperialism and Under-
development: A Reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 
pp. 89-100; Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957); and Johan Galtung, "A 
Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research 8 
(1971): 81-117. 
15 
particular class (or interests), with inevitable "intransi-
gence", nor as a vacuous political arena where conflict takes 
place. The state's political structure is viewed as an 
administrative entity, staffed by bureaucrats, which is - to a 
varying degree - dependent on certain social groups for the 
supply of political support and economic resources in order 
to fulfil its goals. Although administrative structures may 
vary, it is their weakness in the face of a (typically 
international) crisis that produces a revolutionary situation. 
A crisis is typically brought on by the need to increase 
societal resources when the state encounters external military 
or economic challenges, that is, wars or market competition. 39 
An interstate war, for example, induces the state's 
central political machinery to stimulate economic production, 
to seek state revenues from such increased production, and to 
exercise greater central control over resources. If the 
central political machinery fails to accomplish these goals -
either because of the political opposition of the state 
bureaucracy's support groups (like the landed aristocracy) or 
the inherent weaknesses of the type of economic organization 
(like the type of peasant production) - the state is 
39Another way of explaining the administrative incapac-
itation is to view it as a clash between state and rural elites. 
Normal tensions exist, but are increased when state elites 
under pressure of war want to modernize political and socio-
economic practices and organizations. If the state elite is 
closely linked to rural elites and encountersresistance from 
them, the state is incapacitated. 
16 
. 1 . . t t d 40 administrat1ve y 1ncapac1 a e . 
The collapse of the government or at least its adminis-
trative incapacitation is thus not the function of an "intran-
sigent" elite. There is a wide range of elite behaviour, even 
within one state. Typically it is the landed aristocracy that 
balks at the reforming efforts of bureaucrats and if the lat-
ter relies on the former for political and economic coopera-
tion the reforms are doomed. The collapse of the government 
also does not come when frustrated and mobilized masses 
launch an assualt on the capital. Rather, there is an admin-
istrative incapacity which results from political goals not 
being met in a time of foreign military and economic challenge 
because of domestic political opposition and weaknesses in 
economic organization. 
3.2. The Course of Revolution 
A society marked by administrative incapacity, weak-
nesses in economic organization, the landed aristocracy's 
opposition to political and economic reforms, and the experi-
ence of foreign economic or military challenge is in a 
revolutionary situation; but this does not necessarily lead 
to the experience of revolution. Skocpol, for example, 
includes in her ana~ysis a study of societies that were in a 
revolutionary situation but did not experience revolution, 
40
skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 47-51 
and Eisenstadt, pp. 195-206. 
17 
41 
such as nineteenth century Japan. Trimberger also addresses 
this question by studying how certain societies' bureaucracy 
may move out of a revolutionary situation by instituting a 
"revolution from above", that is, successfully instituting 
42 
reforms. 
Although there has been no attempt thus far to develop 
stage-type theories, most structural analysts agree that 
revolutions have three critical developments in common. 
First, for a revolutionary situation to develop into 
a revolution a popular revolt has to coincide with the in-
capacitation of central state machinery. Typically this 
revolt is rurally-based and consists of portions of the 
peasantry becoming politically conscious and active. Although 
43 there is agreement among scholars that peasants play a 
decisive role, there is disagreement as to which portion 
of the peasantry is most likely to be active. Skocpol 
emphasizes the political autonomy of certain portions of the 
41 Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 99-104. 
42T . b 156 r1m erger, p. • 
43The definition of the term peasant varies, with some 
viewing them as a population category while others use the 
term as a class. Wolf states that peasants are "populations 
that are existentially involved in cultivation and make 
autonomous decisions regarding the process of cultivation. The 
category is thus made to cover tenants and sharecroppers as 
well as owner-operators, as long as they are in a position to 
make the relevant decisions on how their crops are grown. It 
does not, however, include fishermen and landless laborers." 
Wolf, Peasant Wars, p. xiv. Paige uses a wider definition of 
"rural cultivators". Paige, pp. 25-40. 
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pesantry: 
Peasants always have grounds for rebellion against land-
lords, state agents, and merchants who exploit them ••. 
If they are to act upon, rather than silently suffer, 
their omnipotent grievances, peasants mu~:t have 'internal 
leverage' - some organized capacity for collective action 
against their exploitative superiors. In my view, the 
extent to which peasants have had such internal leverage, 
particularly during historical political crises of 
agrarian states, is explained by structural and situa-
tional conditions that affect: (1) the degrees and kinds 
of solidarity of peasant communities; (2) the degrees of 
peasant autonomy from day-to-day supervision and control 
by landlords and their agents; and (3) the relaxation of 
state coercive sanctions against peasant revolts .•. it is 
never enough merely to identify different strata of 
property holders, abstracting away from institutional 
contexts.44 
Wolf also notes the role of institutional or power relations, 
but argues that it is neither the poor peasants and landless 
labourers nor the rich peasant that will have internal 
leverage. 
The only component of the peasantry which does have some 
internal leverage is either landowning 'middle peasantry' 
or a peasantry located in a peripheral area outside the 
domains of landlord control. Middle peasantry refers to 
a peasant population which has secure access to land of 
its own and cultivates it with family labor. Where these 
middle peasant holdings lie within the power domain of a 
superior, possession of their own resources provides the 
holders with the minimal 4Ectical freedom required to 
challenge their overlord. 
The middle peasantry thus is the pivotal group in the popular 
uprising and any factor, like ethnicity and geographic loca-
tion, which adds to its "tactical mobility" also reinforces 
44 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 115-116. 
45wolf, Peasant Wars, p. 291. 
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its revolutionary potential. Poor peasants, landless 
labourers and rich peasants are unlikely to engage in revolu-
tionary activity, unless an "external force, such as the 
Chinese Red Army, proves capable of destroying •.• the power 
which constrains." 46 
Paige, on the other hand, notes that peasants dependent 
on income from wages, whether from sharecropping or migratory 
labour, are likely to engage in revolutionary action. This 
statement is qualified, however, by the re~uirement that the 
particular type of income has to be combined with a particular 
type of income of rural classes in order to be a revoluticn. Thus 
A combination of noncultivators dependent on income from 
land and cultivators dependent on income from wages lea1s 
to revolution. Such a combination of income sources is 
typical of sharecropping and migratory labor estate sys-
tems. The revolutionary movement demands the redistribu-
tion of landed property through the seizure of the state ... 
A combination of noncultivators dependent on income from 
capital and cultivators dependent on income from wages 
leads to a reform labor movement.47 
For Paige they types of rural income and the combination of 
types is thus critical. 
Second, it is important to understand that the peas-
antry (or rather critical portions of the peasantry) and their 
actions do not constitute a self-liberating, ascendant class 
in the Marxist mold, though they do have common interests. 
46 Ibid. , p. 290. 
47Paige, p. 71. See also Theda Skocpol, "What Makes 
Peasants Revolutionary?" Comparative Politics 14 (April 1982) 
1982): 351-375. 
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The peasantry functions as a pivotal population group with 
similar interests which establishes a coalition with o~ is 
led by marginal elites. The revolutionary coalition incor-
porates the peasantry, elites and other population grohps. 
In this coalition the marginal elites are important, f1Dr 
they in effect constitute a revolutionary leadership, shaping 
both the ideas that animate the revolution and the organiza-
tional forms of the coalition itself. 48 
With regard to the revolutionary ideology generated 
by the revolutionary elite, structural analysts note the con-
I 
sistent appearance of radical nationalism or varietieslof 
it. 49 They contest, however, that an understanding of' ideo-
logy is necessary to explain the practical strategies ~f 
revolutionaries during the struggle for power or for explain-
ing the outcomes of the revolution. In part the de-emphasis 
of ideology is due to the structural perspective of outcome-
oriented analyses, which opposes the notion that revolutions 
48 In describing revolutionary elites, Skocpol e 
sizes that they should not be viewed as representative 
classes or as willful individuals struggling to impleme 
particular ideological vision of society. They should 
pha-
of 
t a 
be 
viewed as "that which political leaderships in revolut onary 
crises are above all doing - claiming and struggling t 
maintain state power." Skocpol, States and Social Rev lution, 
pp. 164-165. But this still begs the question of why orne 
individuals lead revolutions while others are follower • 
Here Wolf states that they are "marginal" men because hey 
have been barred from positions of power by virtue of .heir 
unused skills or social positions. Wolf, Peasant Wars 
pp. 287-289. 
49Paige, pp. 59-71 and Skocpol, States and Soci 1 
Revolution, pp. 168-171. 
21 
are caused or carried out by a "determined, organized van-
guard," though revolutionary elites may be determined and 
well-organized. From the structural perspective, revolu~ 
tionary ideology is seen as a resource, insofar as its 
nature projects a broad appeal to diverse segments of the 
population and it facilitates the proselytizing efforts of 
the revolutionary elite to encourage broadly-based popular 
. . t• 50 part1c1pa 1on. 
There is significant variation in the political orga-
nizations generated during the revolutionary process. In 
his study of the organizational forms of six revolutions, 
Wolf notes that two forms are common, namely a military 
organization (or army) and a para-military party. Within 
these organizational forms, however, there are different 
types of political-military interaction. 
In the Mexican and Algerian cases, the revolutionary 
organization took the form of an army organized, respectively, 
by a civilian-military leadership and a wartime coalition of 
nationalists. Since this type reflects the primacy of mili-
tary needs during the struggle for power, later efforts to 
transform the army into a political party may meet with some 
difficulty. In the Russian, Chinese and Vietnamese revolu-
tions a different type emerged, where the "roles of the 
50
skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 169-171. 
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51 
armY and party were reversed." The direction of the revolu-
tionary struggle was by a political party with a para-mili-
tary nature: 
In these three cases, it was the political parties of 
middle-class revolutionaries who engineered the seizure 
of power and created the social and military instruments 
which conquered the state, and ensured transition to a 
new social order. It is probably no accident that these 
are also three countries which were characterized by 
patterns of conspiratorial and secret societies before 
the advent of revolution .•. It is here- and only here-
that the party as a separate body comes to dominate the 
other organizations thrown up by the revolution.52 
The political party may be based in urban areas, as in the 
case of Russia, or rural areas like China and Vietnam. 53 A 
third type emerged in the Cuban revolution, and consisted 
neither of an army nor a para-military party but "a small 
group of armed rebels who, very much by accident, had estab-
lished themselves in the one part of the island inhabited by 
a tactically mobile peasantry. Once in power, this rebel 
group made use of the Communist party apparatus ..... 54 This 
type is uncommon and has been criticized for its strategic 
inefficiency. 5 5 
51
wolf, Peasant Wars, p. 297. 
52Ibid., pp. 297-298. 
53 Ibid., p. 298. 
54 Ibid., p. 299. 
55 Ibid. 
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Thus there are two major organizational types, namely 
the armY or military organization and the para-military 
party. Whether the para-military party is based in rural or 
urban areas also results in organizational differences. Two 
questions logically emerge from these organizational dif-
ferences. One is why some revolutions generate a particular 
organizational form. The other question is what the impli-
cations of organizational forms are for revolutionary out-
comes. 
In addressing the question of why one revolution 
generates a particular organizational form, Wolf notes that 
there is no easy solution in the offing, but argues that 
particular patterns are a function of the development of 
revolutions, which includes support groups, ideological pro-
clivity, strategic thinking, and the locus of warfare. In 
the Russian revolution, for example, the development of an 
organizational_formwas influenced by the existence of secret 
societies before the revolution, the fact that the party 
drew its main support not from the peasantry but from indus-
trial workers in key regions, and that industrialization as 
an ideological goal necessitated the development of cadre 
that could occupy key economic positions in the post-violent 
stages of the revolution. In the Chinese revolution, however, 
there 
seem to have been tensions between groups in the party 
which favored the Russian model of development, and those 
24 
who, during the years of protracted war, had learned to 
put their faith in a peasant army with an egalitarian 
ideology. The experience of war in the hinterland had 
taken them far from the cities and industrial areas; it 
had taught them the advantages of dispersal, of a wide 
distribution of basic skills rather than a dense concen-
tration of advanced skills. The citizen-soldiers of the 
guerrilla army had, in fact, lived lives in which the 
roles of peasant, worker, soldier, ang intellectual 
intermingled to the point of fusion.5 
The result was that a party did emerge, but that it contained 
57 
a military sub-organization that was increasingly powerful. 
With regard to the later implications of organiza-
tional forms, Wolf notes that the Russian case is exceptional. 
Here the development of a strong party and political com-
ponent to the revolutionary movement coincided with the 
development of an "effective managerial class and a popula-
tion of skilled industrial workers." 58 The outcome is "a 
strongly hierarchical society, operated by technocrats, 'ex-
perts and Red', but above all experts."59 Where the party 
component is not as strongly developed during the revolu-
tionary struggle for power, as in the Algerian case, the army 
forged during the struggle has to stabilize the society. ,.GO 
56 Ibid., p. 300. 
57Ibid., pp. 300-301. 
58 Ibid. , p. 300. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., p. 297. 
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Even in the case of the Chinese revolution, where a party 
did emerge during the struggle, the army may become increas-
ingly important and do so at the expense of the party. 61 
Organizational forms are not the only factor to influ-
ence the outcomes of revolutions and have to be considered 
along with such factors as international market forces and 
domestic resources. Yet it is during the revolutionary 
process that political groups and ideas are defined: an 
elite emerges, as well as followers, which are linked in an 
organizational form with political goals. 
Third, structural analysts insist that the reaction of 
the state to revolutionary challenge is a critical ingredient 
of the course of revolutions. There are several reasons for 
this key role. Perhaps the most important of these is that 
the state's response to revolutionary challenge influences -
if not determines - the immediate outcome of the struggle for 
power. Changes by the challenged regime of policies, laws, 
practices or resource distribution results in a redistribution 
of groups' power once the violent phase of the struggle for 
power has ended. 62 Here it is noted that the regime will not 
be toppled if it manages to maintain centralized control over 
its armed forces, prevents the disintegration of these forces, 
61 Ibid., pp. 300-301. 
62Gurr, "On the Coutcomes of Violent Conflict", 
pp. 254-255. 
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and effectively uses them to counter the revolutionaries' 
63 
actions. 
Another reason for the key role of the state in the 
process of revolution is that, although the revolutionary 
process was precipitated by administrative incapacitation and 
the revolutionary crisis ''does entail institutional break-
downs and class conflicts that quickly change what is pos-
sible in a given society, many conditions - especially socio-
economic conditions - always 'carry over' from the old 
regime." 64 During the revolutionary process the challenged 
regime is, in other words, never totally dismantled. So~e 
portions of the old regime remain, others are transformed, 
and another portion of it may disappear. 
The importance of the ramants of the old regime is 
underscored by the fact that clearcut victories (or losses) 
are rare in revolutionary struggles for power. In studying 
internal wars which were begun or in progress in 119 nations 
or colonies between 1961 and 1965, Gurr notes: 
There were forty-eight distinguishable guerrilla, civil 
and revolutionary wars, not counting coups, military 
63
see John Ellis, Armies in Revolution (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1974); Katherine Chorley, Armies and the Art 
of Revolution (London: Faber and Faber, 1943); and D.E.H. 
Russell, Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force: A Comparative 
Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and 
South Africa (New York: Academic Press, 1974). 
64
skocpol, States and Social Revolution, p. 171. 
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rebellions, or isolated instances of armed resistance. 
By 1978 three were still major conflicts, while frag-
mentary accounts indicated that sporadic resistance 
continued in nine other instances ••• clear-cut revolu-
tionary victories are uncommon. It is also evident that 
decisive outcomes are not as common in most internal wars 
as they have been in the best-known historical examples, 
for instance, France 1789 and 1848, the United States 
1865, Russia 1917, China 1949, Greece 1949, Cuba 1959, 
Nigeria 1970 and Vietnam 1974. Dramatic victory and 
defeat have impressed these examples on political memory. 
The more numerous revolts that have ended in compromise 
and mutual exhaustion are less often remembered •.• 65 
In studying the "endings" of revolutionary struggles marked 
by the use of guerrilla warfare as a means, Pirouet comes to 
a similar conclusion about their indecisive nature. Here it 
is noted that there are four different types of endings: 
The first type of ending is a formally negotiated 
settlement of the conflict between the regime and the revolu-
tionary leaders, such as the Sudan. All revolutionary lead-
ers are not necessarily involved in the negotiations or 
included in the final settlement. The reason is that the 
challenged regime usually prefers to negotiate with the 
moderate faction of the opposition, whether actual or per-
ceived. If the regime has decided that it cannot win and 
concludes a formal settlement, such a settlement therefore 
usually brings moderates to power. A second type of ending 
is an informal or unofficial negotiated settlement. An 
example of this type is the ending of the Mau Mau Emergency 
65 Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict," pp. 
266-267. 
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in Kenya. The challenged regime again prefers to negotiate 
with moderate factions or leaders of the revolutionary move-
ment. The possibility of such negotiations however depends 
on whether the moderate faction holds positions of power with-
in the revolutionary movement or organization. Even if they 
do hold powerful positions, they may not be willing to 
negotiate with the regime; willingness to negotiate depends 
on whether the regime has managed to redress the grievances 
associated with the moderate faction. A third type of end-
ing consists of a military victory by the revolutionary 
movement which, although there are some dramatic examples 
of military takeovers, are in fact uncommon. Here attempts 
at settlement -informal or formal - may have been made during 
the course of the conflict, but have failed to resolve the 
conflict. Since military victory is often a necessary con-
dition of political takeover, this type of ending favours 
the radical factions of the revolutionary movement who usually 
have a narrow political support base. A final type of ending 
consists of a regime victory, such as Malaya, with military 
d f t "d d 66 e ea avo1 e • 
A final reason for the focus on the state in the 
revolutionary process is that the regime's response to 
66Louise Pirouet, "Armed Resistance and Counter-Insur-
gency: Reflections in the Anya Nya and Mau Mau Experiences" 
in Ali A. Mazrui, ed., The W~rrior Tradition in Modern Africa 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), pp. 205-210. 
29 
revolutionary challenge may initiate political and socio-
economic changes with longlasting effect. Although the 
regime initiates chan~es to avoid political or military· 
defeat~ its ultimate effect is on society as a whole when the 
violent phase of the revolution has ended. Examples of this 
type of change can be found, especially in counterinsurgency 
strategies which may include population removal, land reform, 
67 
economic growth or foreign dependency. It has indeed been 
argued that such changes initiated by regimes during the 
revolutionary process in an effort to survive have the effect 
of transforming the regime and - to varying degrees - the 
society as well. As such it is one of the important factors 
affecting revolutionary outcomes. 68 
Although structural analyses thus have not attempted 
to develop stage-type explanations of the revolutionary pro-
cess, they do stipulate three critical factors in the course 
of revolutions' development: A popular uprising coincides 
with the incapacitation of the central political machinery, 
usually consisting of a peasant revolt in rural areas. The 
peasants do not act as a self-liberating class but enter into 
67For a summary of the basic types of counterinsur-
gency or counter-revolutionary guerrilla warfare see Eqbal 
Ahmad, "Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency" in Norman 
Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., National Liberation (New Ycrk: 
The Free Press, 1971), pp. 137-213. 
68 . Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict," p. 255. 
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a revolutionary coalition with other societal groups. This 
organizational form of the revolutionary movement usually 
reveals an elite, followers and political goals. Finally, 
the response of the existing regime is crucial to the develop-
ment of the course of revolutionary events. 
One implication of this view of the course of revolu-
tions is that it collapses many of the distinctions other 
scholars, like Huntington, make between Western and Eastern 
revolutions. As indicated earlier, Huntington argues that 
Western revolutions have an urban focus and Eastern ones have 
a rural focus. Skocpol, however states: 
Urban workers, whether preindustrial or industrial, have 
often played highly visible parts in (failed as well as 
successful) revolutions. And their aims and achieve-
ments have been linked to those of self-consciously 
revolutionary leaderships. Hence insurrectionary urban 
workers seem like true revolutionaries compared to 
peasants who merely 'rebel' in the countryside, far from 
the centers of national-political consciousness and 
decision. Nevertheless, peasant revolts have been the 
crucial insurrectionary ingredient in virtually all actual 
(i.e. successful) revolutions to date, and certainly in 
the French, Russian and Chinese £evolutions. This is not 
surprising, given that social revolutions have occurred 
in agrarian countries where peasants are the major pro-
ducing class. Without peasant revolts, urban radicalism 
in predominantly agrarian countries has not in the end 
been able to accomplish social-revolutionary transfor-
mations.69 
Thus rural occurrences are crucial - although not necessarily 
the most visible - parts of even Western revolutions. 
69 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 112-113. 
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3.3. The Consequences of Revolution 
The preceding outline of the structural analysts' con-
ception of the causes and course of revolutions makes it 
clear that revolutions do not ensconce willful revolutionaries 
or particular classes in positions of total governmental 
power. If this were the case, the consequences of revolu-
tions would not be problematic. The intentions or ideology 
of revolutionaries would be the major influence on outcomes, 
or the interests of certain classes would make future 
f 1 . 70 directions a oregone cone us1on. 
Although the view of outcomes in studies by Skocpol, 
Eisenstadt, Paige and Trimberger differ in many respects, 
they share one important generalization: the consequences 
of revolutions are determined by the policies followed by 
the new political elite. 71 Policy-making in the post-violent 
stages of the revolution is, however, subject to a number of 
structural constraints. Perhaps the most important struc-
tural constraint is that the international pressures which 
triggered the incapacitation of the central administration 
continue to exist. Although interstate wars and political 
conflicts may abate, international economic forces continue 
to exert a powerful influence. This influence is evident in 
70Ibid., pp. 6-18. 
71see also Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict", 
p. 291. 
32 
two dimensions. In the international dimension the state and 
its economic organizations encounter the economic organiza-
tions, interests and influence of more powerful states. 
This structure of inequality, it is argued, is a logical 
product of the nature of the capitalist world economy, where 
the development of one state's economy, particularly in 
North America and Western Europe, is systematically related 
to the underdevelopment of agrarian states in Latin America, 
Africa and Southeast Asia. In the domestic dimension there 
is also a pattern of inequality between the more developed, 
usually urban centers and the underdeveloped hinterland. 72 
Together the international and domestic structures of 
inequality constrain the actions of the new elite in achiev-
ing their goals. Production, for example, may still be 
based on the output of the rural or peasant sectors of the 
society, where ·efforts to increase production may arouse 
the animosity of both the landed classes and the peasantry. 
Even if the production of these sectors could be increased, 
however, the products tend to be of an agricultural (or 
primary) kind for which the world prices fluctuate. Per-
petually unsure of its foreign exchange earnings, the new 
elite rinds it difficult to engage in longterm planning in 
pursuit of its goals. In short, conditions of economic 
72 See Galtung, pp. 81-90. 
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dependence and inequality limit the policy-making options 
. 73 
of the new reg1me. 
Another constraint is the political nature, resources 
and abilities of the new elite. One reason for this con-
straining influence is that the new regime also incorporates 
members of the old regime. Revolutions, and particularly 
revolutions marked by the use of guerrilla warfare, typically 
produce negotiated endings to the violent phase of the revolu-
tion. Consequently members of the old regime may - to vary-
ing degree - retain their positions in executive, legislative, 
judicial and bureaucratic bodies. In addition to actions of 
the new (or old revolutionary) elite being subverted from 
within governmental areas, the social support base of the 
revolutionary elite also constrains its options. Trimberger, 
for example, notes that since revolutions "from above" occur 
without the mobilization of mass support the regime relies 
on the political support of specific groups in society, such 
as the military establishment and landed aristocrats. Landed 
aristocrats then may exercise political veto power over poli-
cies that threaten their position or at least may refuse to 
74 
cooperate with, for example, a land reform program. Skocpol, 
73
see Gunner Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to 
World Prosperity (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); and H.W. 
Singer, "The Distribution of Gains between Borrowing and In-
Vesting Countries," American Economic Review 40 (May 1950): 
473-485. 
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74Trimberger, pp. 156-174. 
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similarly, argues that the interests of the new regime's 
supporters constrains its actions. The political support 
base of the French National Assembly, for example, was com-
posed of peasants, skilled labourers and small businessmen, 
all of whom sought to either acquire or consolidate property. 
The French National Assembly then could not follow policies 
which denied the principle of private property or redis-
75 tributed property. 
While Skocpol and Trimberger stress the political 
resources of the new regime, Einsenstadt stresses its nature. 
Here the reference is to nature as it is revealed in the 
political actions of the revolutionary elite during the causal 
and course-stages of the revolution. Eisenstadt notes that 
revolutionary elites that are most isolated from both the 
elites of the old regime and other revolutionary groups do not 
hesitate to follow policies marked by coercion and centralized 
state power. Isolated revolutionary elites, in other words, 
tend to monopolize power. Revolutionary elites with well-
developed ties with either pre-revolutionary elites or other 
revolutionary groups, on the other hand, tend towards consen-
sus and democratic policy directions. 76 
Finally the relation of the political and organiza-
tional resources of the new regime to the socio-economic base 
75
skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 178-179. 
76Eisenstadt, pp. 245-246. 
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of the regime may act as a constraint. In particular, the 
direction of economic policies is influenced by the abilities 
of the regime to control the activities of the industrial 
sectors of the society. If the pre-revolutionary order witnes-
sed the growth of powerful industries, redistributive economic 
policies are unlikely. If industries do exist but are not 
powerful, on the other hand, the new regime may be able to 
control their activities through centralization and socialist 
policies, 77 or may seek to encourage industrial growth through 
78 
state intervention in the economy. 
The outcomes of revolutions are thus the consequences 
of the new regime's policies, but this policy-making is sub-
ject to a number of constraints embedded in the structure of 
the new regime and the society at large. The state's posi-
tion in the international political economy and the pressures 
.resulting from it, the political composition of the new regime 
and the contradictory pressures contained in it, and the rela-
tion of the socio-economic ramants of the old order to the 
resources of the new regime act as constraints upon the - not 
altogether new - regime. Indeed, an old regime attempting to 
maintain its position in the face of revolutionary challenge 
may initiate as many changes as does a "new" regime. Although 
77 Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 206-281. 
78Russia is a good example of this type. Ibid., pp. 
206-235. 
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qualitative changes thus may emerge, they are not attribu-
table to the willful actions of new regimes nor do t.hey con-
stitute dramatic historical breakpoints in the development of 
societies. 
4. Revolutions in Africa 
Revol.utions in non-Western settings are often seen as 
a crises in modernizing societies. Best presented by Hunting-
ton, this perspective argues that revolutions are likely 
neither in highly modernized nor in traditional societies, but 
in transitional societies that have experienced some exposure 
to modern socio-economic and political forces. Revolution is 
an extreme case of the lag of political-institutional develop-
ment behind socio-economic development. When a political in-
stitution, like a political party, cannot absorb the popular 
participation engendered by socio-economic development, in-
stability results. Revolution is seen as an extreme case of 
this instability. 79 
Distinctions between revolutions in Western and non-
Western settings are particularly evident as regards their 
course. Huntington argues that "Western"80 revolutions occur 
in societies marked by monarchical political rule combined 
79Huntington, passim. 
80The terms Western and Eastern are not used in a 
geographic sense. Ibid., p. 266. 
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with the political and socio-economic influence of the landed 
aristocracy. One or another crisis then causes the collapse 
of the old political order. "Eastern" revolutions occur 
during later historical periods, when previously traditional 
societies have been exposed to modernizing influences (mainly 
through colonialism). A "Western" revolution typically 
witnesses - in sequence - the collapse of the old regime's 
political institutions, the mobilization of new groups into 
political life and then the creation of new political insti-
. 81 tut1ons. 
In contrast, an "Eastern" revolution 
begins with the mobilization of new groups into politics 
and the creation of new political institutions and ends 
with the violent overthrow of the political institutions 
of the old order ••• In general, the sequence of movement 
from one phase to the next is much more clearly demar-
cated in the Western revolution than in the Eastern type. 
In the latter all three phases tend to occur more or 
less simultaneously ••• In the Western revolution, political 
mobilization is the consequence of the collapse of the old 
regime; in the Eastern revolut~~n it is the cause of the 
destruction of the old regime. 
It must be pointed out that the differences in the course of 
Western and Eastern revolutions reveal dramatic differences 
in geographic focus and strategy. The geographic focus of 
Western revolutions, according to Huntington, 83 is urban areas 
Sllbid., pp. 266-267. 
82 Ibid. 
83This view is contested by most structuralist analysts. 
See Skocpol, States and Social Revolution. pp. 112-113. 
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where governmental collapse creates an arena for political 
conflict and provides strategic incentives for competing 
groups. At the outset of Eastern revolutions, however, the 
government is strong, forcing contenders to 
withdraw from central, urban areas of the country, 
establish a base area of control in a remote section, 
struggle to win the support of the peasants through ter-
ror and propaganda, slowly expand the scope of their 
authority, and gradually escalate the level of their 
operations from individual terroristic attacks to guer-
rilla warfare to mobile warfare and regular warfare. 
Eventually they are able to defeat the governmental 
troops in battle. The last phase of the revolutionary 
struggle is the occupation of the capital.84 
Thus the geographic focus of Eastern revolutions is the 
countryside and their strategic hallmark is revolutionary 
guerrilla warfare. 
It is obvious that Huntington's views are influenced 
by those of Mao. The writings of Mao on guerrilla warfare, 
along with their apparent applications in: revolutions during 
the post-1945 period in fact attracted much attention, with 
most scholars studying the strategic dimensions of those 
revolutions. Foremost in this genre is t~e work of Leites 
and Wolf, as well as works by Galula, Pustay, Paret, Thanpsrn, 
Shy and others. 85 Much of the work of the strategic theorists 
84Huntington, pp. 271-272. 
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bas been subject to criticism, particularly as to its ten-
. 1" 86 d •t 1 "d d 87 p h dency to overgenera 1ze an 1 s ops1 e ness. er aps 
the most important contribution of these scholars neverthe-
less is the development of a view - albeit strategic and 
biased toward the actions of revolutionaries (that is, ex-
eluding governmental actions) - of how guerrilla warfare pro-
gresses in stages. 
According to this view guerrilla warfare starts (in 
stage 1) as societal penetration by guerrilla cadre. Socie-
tal penetration embraces a variety of techniques, all of 
which are designed to develop and firmly entrench a covert 
organization capable of administrative control over the 
local population. The m~litary wing of this structure 
engages in occasional acts of violence which underline 
governmental inefficiency (or revolutionary efficiency) while 
providing the revolutionaries with supplies and recruits. In 
Stage li the revolutionaries expand both the administrative-
political and military wings of their organization. As an 
administrative entity the revolutionary organization attracts 
increasing loyalty from greater numbers of the local popula-
tion, and becomes more open in its operation. Its increasingly 
86
see J. Bowyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerrilla (~ew 
York: Knopf, 1971) and Chalmers Johnson, Autopsy on Peoples' !!! (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 
1973). 
87Theories were lopsided in the sense that they empha-
sized one or the other side in the revolutionary conflict; 
conflict as a dialectic was ignored. 
overt nature is due t~ the fact that the revolutionaries' 
military wing has managed to force the withdrawal of govern-
ment forces to urban areas. Ensconced in their base areas, 
the revolutionaries are in a position to start institution-
alizing their notions of governmental and economic efficiency. 
During Stage III the administrative capabilities of the 
revolutionaries continue to expand. The most important 
change in this phase is that of the military wing, which 
becomes conventional in posture and tactics, and engages 
governmental forces in conventionally styled battles. If 
the revolutionaries achieve success during Stage III, the 
government's defeat is a foregone conclusion. Stage IV 
indeed consists of the revolutionary takeover of the central 
governmental machinery and the national institutionalization 
f th 1 t . 88 o e revo u 1on. 
The history of African states attest to the frequency 
of various kinds of violent upheavals. Traditional soci-
eties in the pre-colonial era, for example, were often 
governed by warrior elites, whose existence depended on and 
led to the cultivation of martial traditions. Among others, 
the cultivation of martial traditions included the conduct 
88Mao Tse-tung, Guerrilla Warfare, translated by 
Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961). Mao did not 
formulate a stage theory in explicit terms; explication has 
come from interpretations of Mao's works and military prac-
tice. See John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary 
!!! (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), pp. 50-73. 
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. t. 89 
of military campaigns against neighboring soc1e 1es. 
The later imposition of colonial rule was frequently met by 
violent resistance from these warrior elites and by others 
who refused allegiance to European rule. Although this 
resistance did not prevent the imposition of colonial rule, 
colonial history was also punctuated by violent episodes 
aimed at the overthrow of colonial regimes and pacification 
90 
campaigns to counter such attempts. In the period between 
1955 and 1965 virtually all African colonies acquired inde-
pendence. With a few exceptions, the achievement of inde-
pendence however was a relatively peaceful affair, conducted 
by political parties. 91 
In the period since 1965 the political leaders and 
parties of independent African states have been challenged 
89 See, for example, Eugene V. Walter, Terror and 
Resistance (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); and 
Adda B. Bozeman, Conflict in Africa (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976). 
90opposition to the imposition of colonial rule is 
often called "primary resistance". Later attempts to over-
throw colonial rule took many forms. See Robert I. Rotberg 
and Ali A. Mazrui, eds. Protest and Power in Black Africa 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 3-142. 
91There is growing opposition to using such broad 
categories as "Third World", "non-Western world" or even 
"African Conflict" because they contain many diverse com-
ponents despite geographic proximity. When the term African 
Revolutions is here used, it refers primarily to sub-Saharan 
Africa or Black Africa. Of the Islamic African countries and 
revolutions in them, .only Algeria is included, because of its 
similarity to the other settler colonies of Africa. 
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by the military, leading to a rash of military coups, several 
of which were marked by violence. 92 Independent African 
states have also been confronted by army mutinies (such as 
those in Tanzania and the former Congo-Kinshasa), attempted 
secessions (like that of Katanga from Congo-Kinshasa and 
Biafra from Nigeria), civil wars (Chad and the Sudan), vio-
lent border disputes (for example, between Somalia and Kenya), 
violent clashes over disputed territories (such as Western 
Sahara), and interstate wars (between Uganda and Tanzania). 93 
Despite the contention that Western social science theory 
does not apply to African forms of conflict, 94 this wide 
92
on the role of the military establishment in African 
politics, see William F. Gutteridge, The Military in African 
Politics (London: Methuen, 1969); and J. M. Lee, African 
Armies and Civil Order (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969). 
On coups, see Samuel Decalo, Coups and Ar·my Rule in Africa: 
Studies in Military Style (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1976). 
93
see William Eckhardt and Edward Azar, "Major Con-
flicts and Interventions, 1945-1975," International Inter-
actions 5 (1978): 75-110; Mohammed Ayoob, ed., Conflict and 
Intervention in the Third World (London: St. Martin's Press, 
1980); Robert F. Gorman Political Conflict in the Horn of 
Africa (New York: Praeger Press, 1981); and Aristide Zol-
berg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States 
of Africa," American Political Science Review 62 (March 
1968): 70-87. 
94 Bozeman, p. 219. While Bozeman's argument is that 
Western social science is inapplicable to African conflict 
because Africans' mental view and social practice of conflict 
is radically un-Western, others have criticized Western social 
science theory on the grounds of its counter-revolutionary, 
bourgeois, dogmatic, and superficial nature. This has led 
many scholars to amend and supplant Western scientific theories 
and concepts. For a review, see Peter Waterman, "On Radicalism 
In African Studies," Politics and Society 3 (Spring 1973): 261-
281. 
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range of violent phenomena in Africa have been studied from 
a variety of scholarly perspectives, including relative 
deprivation theory, mobilization theory, class analysis·, 
civil-military relations, pluralism, race relations and 
95 
culture. Causal questions tend to dominate these theo-
retical explanations, with less attention paid to the course 
95For explanations using concepts related to the study 
of civil-military interaction, see Claude Welch, ed., Sol-
dier and State in Africa (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970); and Decalo. Class analyses is found 
in, for example, Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African 
Reich (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969) and Samir Amin, 
Unequal Development: An Essay in the Social Formations of 
Peripheral Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977) 
Probably the best use of pluralism is contained in Leo Kuper 
and M. G. Smith, eds., Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley, Cali-
fornia: University of California Press, 1969). The relative 
deprivation explanation is widely used. For criticism of 
this view, see Nkemdirim, who points out that the relation 
between relative deprivation and political violence in Africa 
is neither close nor consistent. Bernard A. Nkemdirim "Re-
flections on Political Conflict, Rebellion and Revolution in 
Africa" Journal of Modern African Studies 15 (March 1977): 75-
90. Lofchie stresses the role of organizational forms and 
resources, powershifts and the reaction of the regime to chal-
lenge as more critical factors. See Michael F. Lofchie 
Zanzibar: Background to Revolution (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1965). In a study of the Mau Mau Emergency 
Berman also points to the importance of the regime's response 
to challenge, and the structural determinants of that response. 
See Bruce J. Berman, "Bureaucracy and Incumbent Violence: 
Colonial Administration and the Origins of the 'Mau Mau' 
Emergency in Kenya," British Journal of Political Science 6 
April 1976): 143-175. The factors of race are usually the 
centerpiece of studies on South Africa. Racial factors are 
also stressed in countries containing a population of both 
black and Arab Africans. See M. 0. Beshir , The Southern Sudan: 
Background to Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1968) and Victor 
Olorunsola, ed., The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in 
Africa (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1972). For criti-
cism of the view that ethnic diversity is strongly related to 
Political instability, see Walter L. Barrows, "Ethnic Diver-
sity and Political Instability in Black Africa," Comparative 
~olitical Studies 9 (July 1976): 139-170. For mobilization 
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or outcomes of episodes of violent conflict. A notable ex-
ception in the latter regard is the well-developed debate 
about the consequences of military coups. 96 
Although various forms of conflict occur in Africa, 
few of these violent occurnmces are described as revolutions. 
The term revolution is nevertheless often used to describe 
events in Algeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Angola, the former 
Portugese territory of Guinea, Zanzibar, Namibia, Zimbabwe 
and South Africa. 97 Since conditions commonly associated 
with violence are prevalent in Africa, this raises the ques-
tion of why some African societies are revolution-prone while 
others are merely conflict-prone. 
theory, see Huntington and Raymond Duvall and M. Welfling, 
"Social Mobilization, Political Institutionalization and 
Conflict in Black Africa," Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 
(December 1973): 673-702. 
96F . . . t . th. d H or oppos1ng v1ewpo1n s 1n 1s regar , see enry 
Bienen, ed., The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in 
Political Development (New York: Russel Sage, 1968); R. D. 
McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, "A Comparative analysis of the 
political and economic performance of military and civilian 
regimes," Comparative Politics 8 (1975): 1-10; and Huntington, 
pp. 192-263. 
97The inclusion of Namibia and South Africa should be 
qualified. In the case of Namibia, the issue of decoloniza-
tion as an international-legal matter, as well as the geo-
graphic concentration of guerrilla attacks and South Africa's 
Presence, makes it difficult to view the occurrences there 
simply as a revolution-in-progress. In the case of South 
Africa, it is widely accepted that the preconditions for 
revolution exist, but that the course of the revolution has 
not entered a phase of intense and widespread violence. Some 
have even argued that it is unlikely to enter such a phase. 
See Russel. 
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If the term revolution is used in the sense of wide-
d d . . 1 98 . t . t h h sprea an 1ntense v1o ence, 1 1s easy o see w y t e 
occurrences listed above are described as revolutionary. All 
the societies mentioned share a history of settler colonial-
ism, characterized by the presence of substantial numbers of 
whites and by the political self-government exercised by 
those whites·in colonial territories. This monopoly of state 
power and influence led to certain socio-economic changes as 
we11. 99 Although Zanzibar varies from this pattern in some 
respects, it also was governed by an ethnically distinct 
. . t h 1" d t t d . . t 1 100 m1nor1 y w o monopo 1ze s a e an soc1o-econom1c con ro . 
These entrenched minorities 
have been formidable adversaries resisting claims for 
equality or self-government. Constraints that inhibit 
a more powerful metropolitan power's employment of force 
are virtually absent in the case of a settler regime. 
For settlers, the issue is not whether to fight, but how. 101 
Legum indeed has argued that the degree of violent resistance 
to majority rule depends on two variables, namely the size of 
the white population and their degree of economic and political 
98 Gurr, WMR, p. 11. 
99For the development of the idea of settler colonial-
ism, see Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism: Economic Develop-
ment and Class Formation," Journal of -Modern African Studies 14 
(December 1976): 59.7-620. 
100 See Lofchie. 
101Kenneth w. Grundy, "Black Soldiers in a White_ Military: 
Political Change in South Africa," The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 4 (September 1981): 296. See also Andrew J.R. Mack, 
"Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 
Conflict," World Politics 27 (January 1975): 191. 
102 
control. 
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Yet there are other scholars who argue that change is 
the definitive property of revolutions, entailing qualitative 
socio-economic and political changes. The use of these 
theories to describe revolutions and potential revolutions 
in Africa has led to disagreement. One school of thought holds 
that the requisite causal socio-economic and other changes 
have taken place, but that there are several conditions which 
discourage concerted action by revolutionaries. Tribal and 
regional animosities are cited, for example. Here the 
existence of primordial attachments in urban and rural areas 
make it difficult for revolutionaries to form a united 
front. 103 Another critical obstacle to revolutionaries' 
concerted action is the repressive capabilities of the regime 
in power. By effectively using the military and police estab-
lishments the regime manages to prevent opposition movements 
f d 1 . t 1 t. t. 104 Th . t rom eve op1ng o revo u 1onary propor 1ons. e ex1s ence 
102
colin Legum, "Looking to the Future" in Gwendolen 
M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., Southern Africa in Crisis 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977), 
pp. 258-259. 
103Richard Gibson African Liberation Movements (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1972). 
104
see, for example, B. F. Jundaian, "Resettlement Pro-
grams: Counterinsurgency in Mozambique," Comparative Politics 6 
(July 1974): 519-540; and Gerald J. Bender, "The Limits of 
Counterinsurgency: An African Case," Comparative Politics 4 
(April 1972): 331-360. The repressive actions of the regime, 
however, are often also seen as causing further violence and 
rebelliousness. See Donald Barnett and Karari Njama, Mau Mau 
!rom Within: Autobiography and Analysis of Kenya's Peasant 
Revolt (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1968). 
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of these domestic obstacles to revolutionary action is com-
plemented by international obstacles. Pirouet, for example, 
notes that the success or failure of revolutions in Africa 
is determined not by why and how they occur, but by when. 
The historical timing of revolutions is critical, because it 
is related to the possibility of outside support. States 
that achieved independence before 1965 are now all members 
of the Organization for African Unity which, except for the 
case of white minority-ruled states, accords basic regime 
legitimacy to the governments of fellow member-states of the 
OAU. Thus opposition movements in black-ruled states are 
105 denied legitimacy and support. 
Another school of thought holds that the requisite 
socio-economic, psycho-cultural political changes to cause 
revolutions in most African states have not taken place. 
Bozeman stresses the requisite psycho-cultural dispositions, 
arguing that a promethean "inner order" is absent. The form 
and frequency of African conflict is in fact not a result of 
deprivations, but of resilient traditional perceptions of the 
positive value of conflict and war. This results in curious 
paradox. Africans are comfortable with conflict, even of the 
protracted kind, but have thus far failed to adopt views of the 
Progressive value of certain forms of change and violence. 106 
105p. t 1roue , pp. 197-198. 
106 Bozeman, p. 371. 
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Another explanation states that although there are sufficient 
degrees of deprivation, governmental powers have increased. 
Since a critical administrative crisis is absent, the regime 
manages to at least postpone a revolution. An example of this 
situation is the South African regime's ability to keep its 
armed forces intact and under centralized contro1. 107 
Marxian analysts stress the absence of the requisite class 
development, either with regard to urban classes or to peasants. 
With regard to urban classes, scholars argue that a revolu-
tion is unlikely until urban workers, particularly those in 
heavy industries, have developed the requisite class con-
sciousness. The absence of industrialization, tribal and 
regional animosities, and other factors however discourage 
the political ascendance of an urban class-for-itself. 108 
The question whether the peasantry of African states 
have revolutionary potential is a controversial subject. On 
the one hand, scholars like Chaliand argue that the African 
peasantry does not have revolutionary potential. There are 
several reasons for this situation. With the exception of 
West African states, Chaliand argues, there are no land-related 
Pressures on peasants. The abundance of land, low population 
107
see Russel. 
108
see Kenneth W. Grundy, "The 'Class Struggle' in 
Africa: An Examination of Conflicting Theories," Journal of 
Modern African Studies 2 (October 1964): 379-393. 
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density, the fac.t that the land permits a subsistence economy 
and that ownership is allowed, and the absence of plantations 
collectively produce few demands for agrarian reform. Work-
relationships in the agrarian areas, moreover, are paternalis-
tic and hierarchical. Subjective conditions reinforce this 
lack of revolutionary potential. African peasants' worldview 
is characterized by magico-religious beliefs, ignorance, a 
passive acceptance of authority, and a lack of self-direction 
and initiative. A new rationality is required, stressing 
secular, optimistic and promethean views, but the elites of 
Africa have failed to do so. Leadership is drawn from the 
ranks of bourgeois classes and have shown themselves to be 
self-indulgent and complacent. Although the leadership lacks 
the appetite for a "real" struggle, they do lead ostensibly 
revolutionary movements, which are then characterized by 
mechanical strategic thinking, overreliance on foreign aid 
and external bases, intra-factional struggles, and abstract 
and unrealistic verbalization. This combination of revolution-
by-exile and liberation-in-speech condemns the movements to 
109 political powerlessness. 
On the other hand there are those who argue that at 
least certain portions of the peasantry in African states do 
109Gerard Chaliand, Armed Struggle in Africa, trans-
lated by David Rattray and Robert Leonhardt with an introduction 
by Basil Davidson (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 
Pp. 101-125 and Chaliand, Revolution in the Third World: Myths 
lTd Prospects, with an introduction by Immanuel Wallerstein 
Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1977). 
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have revolutionary potential. In his study of Algeria, Wolf 
states that peasants suffer from the impact of three crises. 
First, population increases and the restriction of the avail-
able land produces a demographic crisis. Second, there is an 
ecological crisis which threatens the security of peasants, 
because the introduction of colonial and capitalist notions 
and practices transform the previously secure resources of 
peasants into market commodities. Although such apsects as 
private property may increase the opportunities of peasants, 
other aspects like taxes, rent and land-seizures and-restric-
tions threaten peasants' security. Third, changed notions of 
authority produce a crisis. Whereas previous rural power-
holders exercised substantial power over the distribution of 
goods, colonial practices turn them into powerless bureau-
crats unable to oppose, for example, the redistribution of 
land. A political gap between the rulers and ruled con-
tl . t 110 sequen y ex1s s. 
Although all peasants are subject to these three crises, 
it is the middle peasants who are most likely to participate 
in uprisings, that is, those with landholdings and some free-
dom from immediate political control. Rich or landless 
peasants may also come to participate in uprisings, but only 
if the particular revolutionary organization can challenge 
~ 10wolf, "Peasant Rebellion and Revolution" in Miller 
and Aya, pp. 49-66. 
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the power of local rulers. Thus virtually all peasants can 
participate in popular uprisings; it is simply that middle 
111 peasants are the first to do so. Peasant uprisings, how-
ever, are not always revolutionary events, as witnessed by 
the jacqueries of the middle ages. Here Wolf stresses that 
the organizational changes wrought by the three crises also 
result in the·adoption of a new worldview, as well as the 
role of "middlemen" or marginal elites to cultivate such a 
. 112 
worldv1ew. 
Since the peasantry are not self-led, Wolf notes, their 
role ultimately is a tragic one. They may cause the old 
order to collapse, but rarely gain political influence in the 
new order. Yet they are at least capable of playing a key 
role in the collapse of the old order. Tribal and regional 
· influences do not prevent this political role; in fact, 
ethnic and regional distinctions may contribute to the 
solidarity of peasant uprisings. 113 
Paige is in broad agreement with Wolf about the revolu-
~ionary potential of peasants in Africa, but argues that it 
is landless peasants who will participate in revolutionary 
movements. This view is derived from a theory of rural class 
conflict which holds that rurally-based movements "are 
111Ibid.' pp. 54:...55. 
112Ibid., pp. 59-66. 
113
wolf, Peasant Wars, pp. 293-294. 
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fundamentally a result of the interaction between the 
political behavior associated with the principal source of 
income of the upper and lower agricultural classes."114 · 
Revolutions are likely when the upper agricultural class is 
dependent on income from land and the lower agricultural 
classes are dependent on wages earned from labor on that land. 
A combination·of these income types and the political behaviors 
associated with them are found in migratory labor estate 
systems, and are characterized by the demands for land redis-
tribution, the tactic of guerrilla war and nationalism as a 
t .d 1 115 dominan 1 eo ogy. 
With regard to tfrica, Paige notes that migratory 
labor estate systems are found in the settler colonies of 
Algeria, Kenya and Angola. Here the political behavior of 
the upper agricultural class (i.e. settlers) was predicated 
on the need to secure necessary landownership and the labor 
needed to cultivate that land. In Kenya, for example, these 
needs were satisfied: 
large-scale land concessions were granted to British 
settlers, and members of the indigenous population unfor-
tunate enough to live on the settlers' new lands were 
declared to be squatters and moved to 'native reserves' 
on inferior land ••• the hut tax, the poll tax, and direct 
conscription were all used to satisfy the settlers' 
demand for labour ••• the tactics created a disenfranchised, 
Politically powerless agricultural labor force which was 
paid almost nothing.ll6 
ll4p . 
a1ge, p. 7D. 
115Ibid., p. 71 
116Ibid., p. 67. 
~3 
Since the agricultural labor force migrates between the estate 
and the traditional subsistence sector (which has been re-
served for the labor force), they are incapable of generating 
workers' organization. The organizational framework and ideo-
logy is provided by traditional elites in the subsistence 
sector, who are threatened by the expanding land claims of 
the upper agricultural class. Thus the combination of land-
less migratory labourers and landholding - but threatened -
traditional elites form the basis of the revolutionary up-
. 117 
ris1ng. 
Thus the debate about the revolutionary potential of 
the peasantry in African states seems to turn on the question 
whether land-related pressures are present or absent. There 
is further agreement that such land-related pressures exist 
in West Africa (according to Chaliand) and in the settler 
colonies (Wolf and Paige). There is disagreement, however, 
about the nature of land-related pressures and, consequently, 
which types of peasants are most likely to engage in revolu-
tionary uprisings. 
The preceding discussion illustrates that the resolution 
of the question why some African states are revolution-prone 
117Ibid., pp. 66-71 and 211-277. For other contribu-
tions to the debate about the political role of the peasantry 
in Africa, see Govan Mbeki, The Peasants Revolt (London: 
Penguin Books, 1964); Colin Leys, "Politics in Kenya: The 
Development of Peasant Society," British Journal of Political 
Science 1 (July 1971) and B. P. Singh, "The Philosophic Founda-
tions of Mao's Peasant Communism," Indian Journal of Political 
§;udies 1 (1977): 59-70. 
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while others are merely conflict-prone depends on the par-
ticular conception of revolution. In turn conceptions result 
in particular views and debates about the course and causes 
of African revolutions. With regard to the outcomes of Afri-
can revolutions, the influence of particular conceptions is 
also evident. 
When conflict is seen as the definitive property of 
revolutions, it has been argued that, provided the level of 
violence does not become too high, internal war can stimulate 
the political development of a developing country. Popper, 
for example, states that internal war can have five conse-
quences. First, it disorganizes traditional structures such 
as rural villages, tribes, families, castes and landed classes 
which by being uprooted, are compelled to aid developmental 
efforts. If the level of violence is too high and the vil-
lage is destroyed in the process, however, the outcome is 
counter-productive. Second, internal war creates new develop-
mental social structures like cities and urban classes and 
compels the centralization of the existing structures. This 
advances the cause of political centralization and the trans-
fer of loyalties to the nation (as opposed to parochial 
loyalties to subnational groupings). Third, internal war may 
stimulate new political structures and centralize existing 
structures, particularly the civil service, political parties 
and security organizations. Fourth, internal war may add to 
the country's technological resources. Although initially 
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used to conduct war, these resources like those in the trans-
portation and communication fields, may later be transferred 
to peaceful uses. Finally, internal war may have secondary 
effects in that propaganda, for example, may later allow the 
leadership to proselytize the nation. 118 
Popper then correlates the use of certain counter-
insurgent strategies with the outcomes of internal wars. A 
scorched earth policy, for example, does result in population 
displacement and their migration to cities, but this a counter-
productive urbanization because the cities cannot accommodate 
large numbers of refugees. Slums are the result. Strategies 
of rural relocation can also be counter-productive, if the 
population is forcibly relocated, but may stimulate develop-
ment if the population participates in the decision-making 
on where they should be relocated. Reprisals by the government 
and terrorist tactics by the revolutionaries can also have a 
developmental effect: reprisals create shared suffering which 
may aid the cause of nation-building, while selectively used 
119 terror may weaken an unpopular opponent. 
The critical indicator in this analysis thus is the 
level of violence, although some attention is paid to the 
creation of groups, and it is clear that the notion of develop-
ment is used as a synonym for Westernization. Examples of 
118Frank J. Popper, "Internal War as a Stimulant of 
Political Development," Comparative Political Studies 3 (Janu-
ary 1971) 415-417. 
119Ibid., pp. 418-422. 
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cases in Africa where the level of violence became too high 
are the Biafran and Algerian internal wars. 120 
When change is seen as the definitive property of· 
revolutions, outcomes again are seen as the consequences of 
events during the causal and course-phases of the revolution. 
Chaliand, for example, holds that the changes resulting from 
most African .. revolutions are superficial or "political", such 
as the control over a nation's resources, some industrializa-
tion, and the strengthening of the state's bureaucratic com-
ponent. Land reform programs, however, are typically neglected. 
The reasons for the superficiality of change are that grass-
roots mobilization of peasants did not take place during the 
revolution (leaving peasants with an unchanged and unpromethean 
worldview) and that the leadership spawned by the revolution 
lacks the self-denying ideological firmness to perform the 
necessary tasks. The leadership was animated largely by 
wounded racial and national pride and fought to recapture 
racial and national identity, but the exaltation of national 
identity and other appeals to the nation's supposed solidarity 
do not remove more fundamental socio-economic cleavages. 121 
As indicated before, the view that African revolutions 
result in more - and unimportant - political changes than in 
fundamental socio-economic changes is not uncommon. 
120 Ibid. 
121
chaliand, Revolution in the Third World: Myths and 
~respects, pp. 28-30, 70-74 and 109-117. 
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The reasons tend to be of two varieties: either the condi-
tions for the ascendance of a particular class are absent, or 
the leadership produced by the revolution lacks ideological 
firmness (i.e. they lack "will"). This raises two questions: 
Are political122 changes unimportant and Do revolutionary 
outcomes depend on class ascendance or willful revolutionaries? 
With regard to the importance of political changes, 
it has been argued that they at least should not be under-
estimated. Kornhauser argues, for example, that revolutions 
emanate from certain structures of authority and that their 
outcomes change those structures of authority in negative or 
positive ways. Here there are four types: A revolution 
seeking to overthrow an alien or foreign authority may result 
in the achievement of political independence and the develop-
ment of a political community, or it may merely result in the 
escape of alien authority. When a revolution seeks to 
strengthen a weak authority (i.e. a state with ineffective 
and fragmented administrative machinery) it may result in the 
strengthening of that state's administrative machinery or fail 
to do so. Revolutions emanating from the exercise of arbitrary 
authority may result in the establishment of constitutional 
122It was pointed out earlier that distinctions between 
"political" and "socio-economic" changes should not be over-
drawn. When the term political is used in this section, it 
refers to formal aspects of political life, such as legal 
Stipulations of citizenship, constitutions, the bureaucracy, 
the executive-legislative arrangements, the judiciary or formal 
relationships between them. 
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government or simply redress certain grievances. Finally, a 
revolution which results from exclusive structures of authority 
may result in the extension of common political rights or may 
123 
merely grant special privileges to select groups. 
Skocpof also argues that political factors are no less 
important than socio-economic factors. Noting that there are 
major socio-economic changes that result from revolutions, 
she states: 
Equally if not more striking, however, are the changes 
that social revolutions make in the structure and function 
of states, in the political and administrative processes 
by which government leaders relate to groups in society, 
and in the tasks that states can successfully undertake 
at home and abroad. Nor are such changes in the 'state 
order' at all mere by-products of the changes in the 
social order. Indeed, to a significant degree, it is the 
other way around.l24 
The political changes resulting from the Russian and Chinese 
revolutions, for example, led to socio-economic changes. 
Here the revolutions brought parties to power which, by using 
state administrative power, sanctioned attacks on certain 
propertied classes and took over many economic functions pre-
viously performed by those classes. 125 
123
william Kornhauser, "Rebellion and Political Develop-
ment" in Eckstein, Internal War, pp. 142-155. 
124 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, p. 164. 
125Ibid. 
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Are revolutionary outcomes the result of class interests 
or the will of revolutionary elites? As indicated earlier, 
outcome-oriented analysts contest the importance of clas·s 
interests and willful revolutionaries. Yet they have stressed 
that the use of outcome-oriented analysis should not be 
mechanical. In using the analysis in African revolutions, 
for example, the analyst should be forewarned that African 
states have a history marked by colonialism, are small coun-
tries, and are in highly vulnerable positions in the inter-
national market economy. It should also be noted that many 
African states have strong military and police establishments 
with well-developed repressive capabilities, which make 
African revolutions less likely than when the state has 
poorly developed coercive instruments. If revolutionary vio-
lence is initiated, the conflict initially will be highly 
. 1 126 asymmet.r1ca . 
5. Structural Analysis and African Revolutions 
The preceding discussion pointed out that, although 
there are disagreements about how the term revolution should 
be defined, there is agreement among scholars that revolutions 
involve conflict and progressive change. It is common for 
analysts to place revolutions under the more general categories 
of violence and change, thereby bifurcating revolutionary 
126Ibid., pp. 288-290. 
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scholarship, but most analyses view revolution nevertheless 
neither as an ''extreme case of violence" or as an "extreme 
case of change." Most analyses- either implicitly or ex-
plicitly - produce a conception of revolution that is multi-
dimensional, thereby casting doubt on the possibility of any 
one theory's ability to capture the full meaning of revolution. 
With regard to the causes of revolutions, structural 
analyses argue that states contain many elites. A revolu-
tionary situation is created when a state elite (i.e. elites 
attached to the state's central political machinery or its 
bureaucracy), typically under the pressure of internal forces 
like interstate wars or competition of other states in the 
world capitalist economy, encounter opposition from agrarian 
elites opposed to the state elite's modernizing efforts. 
Normal tensions between a country's elites exist, but when 
state elites under the pressure of war want to modernize 
socio-economic practices, centralize the distribution of 
societal resources, or increase its share of production, and 
these efforts are opposed by rural elites on whose political 
support the state elites are dependent, the state's adminis-
tration is incapacitated. 
A revolutionary situation produced by elite conflict 
and resultant bureaucratic incapacitation does not necessarily 
lead to revolution. The state elites may be able to insti-
tute a "revolution from above," i.e. manage to reform the 
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state's political machinery and institute changes in its 
dominant socio-economic forms. Yet even failure to do so 
does not necessitate a revolution. A revolution occurs when 
the incapacitation of the state's central political machinery 
coincides with a popular, usually rural or peasant revolt. 
These rural revolts are unlike the peasant jacqueries of the 
medieval period, because of the influence of the forces of 
modernity on thought patterns and forms of organization. 
There is disagreement, however, on which peasants are most 
likely to participate in revolutionary uprisings: some argue 
that peasants' political independence (or at least a degree 
of it) is critical, while others argue that landholdings are 
critical. Another school of thought argues that it is the 
combination of certain forms of wage labour with certain forms 
of ownership that is crucial to determine not only the likeli-
hood of a peasant revolt, but also the type of goals that the 
revolutionary movememt will adopt. 
Thus the course of revolutions is characterized by 
peasant revolts. The course is also marked by the development 
of a revolutionary coalition. Here most structural analysts 
argue that peasants do not constitute a self-liberating class, 
but forge political links with marginal elites from which 
the revolutionary leadership is drawn. The links between 
followers and elites are most visible in the organizations that 
the revolutionary movement generates. Revolutionary organiza-
tions tend to be of two types, namely the military organization 
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(or army) and the para-military party which, moreover, show 
different patterns of civil-military interaction within them-
selves. Although outcome-oriented analyses note that revolu-
tionary organizations also generate an ideology, which tends 
to be a brand of radical nationalism, the role of ideology 
generally is de-emphasized. Ideology is seen as an organiza-
tional resou~~e. More important are the organizations that 
are generated, because they influence outcomes. 
Along with the conditions conducive to peasant revolts, 
structural analysts stress the importance of the response by 
the state to revolutionary challenge. Of particular import-
ance is the regime's ability to use coercion effectively and, 
equally critical, to maintain cohesion of and centralized 
control over its armed forces. The response of the regime 
is also important in two other respects: although its response 
is mainly aimed at maintaining itself (or suppressing the 
revolutionary group), that response may initiate long-lasting 
socio-economic changes; and regime response determines the 
immediate outcome of the conflict. With regard to the immedi-
ate outcomes, it is pointed out that a redistribution of power 
among contending groups occurs, but that clearcut victories 
and losses are rare, especially in revolutions marked by the 
use of guerrilla warfare. Most endings of revolutions witness 
a "carry over" from the old regime: old regime personnel are 
Still ensconced in bureaucratic and other governmental posi-
tions, the state of industrial development may not be 
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significantly altered, and rural elites may still be powerful. 
In assessing outcomes, the analyst should thus be fore-
warned not to expect the complete dismantling of the old 
regime and the constructing of the new order. Broadly speak-
ing, outcomes are the product of preceding political and socio-
economic forces during the causal and course-phases of the 
revolution. The influences of these preceding events manifest 
themselves as constraints on the policy-making of the "new" 
elite. Here it is important to note the constraining influ-
ence of international pressures; these triggered the revolu-
tion in the first place, but continue to constrain the policy-
making options of the new regime. Another constraint is the 
remnants of the old regime in respect to bureaucrats, industrial 
development, and the political and socio-economic power of 
rural elites. Finally, the regime is constrained by the very 
nature of the new elite, which has a particular political 
style, organization and organizational resources, and support 
groups. 
Thus structural analyses have views of the causes, 
course and consequences that distinguishes them from analyses 
stressing that revolutions are fundamentally the product of 
class ascendance or the product of willful revolutionaries 
Who want to reorder society in order to remove the conditions 
of relative deprivation. One of the most useful characteris-
tics of structural analyses is that it seeks an understanding 
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of all phases of the revolutionary process, particularly in 
linking causes and consequences. Another positive feature is 
that it has collapsed the distinctions many scholars estab-
lished between the "Great" and contemporary revolutions. Yet 
the range of cases included in structural analyses is still 
rather limited. 
With regard to revolutions in Africa, there is usually 
agreement that although there are many conditions causing con-
flict, revolutions have occurred or are in progress in settler 
colonies or areas marked by the substantial presence and self-
government of whites. There is disagreement, however, about 
the appropriate theoretical perspective used in order to 
explain these revolutions. Theoretical choices tend to be of 
two varieties, namely the relative deprivation thesis and 
theories stressing political structures of inequality. Dis-
agreement also extends to the course of revolutions, particu-
larly when it concerns the revolutionary potential of the 
peasantry in Africa. Even those who argue that this peasantry 
does have revolutionary potential disagree on why they do so. 
When revolutions do occur in Africa, differences in 
the views of why they occur and how they proceed lead to dif-
ferences in their outcomes. Here some scholars argue that 
African revolutions' outcomes bring about many political 
changes, but there is disagreement whether such political 
changes are important in the development of societies. 
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structural analysts usually argue that political changes 
are critical •. Other scholars note that African revolu-
tions do not bring about the more important socio-economic 
changes, even if a condition of war may, by itself, produce 
certain changes, because the conditions necessary for impor-
tant socio-economic change (class formation and willful revolu-
tionary elites) are lacking. 
Structural analysts warn that the application of their 
theoretical conceptions should not be mechanical; they should be 
sensitive to debates among analysts themselves, as well as 
to disagreements within certain area studies. In applying 
their theoretical conception to an African case the analyses 
should therefore be especially concerned with, one, the impact 
of a history of colonialism and longstanding position of vul-
nerability in the international capitalist economy and, two, 
the ability of some African states to generate strong coercive 
instruments. Both sets of factors are likely to influence 
the causes of African revolutions (i.e. the nature of the 
crisis of the regime), its course (the conditions for peasant 
revolt and the response of the regime to challenge), and its 
consequences (the conditions constraining the new regime). 
6. The Plan of This Study 
This study, then, views revolution as a form of change 
that simultaneously affects several dimensions of society in 
a fundamental and progressi~e manner and which, while it may 
last over a period of decades, culminates in a violent 
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struggle for political control. With this working definition 
as a point of departure, the subsequent analysis follows the 
structural approach. Several scholars, such as Eisenst•dt, 
Paige, Wolf and especially Skocpol were grouped under this 
approach. The structuralists emphasize the patterns of rela-
tionships among groups or societies which, broadly speaking, 
consist of the coincidence of a crisis in the government or 
state power with a popular revolt by peasants, here simply 
seen as rural dwellers. In the Zimbabwean case this requires 
an examination of the emerging crisis within successive Zim-
babwean regimes between 1888 and 1965, the conditions of black 
political action in roughly the same period, the subsequent 
struggle for power, and a discussion of the ending of the con-
flict. 
With regard to the political crisis, the state pri-
marily is seen as a bureaucratic entity. This entity may be 
closely related to powerful socio-economic groups or may 
operate independently of them. When the state is pressured, 
most often from external sources, it may or may not attempt 
to institute reforms. Should the state attempt reforms, the 
ability to do so successfully requires financial resources and 
political support. These the state may receive. However, 
the reforms may engender a reaction, most likely from powerful 
rural groups; if these groups deny the state of financial 
resources and political support, the state is in a crisis 
condition. 
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The next chapter, chapter 2, examines whether the Zim-
babwean government was by 1965 in a condition of crisis. 
Zimbabwean history from 1888 to 1965 is explored in an effort 
to determine the role of the whites and their relation to the 
state and the economy as well as to external pressures. 
With regard to the popular revolt of rural dwellers, 
the focus of the analysis is on their political awakening 
and their willingness to engage in popular action. Here the 
analysis is sensitive to the debate about which peasants are 
most prone to revolutionary action, those who have solidarity, 
autonomy and are temporarily free from regime repression 
(Skocpol), those who have tactical freedom (Wolf's "middle 
peasants"), or those who are landless. Popular action is 
analyzed not as the spontaneous ascent of a particular class 
but as activity that is encouraged and led by elites, who 
create organizations and coalitions for that purpose. The 
focus on popular action is complemented by an analysis of 
the state's reaction to it, particularly the state's repres-
sive capabilities. 
The political awakening and action of the rural dwellers 
(or peasants) in Zimbabwe, and the state's reaction to their 
activity, is discussed in chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 
examines the black political activity and the conditions of 
black political activity in Zimbabwe between 1888 and 1962 
to identify emerging elites, organizational forms, the influ-
ence of socio-economic considerations, and the effect of state 
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repression. Chapter 4 analyzes the struggle for power 
between 1962 and 1979 in order to determine the nature and 
effectiveness of black collective action, the organizational 
forms generated by the struggle, the key characteristics of 
the black nationalist elite, identifies the categories of 
rural dwellers most active in the struggle, and the nature 
and effectiveness of the state's reaction. 
The discussion of the end of the revolutionary conflict 
focuses on the conditions under which the new regime assumed 
power. Of particular importance, the study in chapter 5 
seeks to identify the constraints under which the new regime 
operates. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the study. Here the analysis 
draws conclusions and discusses the theoretical implications 
of the Zimbabwean case both for the study of African revolu-
tions in particular and for the study of revolutions in 
general. Finally, the implications of the Zimbabwean case 
for the structural approach is assessed. 
CHAPTER II 
ZIMBABWE 1888 - 1965: 
THE EMERGENCE OF A POLITICAL CRISIS 
This chapter examines the history of Zimbabwe since 
the granting of the Rudd Concession in 1888. It seeks to 
identify and explain the nature and causes of the political 
crisis that beset the Zimbabwean government in the years 
prior to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 
November 11, 1965. The nature of the political crisis, it 
is submitted, was a product of the nature of white Zimbabwean 
society and its relation to, on the one hand, the economy 
and, on the other hand, the state, as well as to international 
pressures. The subsequent discussion therefore focuses on -
in order - the relation of white society to state power, the 
pre-1945 economy, foreign economic and political pressure, 
and the 1960-1962 governmental crisis respectively. Before 
turning to these matters, a brief outline of the major geo-
physical features of Zimbabwe and a short historical overview 
is presented. 
1. Major Geo-Physical Data 
Zimbabwe is a landlocked state with territory amounting 
to 390,608.72 square kilometers. It borders on Zambia in the 
North, Mozambique in the east, South Africa in the south, 
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and Botswana in the west. The center of Zimbabwe is its 
extensive highveld area which averages above 1219.2m elevation, 
sloping northward to the Zambezi river and Lake Kariba, and 
southward to the Limpopo and Sabi Rivers. In the southern 
border regions, the elevation is about 609.6 meters. The 
highest area in Zimbabwe is in the mountains in the eastern 
border region. The climate is subtropical, with an extensive 
dry season in winter (May to August) and a rainy summer season 
(November to March). 1 
In 1974 the population was estimated at 6 million, with 
whites accounting for 4.5 percent, blacks for 95 percent, and 
Asians and Coloureds (persons of mixed racial origin) for the 
remaining 0.5 percent. Whites are of South African, British, 
or continental European ancestry, while blacks belong to 
Shona.group (the Mashona) or the Ndebele group (the Matabele). 
The population groups speak English, Afrikaans, Shona, 
Ndebele or Fanogalo (a pidgin of black and white languages). 2 
Since Zimbabwe is landlocked it depends on Mozambican 
and South AfrL~an ports and railways. The railway gauge is 
the standard South African width of about 1.1 meter. Until 
1970 the currency was the Rhodesian pound (about US $2.80 in 
1970), but since then Rhodesian dollars have been used 
\ 
1 Harold D. Nelson (et al.) Area Handbook for Southern 
Rhodesia, first edition (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1975), p. vii, see Table I. 
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3 (about US $1.52 after 1971). 
2. Historical Overview 
Although the area today known as Zimbabwe was not 
entirely devoid of population before 300 AD, increasing numbers 
of southward-migrating blacks began to enter the area after 
this time. By approximately 1,000 AD a Rozwi group of people 
arrived in the area, assimilated with the local population, 
and developed into a Shona-speaking dynasty that lasted to 
about the mid-fourteenth century. The Rozwi Empire gave way, 
after the arrival of the Karanga group, to the Mutapa Empire 
which incorporated various Shona-speaking groups united by 
the royal house and the royal-religious cult of the Mwari. 
By the time of the Portu~se arrival in southeast Africa in 
the sixteenth century, the Mutapa Empire had suffered con-
siderable local challenge and disintegration and was geo-
graphically reduced to the northeastern part of Zimbabwe. 
These remnants were then incorporated in the Changamire or 
Rozwi Mambo Empire but by the early 1800s this empire also 
declined. Yet these successive empires established the pre-
dominantly agriculturalist Shona-speaking group as the 
2 Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. ix. 
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4 dominant population group in the area. 
The Mashona's political pre-eminence in Zimbabwe was 
challenged in the first half of the nineteenth century by 
northward-migrating factions of the Zulu Empire in South 
Africa. Led first by Zwangdaba and later by Mzilikazi, these 
Ndebele raiders conquered the declining Changamire Empire and 
established a political order centerd in the southwestern 
part of Zimbabwe. The Shona-speaking people were required 
to pay tribute to the Matabele king. The Matabele order was 
largely based on Zulu political notions, with military regi-
ments headed by chiefs as the basic administrative structures. 
Chiefs owed allegiance (and indeed at first their appoi~t~ent. 
itself) to the king, Mzilikazi at first and later Lobengula, 
who in turn allocated cattle and farmland. Co~pared to the 
decentralized Mashona political order, this focus on the royal 
house created a _far more centralized dispensation. Greater 
similarity existed with regard to religion. The supreme 
deity of the Mashona was the Mwari and the Mlimo for the 
Matabele. These supreme deities communicated with the living 
~ 
by way of spirit mediums, such as the spirits of dead rulers, 
certain animals or local mediums who were consulted for all 
4Although man~ aspects of Zimbabwe's early history have 
been clarified by archeological and other research, many other 
aspects remain controversial. See N. Jones, Prehistory of 
Southern Rhodesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1949), G. eaton-Thompson, The Zimbabwe Culture: Ruins and 
Reactions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931) and A.J~ Hanna, The 
~tory of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland (London: Faber and Faber, 
1960). 
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important affairs. 5 
Besides the Portuguese penetration from Zimbabwe after 
l505 and the activities of a small number of traders, hunters, 
missionaries and explorers, European interest in the interior 
of southern Africa did not exist until the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. At this time the discovery of gold and 
diamonds in $puth Africa sparked interest in the discovery of 
similar deposits in Zimbabwe, initiating a period when agents 
form the two Boer Republics and the Cape Colony attempted to 
secure mineral and other concessions from the Matabele king 
Lobengula. In 1888 agents of Cecil Rhodes, Prime Minister of 
the Cape Colony, secured a treaty with Lobengula which came 
to be viewed a~ granting mineral and metal concessions in 
the area today known as Zimbabwe and Zambia. Although thi~· 
Rudd Concession was not the only one granted, it became the 
basis of Rhodes' request to the British government to grant 
a royal charter to a commercial company seeking to ~rically 
exploit and administer the area. In 1889 the British South 
Africa Canpany (BSAC), entered Zimbabwe and establisherl a settlement 
Pear Present-day Harare (formerly Salisbury). In 18!11 the 
government placed the area under the queen's protectiop (i.e. 
a protectorate was estatilished), *ith BSAC-activities resorting 
5
see Terence 0. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 
1896-97 (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
1967)' pp. 1-45. 
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under the authority of the British High Commissioner in South 
6 Africa. 
1889-1923: Company Rule 
-
British interest in Zimbabwe was animated by a desire 
to thwart the possible northward expansion of the Transvaal 
Republic. Bringing the territory under British influence 
would not only block the geographic amibitions of the Trans-
vaal, but "the anticipated discovery of a gold field richer 
than that of the Rand was expected to provide the basis for 
the building up of a strong, rich and loyal counterweight to 
the Afrikaner threat." 7 
Despite these ambitions and the declaration of pro-
tectorate status, the British were unwilling to engage directly 
in the administration of the territory, or to prepare for 
closer imperial control. Such involvement would require heavy 
financial expenditure and Britain expected the territory to 
be, if not wildly profitable, then at least self-supporting. 
Company rule was therefore privately financed and expected 
to maintain solvency in its administration of the area. 
Executive, legislative and administrative initiative 
6For an excellent discussion of this period in Zim-
babwean history and especially race-related views, see 
Phillip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1958). 
7Martin Chanock, Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa 
1900-45 (Totowa, New Jersey: Frank Ct•ss, 1977), p. 12. 
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8 
and authority was placed in company hands. 
The first ten years of BSAC-rule radically altered 
expectations about Zimbabwe's development. First, explora-
tions in Matabeleland and later Mashonaland dashed hopes of 
a second Rand. Minerals were discovered, but deposits were of 
limited quantity and were dispersed in scattered sites that 
were difficult to exploit on a profitable basis. Second, the 
conquest of the Mashona and Matabele proved more difficult 
than expected. Economic interest in Matabeleland led to a 
Matabele War in 1893 and, although Lobengula's forces were 
defeated, a more serious war broke out in 1896 in both 
Matabeleland and Mashonaland. It was only with the help of 
imperial troops that separate peace treaties could be 
9 
secured. Third, the charter granted to the company was due 
to expire in 1914 and could not be renewed without the support 
of local settlers. These settlers expressed disapproval with 
company activities, which was matched by British government 
disapproval of the financial conditions of the company, as 
well as of the political involvement of company officials 
. 
8
There is much scholarly agreement on British motives 
in Z~mbabwe during the late nineteenth century. See, for 
example, Claire Palley, The Constitutional History and Law of 
Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1966) pp. 3-127. I f 
9 
m 
11 
For these wars, see Panger, passim. and Robin H. Pal-
(er War and Land in Rhodesia in the 1890s" in Bethwell A. Ogot 1 ~d.) War and Society in Africa (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 72), pp. 85-107. Hereafter referred to as "War and Land." 
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. 1. t. 1 ff . 10 in south Afr1can po 1 1ca a a1rs. 
The result was a redefinition of Zimbabwe's future. 
Perhaps the most important redefined goal was the recognition 
that mineral exploitation alone would not suffice as the base 
of the Zimbabwean economy and that farming should supplement 
mineral exploitation. Agricultural production and the sale 
of farmland would not only recoup the company's losses in the 
short run, but also complement mineral proceeds in the long 
run. Imperial authorities also effected a constitutional 
reconstruction of local politics: a Southern Rhodesia Order 
in Council in 1898 imposed several restrictions on the acti-
vities of the BSAC, a legislative council was created with 
four elected offices and five company offices presided over 
by the BSAC-administrator, and a judicial system was estab-
lished. The territory was placed under the executive auth-
ority of a Resident Commissioner as local representative of 
the British High Commissioner in South Africa, who in turn 
was responsible to imperial authorities in Britain. The 
civil service was also reformed, particularly with regard to 
the administration of the black population. A Native 
Affairs Department was created and it was represented in_ 
the two provinces of Matabeleland and Mashonaland by a Chief 
Native Commissioner, Native and Assistant Native Commissioners, 
10 Palley, pp. 128-190. 
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11 Chiefs, Headmen and Messengers. 
Although it was thus accepted that the BSAC would 
still be responsible for the administration of Zimbabwe; the 
British government began to assert its imperial control over 
a company regarded as less than trustworthy. The British 
government further expected that company rule would be replaced 
by local settler self-government and would eventually be in-
corporated into the South African political order. 12 One of 
the first steps in this direction was the increase in the 
number of elected (i.e. settler) offices on the legislative 
council (to outnumber the BSAC-offices) in 1907, the encourage-
ment of white immigration, and the aid given to land settle-
ment. 
For the black population the most important develop-
ment in the 1890s came in the wake of the two wars with the 
introduction of land apportionment and native reserves to 
Zimbabwe. After the 1893 Matabele War, two areas of land 
north of Bulawayo were set apart for exclusive Matabele use. 
After the 1896 and 1897 uprisings, imperial authorities were 
determined that the BSAC would not further encroach on black 
11
rt is important to note that Britain did not imple-
ment the indirect mode of colonial administration in Zimbabwe. 
It was a form of direct rule through the Native Affairs Depart-
ment whose personnel held discretionary power. For this 
reason it was stressed that NAn-personnel should be "honour-
able and capable men." Correspondence of Milner to Asquith, 
1897, quoted by Pal1ey, p. 140. 
12 Pal1ey, pp. 132-199. 
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land. To ensure adequate black land, Native Commissioners 
were to demarcate reserved black land and in 1908 these de-
marcations were approved by the imperial authorities. Hence-
forth land ownership and use in Zimbabwe was determined by 
law. Some land was held by the BSAC, some by whites, and 
13 the remainder by blacks. 
The difficulties of the BSAC mounted. In 1918 the 
~Privy Council ruled that all unalienated land in Zimbabwe 
belonged to the Crown, ending company hopes that it could 
recover its losses in the failed gold boom by the sale of 
land. The BSAC now hoped for incorporation with South Africa, 
for it hoped that South African authorities would compensate 
it more generously than the British Treasury, Between 1918 
and 1922 negotiations concerning the constitutional future of 
Zimbabwe took place, finally reducing the options to respon-
sible governme~t under Crown authority or amalgamation with 
South Pfrica. In 1922 Zimbabwean voters rejected the option ~, 
of amalgamation and in 1923 received a responsible govern-
ment constitution. 14 
13 The causes, nature and consequences of land appor-
tionment is the subject of many scholarly disagreements. The 
effect of land apportionment on black political activity will 
be discussed in the next chapter; its relation to the Zim-
babwean economy and black poverty is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
14The best account of this period is in Chanock, pp. 
10-164. 
~ 
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2 1923-1965: Responsible Government 2. 
Unlike in Zambia, which moved from company rule to 
colonial status, the Eouthern Rhodesia Constitution Letters 
patent of 1923 provided for "the establishment of responsible 
government subject to certain limitations." 15 Complete self-
government, in other words, was not legally recognized: there 
was partial self-government with the British government reserv-
ing powers over the conduct of foreign policy, matters affect-
ing railways, mineral extraction, and native affairs. The 
resident commissioner was replaced by the governor as the 
Crown's representative in Zimbabwe. 16 
The legislative authority was unicameral and resided 
with a Legislative AF;sembly similar to the House of Commons. 
The Legislative Aseembly consisted of 30 members, with two 
members representing 15 electoral districts, but it could 
also elect a non-member Speaker who was entitled to vote. 
Franchise was qualified: a voter was required to have an 
annual salary of at least 100 pounds and property valued at 
~ 150 pounds, and to be literate in English. 17 Except for the 
reserve powers, the Legislative Assembly exercised full 
15 Palley, p. 215. 
16Ibid., pp. 236-271. 
17 The Voters Qualification and Registration Amendment 
Ordinance No. 14 of 1912 and the Women's Enfranchisement 
Ordinance of 1919 was the basis of the franchise of the 1923-
constitution. Minor changes in electoral laws were made in 
1928 and 1937. 
81 
legislative powers. The executive authority was exercised 
bY a Cabinet headed by a Prime Minister and other Ministers 
drawn from the Legislative Assembly. As in the British ·model 
of parliamentary government, the Cabinet was not a creation 
of the constitution; it was simply stated that the Governor 
as representative of the Crown would select and be advised 
by an Executive Council. In practice this Executive Council 
came to be the Cabinet. As far as the judiciary is concerned, 
it was also modelled on the role of the judiciary in Britain 
and its political independence was guaranteed. 18 
In the 1923-elections the Responsible Government 
A~sociation (RGA) won a majority and, later reconstituted as 
Athe Rhodesian Party, maintained this parlimentary majority 
until the 1933 elections, when it was defeated by the Reform 
Party. The Reform Party was created in the late 1920s and, 
after its electoral victory in 1933, absorbed the Rhodesia 
Party to become the United Party. The United Party was later 
renamed the United Federal Party. This United Party dominated 
partisan politics in Zimbabwe between 1933 and 1962, when it 
\ 
was defeated by the Rhodesian Front. 19 
18
several constitutionl changes were later made. The 
most important of these was the elimination of the British 
reserve powers with regard to the railways and mining industry. 
19
colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 131-189. 
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Although the United Party never lost its parlimentary 
majority - its leader Godfrey Huggins was Prime Minister from 
1933 to 1953 when he became Prime Minister of the Centra.l · 
African Federation and was succeeded by Garfield Todd and he 
in turn by Edgar Whitehead - it did encounter significant 
partisan challenges. One such challenge came in the wake of 
the Second World War when the Liberal Party, led by former 
Finance Minister Smit, managed to attract support. Although 
the scheduled 1944 elections were postponed to give the United 
Party time for additional campaigning, the Liberal Party still 
managed to gain twelve seats as opposed to the 13 of the 
United Party in the 1946-election. The Liberal Party, though, 
later lost momentum, partly as a result of internal disagree-
20 
ments. 
Another serious partisan challenge came from the 
Dominion Party in the 1958-elections. Were it indeed not for 
the newly introduced preferential voting system, the Dominion 
Party would have won the 1958-election, for it won a majority 
of first preferences votes. 21 The influence of the Dominion 
20Ibid., pp. 131-143. See also Lewis H. Gann and M. 
Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1964), pp. 165-191. 
21 1n the preferential voting system, voters could rank 
their preference of political parties. First preference votes 
would then be counted and second preference votes transferred 
from the least sucsessful candidate (in terms of votes polled) 
to ones more successful. Beyond first preference votes, in 
other words, successful candidates had to obtain a majority 
of all second preference votes. See Palley, p. 311 and 
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PartY declined after 1958 and in 1962 it amalgamated with the 
. southern Rhodesia Association and the United Group to form 
t 
the Rhodesian Front. The Rhodesian Front was first led by 
Winston Field, but he was replaced by Ian Smith, who was 
Prime Minister when Zimbabwe unilaterally declared itself 
d t f B •t . 22 indepen en rom r1 a1n. 
While the voting population in Zimbabwe was a small 
percentage of the total population, voting turnout since 
1933 has always been high. 23 Franchise qualifications were 
raised in 1951, increasing annual income requirements to 240 
t pounds annually, property to 500 pounds, and literacy to 
include the ability to speak and write English.24 In 1957 an 
Electoral Amendment Act preserved the high qualifications, 
but introduced a special roll of voters (besides the exist-
ing common roll) with lower qualifications. Special roll 
voters did not, however, have the same voting power as common 
. 25 
roll voters. 
Although some gerrymandering did occur, especially after 
F.M.G. Wilson (ed), Source BookofParliamentary Elections and 
Referenda in Southern Rhodesia 1989-1962 (Salisbury: University 
College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1963), p. 180. 
22Larry W. Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia: 
in an African State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
University Press, 1973), pp. 33-37. 
23 Leys, pp. 195-198. 
24 Palley, p. 246. 
White Power 
Harvard 
25
see Ibid., pp. 308-312 on the complex voting system 
Of 1957. 
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the 1946 elections, the most conspicuous bias in Zimbabwe 
was its rural weight: before 1951, at least 14 of the 
30-member parliament had to represent rural districts. ·This 
number was later reduced to eleven, but it still overrepre-
sented rural districts especially in the post-1945 period 
when immigration swelled the population of whites in urban 
26 
areas. 
There have been attempts to correlate party support 
among white Zimbabweans with factors such as occupation, 
language and regional divisions. 27 This is a problematic 
enterprise in view of a number of considerations. First, 
the electorate after 1945 was of a continually changing 
nature because of rapid white population increase through 
immigration. Between 1946 and 1948, for example, 10,000 new 
voters appeared on the voting ro11. 28 Second, the electoral 
system of Zimbabwe underwent frequent changes with regard to 
the number of districts, types of voting, and the number of 
26 Leys, pp. 190-195 and 210-211. 
27For example, Cyril A. Rogers and Charles Frantz, 
Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia: The Attitudes and Be-
havior of the White Population (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1962) and A.K.H. Weinrich, Black and White 
Elites in Rural Rhodesia (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1973), pp. 62-85. 
28 Leys, p. 209. 
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t . 1 t. 29 parties con est1ng e ec 1ons. Since there are so many 
factors influencing voting results, voting behavior is dif-
ficult to assess. 
2.2.1. The Central African Federation (1953-1962) 
After the 1923 failure to incorporate Zimbabwe into 
a South African political order, efforts to incorporate 
Zimbabwe into a larger political unit shifted their focus to 
the northern territories of Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) 
and Malawi (then Nyasaland). The benefits of such a union, 
it was argued, would be economic (the creation of a common 
market, a central banking system, and the economic develop-
~ ment of Nyasaland in particular) and political (a union with 
imperial sympathies and acceptable race policies acting as a 
counter to the nationalist and segregationist race policies 
of South Africa). 30 
For its part, the Zimbawean government advocated the 
amalgamation of Zambia and Zimbabwe. The discovery of 
minerals (copper) in Zambia and the generally complementary 
nature of the two economies made closer union economically 
29Ibid., pp. 210-211. 
30
see Robert U. Rotberg, "The Federation Movement in 
British East and Central Africa," Journal of Commonwealth 
Political Studies 2 (1964): 141-160 and also Palley, pp. 
322-324. 
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attractive, especially after the lapse of the Customs Agree-
ment with South Africa in 1936. Even when it was in opera-
tion, this agreement could not prevent South African-imp.osed 
tariffs so that northern markets became more attractive after 
31 its lapse. The desire for closer union with Zambia was 
indeed a well established part of white politics in Zimbabwe 
after 1923; ~t was simply that events after 1945, especially 
events related to the rise of the Afrikaner movement in South 
Africa, provided it with an additional impetus. 32 
The British government made several prewar inquiries 
into the possibilities of a central African political order 
but these mainly concluded that, despite the economic, 
political and strategic advantages Britain would gain from 
such a union, 33 dissimilar race-policies made a union impos-
sible. British policy toward its African dependencies was 
stipulated in the Passfield Memorandum of 1930: native (or 
black) interests and not those of whites (settlers or immi-
grants) would be considered paramount in the future develop-
ment of those territories. Accordingly, race policy in 
31 Chanock, p. 217, 
32Ibid., pp. 190-248. 
33Ibid., pp. 190-210. 
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34 Zimbabwe was an illiberal anomaly. Yet by the advent of 
the Second World War, the British government's Bledisloe 
t d th "d f 1 . . . . 1 35 commission accep e e 1 ea o c oser un1on 1n pr1nc1p e 
and, following the commission's recommendations, a Central 
African Council was created in 1944 to act as an advisory 
board on interterritorial matters. By 1948 British policy 
officially adopted the view that a federation between Zambia, 
t 
Malawi and Zimbabwe was desirable. Following negotiations, 
36 the Central African Federation became a reality in July 1953. 
Under the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, the different territorial constitutions of 
the constituent territories remained in effect. In a complex 
division of powers, territorial governments retained the right 
to legislate on many matters (including race-relations), 
while other powers were held concurrently, and others by the 
federal government exclusively. The federal government could 
exercise only those powers specifically granted to it, such as 
34
see the Report of the Commission on Closer Union of 
the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa, Cmnd. 3234, 
1929 (the Hilton Young Commission) on the criticism of Zim-
babwe's race policies. For the statement on the paramountcy 
of black interests, see Memorandum on Native Policy in East 
Africa, Cmnd. 3573, 1930 (the Passfield Memorandum) and the 
earlier Devonshire Memorandum in Indians in Kenya-Memorandum, 
Cmnd. 1922, 1923. 
35Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, Cmnd. 5949, 
1939 (the Bledisloe Commission). 
36 Palley, pp. 345-409. 
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agricultural policy-making. The federal executive was a 
prime minister (Huggins and later Roy Welensky), who presided 
over a unicameral Federal Legislative Assembly composed" of a 
fixed number of black and white members and a number of 
racially unspecified members. A party-system was called for 
and in the 1953 elections the United Federal Party gained a 
majority. A federal court system also came into existence, 
as territorial courts were allowed to enforce both federal 
and territorial laws. The Central African Federation (CAF) 
was not self-governing: it exercised qualified self-government 
with the Crown represented by a Governor-genera1. 37 
The CAF-period in Zimbabwean history lasted nine years. 
A:It generated considerable economic benefits for Zimbabwe . 
. \ 
I 
1 
These included the absorption of all its public debt by the 
federal government, the development of joint energy resources 
(chiefly the Kariba Dam hydro-electric project), dispropor-
,tionate federal spending on Zimbabwean affairs, and the 
enlargement of the market for Zimbabwean goods. 38 
37Ibid. 
38Arthur Hazlewood, "The Economics of Federation and 
Dissolution in Central Africa" in Arthur Hazlewood (ed.), 
African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies in 
Economic and Political Union (London: Oxford University Press, 
1967), pp. 185-250. See also Bowman, pp. 22-26 and William J. 
Barber, "Federation and the Distribution of Economic Benefits" 
in Colin Leys and Cranford Pratt (eds.) A New Deal in Central 
Africa (London Heine~an, 1960), pp. 81-97. 
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As was indicated in the preamble of the CAF-constitu-
tion, the British government hoped that the new political 
order in Africa would eventually achieve independence -·if 
it ~ere desired by the majority of all its inhabitants (i.e. 
not merely the majority of voters). 39 This option would be 
considered at the Federal Review Conference in 1960. In 
1957 the British government did upgrade the international 
legal status of the federation, but hereafter prospects for 
the achievement of federal independence dtmmed. British 
territories elsewhere in Africa began tc• achieve indepen-
dence and pressures from black African nationalists in Zam-
bia and Malawi for independence for their respective ter-
ritories increased. Following upheaval in Malawi in 1959 the 
British government sent a commission of inquiry, which con-
eluded that the existence of the federation was the chief 
1 cause of the unrest. 40 Subsequently the Monckton Commission, 
sent to prepare documents for the Federal Review Conference, 
concluded that federation in its present form was unviable 
because of black opposition. Federation should be either dis-
41 
solved or totally restructured. 
In Malawi and Zambia negotiations between the Colonial 
39 Palley, pp. 345-409. 
40Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, Cmnd. 
814, 1959 (the Devlin Report). 
41Report of the Ad~isory Commission on the Review of 
the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Cmnd. 1148, 1960 
(the Monckton Commission). 
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Office and black nationalist leaders led to the formation of 
black-dominat.ed governments in, respectively, 1961 and 1962. 
Formerly protectorates, they now became independent states. 
In Zimbabwe, however, the political situation was more com-
~plicated. The territory was not a protectorate nor a colony 
proper; it had a white government which, despite the exist-
ence of a so-called "multi-racial"-strategy, 42 did not attract 
/black support. Black support, as far as electoral activity 
was concerned, focused more on the National Democratic Party 
(NDP) of Joshua Nkomo. 43 
To resolve the political situation in Zimbabwe, the 
A British government convened a constitutional conference to 
devise a new constitution for Zimbabwe and invited all the 
major political parties to attend. The outcome of this con-
ference was a new constitution, based on "the concepts of 
British parliamentary democracy, the British Cabinet systemf 
and constitutional guarantees of civil rights," 44 and the 
deletion of the reserve powers formerly held by Britain. A 
major aim of the new constitution was to increase black 
political participation and to express a constitutional 
42This will be discussed more fully in later sections 
of this chapter. 
43The National Democratic Party was an outgrowth of the 
banned African National Congress. 
44 Palley, p. 413. 
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commitment to improvements in the material conditions of 
45 blacks. Despite its participation in the creation of the 
r new constitution, the NDP and the Dominion Party later 
'/'-
opposed it. The new constitution was nevertheless ratified 
by the Zimbabwean electorate in July 1961, and it came into 
effect in November 1962. 46 
The UFP's electoral fortunes declined after the 1961-
referendum. It claimed that the 1961-constitution amounted 
to independence: the British government had approved the 
document as a whole and specifically agreed to rescind its 
47 
reserve powers. In reply, the British government stated 
that independence required a new set of negotiations; it was 
not tantamount to the 1961-constitution. This led to 
charges of electoral deceit on the part of the UFP, who pro-
claimed the 1961-referendum as an "independence" referendum, 
and suspicion and mistrust arose towards the British govern-
ment. In the December 1962 elections the Rhodesian Front, 
~created a scant nine months earlier, defeated the UFP. In 
45
see Ibid., pp. 413-628 for the 1961-constitution. 
46James Barbet·, Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 79-111. 
47Barber argues that the Zimbabwean electorate were 
genuinely confused as to whether the 1961-referendum was on 
independence or simply the ratification of the 1961-consti-
tution. Ibid., pp. 92-98. 
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the same month, the CAF was officially dissolved. 48 
2.2.2 The Rhodesian Front and Independence 
Upon the dissolution of the CAF, the Rhodesian Front 
t f 11 1 . d f . d d f B ·t · 49 governmen orma y app 1e or 1n epen ence rom r1 a1n, 
marking the start of "protracted and often bitter negotiations" 
that would lead to the unilateral declaration of independence 
(UDI). 50 In the pre-UDI negotiations, the Rhodesian Front 
~government accepted the 1961-constitution as a basis for 
independence, despite its opposition to it in the preceding 
elections. The British government, on the other hand, argued 
that further changes were required to ensure expanded black 
participation in Zimbabwean political life. Yet neither 
-'f,governm@js~re.qui~eji a black-dominated government to precede 
the granting of independence; a white government could achieve 
independence, provided that it did so with constitutional and 
other guarantees for increased black political participation. 51 
48 Ibid., pp. 147-195. 
49cmnd., 2073, March 29, 1963. 
50 James Barber, p. 178. 
51This is e~ident in the principles, privately convey-
ed to the Zimbabwean government, according to which the British 
government would grant independence, namely: 
(i) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to 
majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961-constitu-
tion, would have to be maintained and guaranteed. 
(ii) There would have to be guarantees against retrogres-
sive amendments of the constitution. 
(iii) There would have to be fmroediate improvements in the 
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After March 1961 several meetings took place between 
the Zimbabwean and British governments, as well as meetings 
with black leaders in Zimbabwe, but all ended in failure. In 
April 1964 Prime Minister Field became a political casualty 
f "1 h" . d d 52 d h 1 d of the a1 ure to ac 1eve 1n epen ence, an e was rep ace 
by Ian Smith who, unlike Field, had a reputation for vigorous 
independence demands. These demands included the possibility 
of UDI, which Smith viewed as a "three-day-wonder" with no 
serious political or economic consequences. 53 
In opposition the UFP reconstituted itself as the <x 
Rhodesia National Party (RNP) and later renamed itself the 
Rhodesia Party (RP) but it could not match the electoral 
appeal of the Rhodesian Front, losing two by-elections during 
1963 and 1964. 54 Confident of its parliamentary 
political status of the black population. 
(iv) There would have to be progress toward the abolition 
of racial discrimination 
(v) The British government would have to be satisfied 
that any proposed basis for independence was accept-
able to the people of Zimbabwe as a whole. 
See Southern Rhodesia - Documents Relating to the Negotiations 
between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments, 
November 1963 to November 1965, Cmnd. 2807, 1965. Hereafter 
cited as Cmnd. 2807. 
52
other criticisms of Field were his autocratic poli-
tical style and his failure to deal more decisively with 
domestic black opposition. James Barber, pp. 192-195. 
53For the differences between Field and Smith on inde-
pendence, see Ibid., pp. 249-252 and Bowman, pp. 63-90. 
54 James Barber, pp. 175-177 and 252-261. 
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majority, the Smith government called for a referendum on 
independence in May 1964. In answer to the question "Are 
you in favor of independence based on the 1961 constitution?", 
89.1 percent of the registered voters (in a 61.6 percent poll) 
voted affirmatively. 55 It must be noted that the referendum 
was not fashioned as a popular vote on UDI; it simply confirmed 
that the majority of registered voters (i.e. whites) desired 
independence. 
The 1964 referendum outcome was cited by the Smith 
government in its negotiations with Britain to show that it 
at least had the support of the majority of whites. Since the 
British government stipulated that the granting of indepen-
dence be acceptable to the Zimbabwean population as a whole, 
the Smith government set out to secure the support of the 
majority of the blacks and did so by convening ~ meeting of 
tribal leaders in October 1964. At this meeting the tribal 
+leaders gave their sup~~rt to independence and, since the 
Smith governmen~ ~~garded the-tribal leaders-as represen~a­
tives for the black population as a whole, it now claimed 
- -- ----- - - -- - - - .- . -. -- -- --56 
support from both black and white maJor1t1es. 
The British government rejected both the referendum 
and the indaba with tribal leaders as adequate indications of 
majoritarian support. Fa.ced with this opposition from abroad 
55 Bowman, p.· 74. 
56This meeting (or indaba) has been criticized for its 
Possibly coercive nature. See Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
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and a declining white opposition at home, the Smith govern-
ment called another general election in May 1965. In this 
election the issue of independence was dominant but it again 
was not an election about UDI. Although .the opposition did 
charge that the RF was preparing for it, the RF replied that 
it would only consider UDI if it were faced with the prospect 
of a black-dominated government - which the British govern-
ment did not demand. The outcome of this election gave the 
RF all A-roll seats (50); of the B-roll seats, the RP won 15 
with five independents. The results clearly were a triumph 
for the RF and a personal victory for Smith. 57 
Between May and November of 1965 negotiations with the 
British government again proved fruitless. The British govern-
ment of course was opposed to a possible UDI and threatened 
~sanctions, though not military force, if this were to come 
about. To remove the deadlock in negotiations it further 
offered the Smith government some concessions, and attempted 
to persuade the black nationalist leaders to co-operate on 
the basis of the 1961 constitution. By October 1965, however, 
the Smith government decided upon UDI and declared it 
officiallv on November 11, 1965. 58 
57 James Barber, pp. 268-294. 
58
rbid., pp. 295-305. 
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2.3. summary 
The foregoing discussion shows that the original popu-
lation of Zimbabwe (the Shona-speaking people) encountered, 
first, the arrival and political challenge of the northward-
migrating Matabele and later the arrival, again from the South 
of white settlers under BSAC-aegis. Both of these develop-
ments, as has been the case throughout Zimbabwean history, 
were produced by the dynamics of the South African society, in 
these cases, the dynamics of the Zulu Empire and the discovery 
of the mineral wealth of South Africa. The initial develop-
ment of Zimbabwe was indeed predicated on the hope that 
,~imbabwe housed a second Rand, that its exploitation would be 
a success, and that it would lead to the establishment of a 
political order with imperial sympathies. Events during the 
late nineteenth century dashed all of these hopes and by the 
end of the First World War it was expected that Zimbabwe 
naturally belonged to the Union of South Africa. 
This 'expectation·was also to fail. In 1923 the set-
tlers opted for qualified self-government and acquired a West-
minster-style constitutional government. Self-government 
was not complete, since Britain exercised its reserve powers,· 
though in an unobtrusive manner. Local political activity 
was the reserve of whites, and in particular the reserve of 
the United Party which held a parliamentary majority for 
'almost thirty years. Yet significant electoral white chal-
lenges did exist, particularly after the Second World War. 
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After the Second World War, efforts to incorporate 
Zimbabwe into a larger political tmit focused on the territories 
to its north, leading to the creation of the CAF. Like the -early 
Zimbabwe itself, the CAF was designed as a counterweight to 
south Africa but it contained centrifugal political forces 
.that ensured its demise. It did nevertheless bring con-
.siderable ec.onomic benefits to Zimbabwe in particular. The 
breakup of CAF coincided with the defeat of UFP and its re-
placement by the Rhodesian Front, which attempted to secure 
British consent to its independence demands. Despite the 
fact that the British government did not demand an immediate 
government recomposition in Zimbabwe, negotiations were mark-
ed by its consistent failure, as well as by mistrust, acrimony, 
intransigence, suspicion and genuine misunderstanding. 
Finally the Smith government declared UDI. 
The fore_going discussion is a brief overview of Zim-
babwean history before 1965. It emphasizes white politics 
~and serves the purpose of identifsing certain landmark events 
in_ the histor~ of ~hfte politics. The underlying dynamics 
of this historical development is the subject of the remain-
ing sections of this chapter. 
3. A Government in Crisis? 
A common interpretation of UDI is to see it as the 
racist reaction of whites to black demands and the support of 
those demands by the British government. In the 1950s, so 
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the interpretation goes, nationalist movements in Africa 
achieved political success, including the nationalist move-
ments in the former territories of CAF. White leaders in 
Zimbabwe, as well as the white population in general, felt 
threatened by these developments and the possibility that 
similar events could occur in Zimbabwe. This British-backed 
black challenge engendered a racist reaction: rather than 
negotiate with the British government or black leaders, the 
~Zimbabwean government descended into willful political intran-
sigence and prepared to defend white minority rule 
against all odds. 59 
This study does not contest the importance of increas-
ed black political activity in Zimbabwe, nor that the support 
that blacks received from abroad was important. The nature 
and extent of black political activity will be discussed in 
the next chapter. It does argue, however, that the events 
that accompanied the dissolution of the CAF, like the RF 
electoral victory and UDI, cannot be understood exclusively 
59For examples of this view, see Martin Loney, 
Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response (Baltimore, 
Maryland: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 127-133; Bowman, pp. 33-
61 and 154-155; James Barber, pp. 268-294; and B. Vulindlela 
Mtshali, Rhodesia: Background to Conflict (New York: Haw-
thorn Books, 1967), pp. 120-132. These views are a logical 
extension of Leys' view of racism as the "inner law" of white 
Zimbabwean politics. 
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as a racist reaction by whites. 60 The remainder of this 
chapter is thus an examination of the question whether suc-
cessive pre-UDI governments, on encountering foreign economic 
and political challenge, attempted political and socio-
economic reforms, and whether rural based opposition to those 
reforms resulted in a governmental crisis in the early 1960s. 
3.1. White Society and the State 
That the state (or government) was the executive com-
mittee of Zimawwean whites in pre-UDI politics is, as stated, 
a common interpretation. This view raises two questions: 
How was public policy-making in this period actually conducted? 
and What was the relation of public policy-makers to the white 
community? 
How was public-policy making conducted in pre-UDI 
Zimbabwe? The institutional context of policy-making was at 
first derivative of colonial rule: a legislative council 
with elected and appointed officials was presided over by the 
~ BSAC administrator who in turn was responsible to the High 
Commissioner of South Africa and he, in turn, to the British 
60Arrighi criticizes the racism thesis for its ignor-
ance of the economic roots of UDI. See Giovanni Arrighi, 
"The Political Economy of Rhodesia" in Giovanni Arrighi and 
John Saul, Essays in the Political Economy of Africa (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp. 366-367. 
Murray criticizes the thesis because it overlooks seri-
ous white divisions; it was the existence of those divisions 
and attempts to overcome them that was the animating factor 
~n white politics. See D.J. Murray, The Governmental System 
!._n Southern Rhodesia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. ix-
Xxi. 
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government. Later, responsible government established a uni-
cameral legislature wherein the dominant party produced the 
executive. Responsible government in general and a West-
minster-style institutional context in particular is usually 
associated with party government. Political parties come 
into existence, win a majority in the legislature and by con-
vention compose the executive. The mode of governing then is 
in essence party-government, with policy-making located in 
the party's parliamentary caucus, the cabinet (as senior party 
members), or even an "inner" cabinet of the most senior party 
members. Yet under neither company rule nor later self-
government did Zimbabwean policy-making and political initia-
tive reside with the legislatures or with the political 
parties that controlled them. The center of gravity of policy-
making was the chief executive, working in close harmony not 
with the cabinet but with the bureaucracy. 
The absence of strong political parties, in the sense 
of nation-wide and hierarchically structured organizations, 
and by implication the relative weakness of the legislature 
is the subject of several studies of pre-UDI politics. One 
interpretation holds that strong political parties did not 
exist because a partisan impetus was absent from white poli-
tics. The white population constituted a "white island in 
a black sea", that is; a possible partisan division resulting 
from occupational, ideological, regional and other white 
Cleavages were negated by common perceptions with regard to 
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the race-issue. Political cohesion resulted from the need 
to unite against the black threat; Leys indeed su~sts that 
this racially motivated political cohesion was the "inner 
law" of white politics and, since there could be no authentic 
divisions among whites, a "one-party-system" existed. In 
support of this thesis, be cites the long dominance of the 
United Party, while the existence of opposition parties is 
explained by the fact that they often consisted of disaffected 
former members of the UP. 61 White consensus thus turned 
politics into public administration with minor partisan 
squabbles over the means of the implementation of white 
dominance. This accounts for the dominance of the chief 
executive and the importance of the bureaucracy. 
Another interpretation holds that it was exactly 
because serious divisions existed within the white community 
(for example, agricultural versus manufacturing interests) 
that a strong executive was called for. Mediation between 
interest groups was the main function of the chief executive, 
which under the long reign of Huggins led to an essentially 
oligarchical mode of governing known as the "Hugginsbureau" 
of the "Establishment". This "no-party-system" view of 
61 Leys, pp. 131-177. 
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Murray62 is further developed by Bowman: 
The Rhodesian Front is the first Rhodesian party to 
mobilize whites into an effective political organization 
and involve them in public policy decisions. Huggins, 
Welensky, Whitehead, Todd - none of these prime ministers 
ever built (or even tried to build) a party organization 
that lasted more than a month or two before and after 
elections. Once elected, all (to somewhat differing 
degrees) felt free to make nearly any political decision 
without reference to anyone except perhaps a few senior 
colleagues .•. [the RF party organization] far more than 
the political party shift in the 1962-elections, consti-
tuted the real internal revolution in white Rhodesian 
politics. Decision-making within the white community 
became more complex and more inflexible.63 
Thus policy-making resided with the executive and, within it, 
with the chief executive more than with other members of the 
62 Murray, pp. 344-358. The term oligarchy is used by 
Clements, who comments: 
Rhodesian settlers invoked the democratic traditions of 
the Motherland to support their claim for 'Responsible 
Government' •.• (but having) established the principles 
which entitled them to control of their own affairs, 
their immediate task was to abandon them in the exercise 
of that control ••• Rhodesian democracy, in fact, most 
closely resembled the British eighteenth-century oli-
garchy in its political manifestations •••• there was no 
strong party system; personalities counted for more than 
policies---Conflicts of interest were settled by bargain-
ing and compromise, and never allowed to become as sharp 
as to threaten the structure of society. Maize prices, 
railway rates, cattle marketing, tobacco exports, rural 
roads and telephones, state lotteries, mineral rights, 
hospitals and school facilities - such were the issues 
which won or lost elections. Frank Clements, Rhodesia 
A Study of the Deterioration of a White Society (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 44-45. 
63Bowman, p. 91. Gann and Gelfand attribute the 
absence of a party system to the smallness and instability of 
the electorate. See Gann and Gelfand, pp. 88-89. 
64 
cabinet. 
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In the absence of a strong populist democratic tradi-
tion in white politics, the public or civil service bureauc-
racy also became a powerful political actor. The public ser-
vice in Zimbabwe was first established under BSAC-rule, 
partly to demonstrate that it was not merely interested in 
commercial profits but was a public-spirited, responsible 
representative of the Crown interested in the development of 
65 the area. Accordingly a public service was created, 
organized on a departmental basis and governed by regulations 
with regard to the terms of service, appointments and internal 
discipline. This foundation of the public service was closely 
modelled after and largely staffed by bureaucrats from the 
public service of the Cape Colony, which was a highly profes-
66 
sionalized bureaucracy. 
64
on the· absence of an "inner cabinet" and the con-
sistently authoritarian political style of Zimbabwean prime 
ministers, see Palley, pp. 458-460. Leys similarly describes 
cabinet government as feeble. Leys, p. 60. See also Barber, 
who states: 
Because political activity was confined mainly to a 
minority distinguished by its race and economic strength, 
the ebb and flow of politics was based on attempts to 
balance the interests and groups within that minority ••. 
The ruling group in government and politics was a tight 
circle of men who knew each other intimately. James 
Barber, p. 9. 
65 Correspondence of Milner to Chamberlain quoted in 
Palley, p. 137. 
66The notion that the civil service should be staffed 
by career civil servants was a reaction to "amateurish" 
bureaucrats of the BSAC. See Palley, pp. 137-138. 
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67 Except for the Native Affairs Department (one of 
the reserve powers of the British government), the public 
service departments were constitutionally responsible t"o the 
BSAC-administration and later to the executive. By 1923 the 
political influence of the public service increased beyond 
political advice and expertise offered through the advisory 
committees to the cabinet. A Rhodesia Civil Service Council 
became an official advisory body to the cabinet, uniting the 
various public service spokesmen of the advisory committees. 
The latter committees were reconstituted. In addition to the 
access that the Civil Service Council offered to political 
influence, several public service associations like the 
Rhodesia Post and Telegraph Association, the Rhodesia Teachers 
Association and the Public Service Association were created 
that engaged in political activities beyond the supply of 
specialized advice. This activity included partisan politics; 
in the 1923 elections, for example, they opposed incorpora-
tion with South Africa. 68 
Another reason for the political influence of the 
bureaucracy was its size. Even under BSAC-rule, the size of 
the public service in relation to the size of the population 
67The NAD was known as the "government within the 
government". See Murray, pp. 271-343. 
68 Ib1"d., 20 35 pp. - • 
105 
69 
was large, and after the 1923 elections there were pres-
sures - expressed in the legislature - to decrease its size. 
In response, the different public service associations and 
the Civil Service Council set out to subvert the efforts of 
individual ministers to exert cabinet control over the dif-
ferent departments, while seeking to establish its influence 
with the chief executive. By 1933 the public service effec-
tively circumvented the imposition of legislative control 
and by individual ministers' control over the public service 
departments, and also established close links with the chief 
executive, mainly through the Public Service Board (which 
controlled public service appointments and promotions) and 
the various public service associations. Henceforth it 
exercised "unparalelled control over their own affairs." 70 
Between 1933 and 1965 the public service continued to 
grow in size, administrative capacity and public responsi-
bility. This growth is related to three developments: First, 
the depression of the early 1930s invested the public ser-
vice with responsibility concerning the supply of goods, 
69Ibid. and Michael Bratton, "The Public Service in 
Zimbabwe", Political Science Quarterly 95 (Fall 1980): 445. 
The size of the public service in 1923, Bratton states, 
"seemed small and simple, employing just over 2,000 settlers 
and comprising only six administrative departments. Yet 
compared with the settler population of 33,620 at that time, 
or with the 1500 administrators responsible for Nigeria at 
the peak of British rule, the early administrative presence 
Was substantial." (p. 445) 
70 Murray, p. 39. The Public Service Association was 
dominated by senior civil servants. Ibid., p. 49. 
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services and employment. Second, World War II and the 
economic growth that is associated with it made resource 
mobilization a public responsibility. Third, the creat1on 
of the CAF established a large and complex bureaucracy, 
prompted the development of public work projects, and led to 
an increase in public investment in the private sector. 72 
The extent of public service growth can be illustrated 
by the following figures: In 1921 the public service 
employed 15 percent of the white population, 25 percent of 
a substantially larger population by 1951, and 27 percent 
of an even larger population by 1961. If the number of 
public transportation employees is added to these figures, 
the public service in 1951 employed 33 percent of the white 
population, and 38 percent by 1961. 73 The extent of admin-
istrative capacity is partly revealed in employment figures, 
but also in the increase in specialization (six departments 
in 1923 as against 32 in 1957), 74 public ownership (for 
example, energy resources like electricity, transportation, 
71 Bratton, p. 445. 
72 The nature of the Zimbabwean economy and its his-
torical development will be discussed in the following section 
of this chapter. 
73 Murray, pp. 16-19. 
74 Leys, pp. 62-64. 
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communication, and even some industries like cotton and 
sugar),75 public regulation (production and marketing control 
boards like the Tobacco, Dairy and Maize Control Boards"), as 
well as tariffs, quotas and export and import controls. 76 
Even before the Second World War the Zimbabwean public 
service thus had the administrative capacity and was invest-
ed with responsibility to intervene in the social, economic 
and other dimensions of Zimbabwean society. This interven-
tionist posture stood at the direction of the executive and 
specifically the prime minister: it had defeated the imposi-
tion of popular-legislative control even before the 1930s 
and was consequently largely divorced from the legislature 
and the party that controlled it. Since public policy-
making thus emanated from an executive-bureaucratic alliance, 
it raises the question of how autonomously this alliance 
operated from either metropolitan influences or local 
interests expressed through non-parliamentary avenues. 
The extent to which Britain exercised its reserve 
powers is a subject surrounded by much disagreement. The 
debate is almost exclusively centered on race-related matters. 
75The Zimbabwean government bought the railway com-
panies in 1947 and negotiated a repeal of the reserve clause 
With Britain. The later purchase of sugar- and cotton-indus-
tries aroused considerable criticism; government assistance, 
it appears, was acceptable to whites, but only a limited 
degree of public ownership. See Murray, pp. 162-197. 
76 For the most part, government regulation was a pro-
duct of the Depression in the 1930s. 
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Here scholars like Palley argue that Britain did exercise 
its reserve powers but, since it did so in an unobtrusive 
manner, British influence on Zimbabwean public policy was 
not noticeable. 77 Others contend that the constitutional 
reserve powers were in practice rarely exercised and that 
complete policy-making freedom existed. 78 In pre-UDI 
negotiations the Zimbabwean government also claimed that a 
practice of complete self-government existed. 79 
British influence on Zimbabwean public policy, it is 
submitted, did not take the form of public policy directives 
delivered to the Zimbabwean executive or its legislature. 
It consisted, rather, of a sustained and broad agreement 
between the two governments on the nature of British imperial 
policy in southern Africa and Zimbabwe's part in those 
imperial designs. Except for a brief period in which incor-
poration with·South Africa was considered, British policy 
toward Zimbabwe was grounded in the desire to develop an 
economic and political counterweight to South Africa. This 
imperial aim was the major cause of British support for the 
establishment of a white settlement in Zimbabwe and was 
sustained after 1923 and especially after 1945 with the 
77 Palley, pp. 236-271. 
78 s~e, for example, Bowman, pp. 6-8. 
79 Palley, pp. 738-746. 
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creation of the CAF. Had the British government imposed 
its desire to create a pro-British unit in southern Africa 
bY coercive means, it probably would have encountered 
resistance, but·there never was a need to do so for the 
Zimbabwean government and white population alike were 
. t. t f . . 1 . 80 enthus1as 1c suppor ers o 1mper1a a1ms. 
The voluntary Zimbabwean participation in imperial 
designs in southern Africa created a self-imposed constraint 
on Zimbabwean public policy-making, including race-related 
policy. There are several manifestatious of this influence. 
With regard to the native reserves, the British government 
du~ing the period of BSAC-rule accepted it as a means of 
"protecting African possession of land, of defining rights 
and increasing security" 81 against white encroachment. Yet 
it resisted attempts to finalize the reserves in a legal 
form, as well as attempts to limit the amount of land avail-
able for future black use. 82 By 1918, however, the British 
so Chanock, passim. 
81 Ibid., p. 137. 
82Thus the creation of the reserves was a defensive 
measure. The problem is not that the British government 
attempted to defend black interests, but that they entrusted 
the selection of suitable areas to local Native Commissioners 
who were susceptible to locaJ white political pressures and 
largely ignorant of population-land-ratios and possible soil 
depletion, as well as of black methods of cultivation. See 
Palmer, "War and Land", pp. 85-107. Others argue that the 
reserves were created with the deliberate intention of 
impoverishing blacks and consequently forcing them into wage-
labor. Eee Giovanni Arrighi, "Labor Supplies in Historical 
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government accepted the report of the Rhodesian Land Commis-
sion to reduce and consolidate the 104 reserves. The reason 
for this retreat, Chanock states, was that imperial policy 
now favored incorporation with f!outh Africa and that this 
would cause an influx of fouth African whites (particularly 
Afrikaners), which would increase and radicalize white land 
demands in Zimbabwe. The future South African government 
that would administer the area would, moreover, demand a 
political concession from Britain to lower the land demands, 
possibly the total removal of black participation in white 
politics (i.e. the establishment of a racially exclusive 
franchise). This fear of the possibility of disenfranchised 
and landless blacks led the British government to seek legal 
guarantees for "what it regarded as a reasonable minimum of 
African land." 83 In this manner the British government con-
tributed to creating the centerpiece of the future Zimbabwe's 
economy and society. 
Although the situation is somewhat different, similar 
dynamics are exhibited in the attempt to create the CAF. In 
this case, Zimbabwe was seen as the more "illiberal" unit 
and, at least initially, the British government exerted pres-
sure on Zimbabwe to "liberalize" its race policies. 84 
Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the Afri-
can Peasantry in Rhodesia" in Giovanni Arrighi and John s. Saul 
pp. 180-234. Hereafter cited as "Labor Supplies'J. 
83 Chanock, p. 137. 
84 Ibid., pp. 214-228. 
ll.l 
British imperialism is also evident in Zimbabwe's immigra-
tion policies, which always aimed at ensuring the presence 
of a large number of "loyal British subjects" in Zimbabwe. 85 
This led to the discouragement of immigration from South 
African sources, as South African immigrants would include 
Afrikaners with questionable imperial sympathies. Even 
public policy with regard to the franchise was influenced by 
imperial designs, for the literacy requirements barred 
Afrikaners who, though perhaps literate in Afrikaans, did not 
86 have full command of the English language. 
Thus the executive-bureaucratic alliance was, largely 
by its own volition, subject to influences from the British 
government. British policy in southern Africa was an 
imperial one, for it attempted to seek a counter to the 
segregationist and, most importantly, nationalist directions 
of South African public policy. Zimbabwe therefore became 
the nucleus of a pro-British and, hopefully, a liberal counter-
weight to South Africa - and consented to its role by incor-
porating these aims into its public policies. 
In the absence of a populist political tradition in 
white politics, was the executive-bureaucratic alliance more 
closely connected with some whites than with others? 
85 Clements, pp. 40-94. 
86 Jbid. See also Chanock, pp. 141-164 and Palley, 
pp. 206-211 and 322-344. 
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Some scholars, like Arrighi, argue that the white 
ksociety was characterized by class divisions, derivative of 
economic considerations. Prior to the S~cond Wo~-Wa~ -
there were four classes, namely the rural bourgeoisie (white 
minners and agriculturalists), large-scale capitalists 
engaged in controlling transport- and power-industries, pri-
mary production and land speculation, a white wage-earning 
class (administrative employees, clerical workers, foremen, 
artisans and semi-skilled workers) essentially engaged in 
service industries, and a petty bourgeoisie (shopkeepers, 
small employees and tradesmen). Although the interests of 
these classes were not identical, they were compatible. This 
compatibility of interests led to a class coalition opposed 
to the interests of the large-scale capitalists on the one 
hand and the black class on the other hand. Pre-1945 white 
politics was thus characterized by the ability of the white 
class coalition to capture state power and to use it to limit 
the competition of the black underclass and international 
capital. 87 
Instead of the formal class divisions suggested by 
Arrighi, Murray argues that divisions were more informal and 
87Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia", pp. 
336-348. For modified versions of this thesis, see Kenneth 
Good, "Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class 
Formation", Journal of Modern African Studies 14 (December 
1976): 597-620; Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism in 
Rhodesia" African Affairs 73 (January 1974): 10-36; and 
Loney, pp. 51-58. 
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included non-economic groups. The most important of these 
groups centered on the public service (the Public Service 
A~sociation), white agriculture (first the Rhodesia Agricul-
tural Union and later the Rhodesia National Farmers Union), 
mining (the union of small working miners and the major 
companies), commerce (the local chambers of commerce and the 
national Associated Chamber of Commerce) and industry (the 
Federation of Rhodesian Industry). All these groups found 
formal incorporation in the government control boards. In 
the Pre-1945 era, the interests of agriculture and mining 
usually prevailed over that of commerce and industry. The 
reason, Murray suggests, was that commerce and industry were 
locally organized groups with demands that could be satis-
fied on a local or municipal level. Lacking a strong national 
organization and focus, they could not prevail over the well-
organized agricultural, mining and public service associa-
t . 88 1ons. 
As the preceding discussion indicates, there is wide 
agreement89 that mining and agricultural interests in pre-
1945 Zimbabwe have leverage within the executive-bureaucratic 
88 Murray, pp. 344-352. 
89 See also, Leys, pp. 98-105; and Robin Palmer, "The 
Agricultural History of Rhodesia" in Robin Palmer and Neil 
Parsons (eds.) The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and 
Southern Africa (Berkeley, California: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1977), pp. 239-243. 
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alliance. Disagreement about this leverage does exist, and 
focuses on the conceptualization of the powerful intere~ts 
(classes or interest groups), the considerations that animate 
their activity (economic self-interest or the satisfaction 
of group interests), and on the formality or informality of 
these groups' access to state power. 
3.2. The Pre-1945 Economy 
As stated before, Zimbabwe was opened to white settle-
ment in the hope of discovering great mineral wealth, but 
although deposits were found, they did not lead to the crea-
tion of a second Rand. The BSAC had, in anticipation of a 
gold rush, acquired land and sold it at inflated prices to 
incoming settlers. To then offset BSAC capital losses, 
+agricultural development was encouraged. 
The ecological environment for farming in Zimbabwe is, 
as in most parts of southern Africa, harsh: most suited to 
farming in Zimbabwe is the flat, high, cool and well-watered 
highveld running diagonally - northeast to southwest - across 
the interior; from this highveld the middleveld slopes east 
and westward, and is less conducive to crop farming; and the 
lowveld is infested with the tsetse fly and virtually water-
less. For most of the year, in fact, there is no rain in 
Zimbabwe. After 1900 there were other obstacles: a lack of ~ 
capital, equipment, infrastructure and a small domestic 
market (mainly the mi~es). Yet the BSAC encouraged farming 
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Figure II: Farming Potential of Zimbabwean Land (1962) 
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( 
bY developing land settlement schemes, created a Department 
of Agriculture that offered extension services, and created 
a Land Bank with lending and credit facilities. Settling on 
the fertile highveld, the new white farmers selected maize 
90 
and tobacco as their main crops. 
Like the mining industry, agriculture was labor-inten-
sive and for a while competed with the mines for black labor. 91 
Another source of competition was black farmers, who also sup-
plied maize to the mines, and it is indeed argued that they 
were more successful suppliers of mine-needs than white 
farmers. 92 The initiation of white cattle ranching further 
exacerbated the competition between black and white farmers. 
White agricultural production nevertheless rose and by the 
First World War "was firmly established as a central sector 
of the Rhodesian economy." 93 
90 Palmer, "Agricultural History of Rhodesia", pp. 
221-230. 
91
see Arrighi, "Labor Supplies", pp. 180-206. 
92Palmer, "Agricultural History of Rhodesia", pp. 228-
230; Ian Phimister, "Peasant Production and Underdevelopment 
in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1914, with Particular Reference 
to the Victoria District" in Palmer and Parsons, pp. 255-267 
and Barry Kosmin, "The Inyoka Tobacco Industry of the Shangwe 
People: The Displacement of a Pre-Colonial Economy in 
Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1938" in Palmer and Parsons, pp. 268-
288. 
93 Palmer, "The Agricultural History of Rhodesia", 
p. 237. 
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Agricultural production, however, suffered from extreme 
fluctuations: 
After the collapse of tobacco through overproduction in 
1913-1914, the industry slowly recovered and production 
rose from 426, 423 lb in 1914-15 to a record 5,659,809 lb 
in 1925-6 ••• Tobacco enjoyed another brief boom, following 
an increase in imperial preference, and production soared ... 
(to) 24,943,044 lb in 1927-8. But once again, as in 1913-
14, Rhodesian growers had over-reached themselves, for the 
overseas market was saturated, vast unsaleable stocks 
accumulated in British warehouses, the order books were 
closed and a great many tobacco farms were abandoned, with 
some 700 producers, three-quarters of the total, elimi-
nated.94 
With regard to maize: 
A similar pattern can be observed in regard to the maize 
industry, where production rose from 1,393,654 (203 lb) 
bags in 1925-6 to 1,985,848 bags in 1935-6, and exports 
rose from 434,592 (200 lb) bags in 1926 to 745,010 in 
1930. But by the beginning of 1931, with the export 
price falling from lls to 3s 4d~ most European maize-
growers were facing bankruptcy. 5 
Cattle farmers also became geared to meat exports after the 
introduction of refrigeration in the Rhodesian Railways and 
government bounty, but .suffered an immediate setback with the 
outbreak of foot-and-mouth-disease. This outbreak led to a 
two-year suspension of all agricultural products except citrus 
and tobacco. 96 
The generally unstable agricultural production led to 
government intervention. In 1931 and 1934 the government 
94 Ibid., pp. 236 and 239. 
95 Ibid., p. 240. 
96 Ibid. 
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promulgated the Maize Control Acts, designed to stabilize 
maize prices and to provide protection to white farmers 
against black farming competition in the higher-priced 
domestic market. The Tobacco and rairy Control Boards simi-
larly protected white agricultural production against over-
production and falling prices. In 1933 the government 
further decl~red a moratorium on farmers' payments for land 
purchases, enacted a Farmers Debts Adjustment Act that pro-
vided loans to farmers, and provided subsidies for road-
building and conservation efforts. 97 
The white agricultural economy was also of a generally 
static nature. Whites owned land under the provisions of the 
initial land apportionment that was enshrined in the 1923-
constitution. Hereby land was divided into native reserves 
(approximately 22 percent of the total land), white land 
(about 31 percent) and unassigned land (about 47 percent). 
Unassigned land formerly belonged to the BSAC, but after 1923 
it could be purchased by either blacks or whites. By 1925 a 
new land commission (the Morris Carter Commission) recommended 
readjustments, since few blacks bought land in unassigned 
areas and since whites then bought the best farmland. The 
result was the Land Apportionment Act of 1931, which extended 
White land ownership to about 51 percent of the total land 
While preserving nati_ve reserve land at about 22 percent. 
------~~-----------
97Loney, p. 57. · 
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Unassigned land was divided into African Purchase Land (about 
8 percent), while 19 percent remained unassigned. This land 
division remained in place until 1969, when it was replaced 
bY the Land Tenure Act. White land was almost entirely 
situated in the fertile highveld close to railroad links. 98 
Despite the extensive and fertile land held ~Y white 
1 . t 99 1 11 t. f th 1 d agricultura 1s s, on y a sma propor 1on o e an was 
actually cultivated before the Second World War. White 
agricultural production's twin pillars were maize and tobacco, 
as well as some cattle ranching, which used large amounts 
of land to produce a relatively small yield of crops or graz-
ing. Land ownership clearly did not equal land cultivation. 
Land cultivation, moreover, was semi-primitive: extensive 
rather than intensive black labor was used in conjunction 
with rudimentary tools (like hand hoes) and a lack of mech-
anization (single disc ox plows rather than tractors). Lack 
of adequate soil conservation measures and resulting soil 
depletion100 further added to the generally uneconomic nature 
98 George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography (London: 
University of London Press, 1970), pp. 37-58. 
99 The number of farmers was 
3052 by 1932 and to 3640 by 1944. 
and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia 
Press, 1977), p. 21. 
2042 in 1914, and rose to 
D.G. Clarke, Agricultural 
(Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo 
100
soil depletion in white areas was mainly due to the 
lack of rotational cultivation and fertilizer. Palmer, 
"Agricultural History of Rhodesia", p. 240. 
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of white agricultural production.
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The absence of modern agricultural methods in pre-1945 
Zimbabwe is directly attributable to the lack of capital 
(either foreign capital or local profits) and the small size 
of the domestic market. The initial market in Zimbabwe con-
sisted of urban areas and mines, but these needs were met -
largely by black farmers - before the First World W~r. 
Further expansion of the domestic market did not occur until 
the Second World War. The export market was, as shown, 
highly unreliable and the overproduction it encouraged led to 
boom-bust periods in white agricultural production, which led 
to increasing government regulation of marketing and produc-
tion. 
The mining industry was more explicitly geared to the 
export market. Minerals were exploited by large companies 
and smallworking miners, who concentrated on the exploitation 
of gold in about 1,750 workings. By the late 1930s, minerals 
contributed approximately 25 percent of the national income 
Of Z . b b 102 1m a we. 
Before 1945 the Zimbabwean economy thus resembled 
colonial economies of the export-type: it had a mining in-
dustry almost totally geared to exports and a white-dominated 
101
rbid., pp. 239-243; Loney, pp. 53-58 and Arrighi, 
"Labor Supplies", pp. 191-198. 
102Arrighi, "Political Economy of Rhodesia", p. 354. 
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agricultural industry. Few secondary industries existed, 
largely because of the small size of the domestic market; 
secondary needs were largely met by South African and 
103 British manufacturers. 
3.3. Foreign Pressure 
As the preceding discussion shows, pre-1945 Zimbabwe 
was vulnerable to foreign pressures in at least two major 
respects: First, it was vulnerable to British imperial 
actions in the southern African region. s~ccnd, given the 
nature of its economy, it was vulnerable to developments in 
the world economy. The latter vulnerability indeed prompted 
a government inquiry (the Danziger Memorandum of 1943), which 
questioned Zimbabwe's future as an export-oriented economy 
and suggested the development of secondary industries in-
stead.104 
3.3.L Economic Pressure 
Zimbabwe entered the Second World Wr.r as a Common-
wealth component of the Allied war effort. The effect of the 
war on the Zimbabwean economy was explosive. As Arrighi 
states: 
The lack of internal demand represented a brake on indus-
trialization and development, and the progressive decrease 
103British trade with Zimbabwe was a result of Common-
wealth preference. Trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa 
Proceeded under several customs agreements. Zimbabwe also 
relied on South African ports and railroads for the export 
of its goods. 
104Gann and Gelfand, pp. 175-176. 
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of overall peasant productivity worsened this obstacle. 
World War II was the external stimulant which more than 
offset the hindrance and started economic growth in 105 Southern Rhodesia after the stagnation of the 1930s. · 
· The Second World w~r created a virtually insatiable demand ;Z 
for Zimbabwean goods, as the Allied war effort required 
manufactured goods, agricultural products, and minerals like 
chrome, gold and asbestos. 106 
The Zimbabwean economy, however, given its structure, 
was ill-equipped to meet rapid increases in demand. There 
were few secondary industries and the agricultural economy 
was, as shown, static. The boom conditions of the Second 
World War were, moreover, sustained after 1945 as the shortage 
of raw materials and United States currency continued. 
European states did not wish to spend United States capital 
by buying American-made goods, like tobacco. 
The Zimbabwean government responded to these foreign 
pressures by encouraging the development of secondary indus-
tries within Zimbabwe •. It set up anti-inflationary devices 
and publicly financed the creation of iron- and steel-
industries. The government's efforts were complemented by 
a sudden and unexpected influx of Eritish capital. Whereas 
105Arrighi, "Political Economy of Rhodesia", p. 350. 
106In its most direct form the increase in demand 
came from the placement of an allied air training scheme in 
Zimbabwe, resulting in an influx of allied capital and a 
demand for Zimbabwean supplies to air stations, quarters, 
land, and buildings. Ibid. 
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a considerable amount of British capital was previously 
invested in South Africa, the rising tide of Afrikaner 
nationalism in South Africa made Zimbabwe, with its imperial 
sympathies a more politically suitable investment area. 
Foreign investment, which amounted to 13.5 million pounds in 
1947, was more than double that in 1949 and reached 50.7 
million pounds in 1951. 107 The result was the development of 
a manufacturing industry in Zimbabwe, as can be gauged from 
the following figures: 
The contribution of manufacturing to national income rose 
from 9 percent in the late 1930s to about 15 percent in 
the early 1950s to over 18 percent in the early 1960s •.. 
the industry passed from the small family-shop stage to 
the large-scale, mechanized, corporate-owned factory.l08 
This rise of secondary industry in Zimbabwe was to 
have several economic and political consequences. One was 
the transformation of the white population structure in Zim-
babwe. In 1921, for example, 25 Percent of white Zimbaweans 
were farmers, eleven percent were employed in the mining 
industry, 26 percent were public service employees (11 percent 
of which were railway workers) and 17 percent were employees 
of commercial and industrial enterprises. By 1951, however, 
only 12 percent were farmers, mining employees were reduced 
to five percent, while public service employees rose to 33 
percent (including transportation workers) and commercial and 
107Ibid., p. 351. 
108
rbid., p. 353. 
124 
industrial employees rose to 49 percent. By 1961 these 
patterns were further accentuated. Farmers declined to five 
percent and mining employment to three percent, while the 
public service rose to 38 percent (including transportation 
workers) and commercial and industrial employees to 54 
109 percent. 
In summary, the pre-1945 population structure was 
characterized by the numeric preponderance of farmers andf. 
public service employees. In post-1945 Zimbabwe, public 
service continued to account for a high proportion of white 
employment, but it was first rivalled and then surpassed by 
commercial and industrial employment. Farmers were numeri-
cally eclipsed. 
Since these figures are given as percentages, it is 
important to note that there was spectacular white popula-
tion growth after 1945. As a result of slow economic growth 
and a selective immigration policy, the white population grew 
from 33,600 in 1921 to 69,000 by 1941. Five years later, 
however, the population of whites grew to 82,400 and reached 
135,600 by 1951, reaching 177,100 by 1956 and 221,500 by 
1961.110 
An immediate political consequence of this popula-
tion increase was the expansion of the white voting roll. 
109These figures are adapted from Murray, pp. 16-19. 
110 Bowman, p. 13. 
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Although not all immigrants registered as voters, immigrants 
did emerge as an electoral force, particularly since most 
did not settle as farmers, but entered public service, 
manufacturing and industrial employment. The number of far-
mers actually remained stable; it is as a percentage of the 
total population that they declined. 111 
Besides its efforts to stimulate the development of 
secondary industries, the Zimbabwean government also acted 
to stimulate agricultural production. These efforts fell 
into two categories, namely efforts to promote the productive 
capacities of black farmers and efforts to promote white 
agricultural production. Black agriculture itself fell into 
two categories, namely production in the African Purchase 
Land and in the Native Reserves. 
As indicated before, black agriculturalists had 
responded well to the market- and cash-economy (centered on 
the mines) during the 1890-1910 period. Subsequently the 
productive capacities of black farmers declined progressively, 
Ch . fl b f '1 d 1 t. . th d 112 .j-1e y ecause o so1 ep e 10n 1n e reserve areas, ~ 
111
see Clements, pp. 40-95 and William G. Kuepper, 
G. Lynne Lackey and E. Nelson Swinerton, "The European Depart-
ure from Rhodesia: Migration in a Crisis-Situation", paper 
Presented at the Third World Conference, Chicago, Illinois, 
March 29, 1979, pp. 2-5. 
112
since the soil in the reserves was less fertile 
than in white areas, more land would be required for blacks -
even without population pressure. Nelson, pp. 272-276. 
12~ 
113 traditionalist cultivation methods, and population pres-
sure in the reserves. Apart from the hard-pressed 
reserves,
114 
some blacks lived on purchased land, bought in 
competition with whites in the unassigned areas before 1931 
or allocated as African Purchase Land. Although these far-
/ 
mers occupied larger farms and employed non-family labor, 
their methods of cultivation were similar to that of farmers 
in the reserves, that is, nonmechanized labor-intensive 
cultivation and cattle-holding. 115 
Initially political interest in the productive capa-
cities of black agriculturalists were confined to the crea-
tion of a Native Education Department (later renamed the 
Native Development Department), but the promotion of black 
agriculture consisted of the inspection of mission schools 
and the encouragement of local, traditionalist industries 
(like weaving and woodcarving). The Native Development 
Department was later absorbed by the Native Affairs Depart-
ment in 1933. Up to the Second World War, the objective of 
113Ibid., p. 294. Agriculturalists in the reserves 
occupied small plots, cultivated crops with family and non-
mechanized labor, or tended to small herds of cattle. 
114The annual reports of Chief Native Commissioners 
regularly mentioned "overcrowding", "general overstocking" 
and a "vicious and expanding circle of destruction." Quoted 
by Arrighi, "Labor Supplies", p. 207. 
115 Nelson, p. 294. 
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the Native Affairs Department was to preserve law and order 
in the black rural areas, to collect taxes and to support 
the "traditional way of life . .,ll6 
During the Eecond World War, government policy toward 
the development of the black areas changed. One of the first 
indications of this change was Huggins' Statement on Native 
Policy in 1941, which expressed interest in increasing black 
agricultural output. Subsequently, government policy was 
characterized by efforts to increase black agricultural pro-
duction. 
In 1943 a survey of the reserves by the Department of 
Native Agriculture estimated that out of the 98 Reserves, 62 
were overpopulated) (19 were more than 100 percent over-
117 populated) and 50 were overstocked." With regard to 
overpopulation, the government's responsewas to appoint 
the Mcilwaine Commission to investigate soil conservation 
under the recently enacted Natural Resources Act of 1941, 
who recommended that soil conservation measures should be 
implemented through a Natural Resources Board and through 
local Native Commissioners. In addition to these measures 
the government appointed the Ds.nziger Commission in 1948, 
with responsibility to investigate land allocation. While 
116
on the history of the Native Affairs Department and 
the general administrative machinery for black affairs, see 
J. F. Holleman,. Chief, Council and Commissioner, Some Problems 
of Government in Rhodesia (Assen, the Netherlands: Royal 
VanGorum, 1969) pp. 3-43. 
117Arrighi, "Labor Supplies", p. 208. 
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the native reserves and the African Purchase Land had not 
increased since the Land Apportionment Act of 1931, the 
bl~popu1ation by 1941 had increased by 40 percent. Con-
sequently a 1950 Amendment to the Land Apportionment Act 
designated four million acres of unassigned land as Special 
Native Areas. These areas, which were later somewhat en-
larged, were·to relieve the population pressure of the native 
reserves. However, these areas were also to absorb "unproduc-
tive" squatters on white farms. 118 
In 1944 the Zimbabwean government appointed another 
commission to investigate black agriculture and trade. This 
Godlonton Commission produced a report that used the cate-
gories of developed and undeveloped rather than the familiar 
black-white categories in describing Zimbabwean agriculture, 
and criticized black production, marketing and trade. The 
principal causes of poor black production, the report argued, 
were bad animal husbandry practices and the failure of local 
leadership (i.e. traditional chiefs) to promote such prac-
tices. The Godlonton Commission's "Report of the Corr.mission 
on Native Production and Trade" led to the enactment of the 
Native Development Fund Act and the Native Production and 
Marketing revelopment Act in 1948; it created government funds 
118Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, pp. 37-58. 
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for the support ·of black agricultural initiatives, attempted 
to improve black marketing conditions and also created an 
administrative machinery designed to centralize all efforts 
to promote black agriculture. Efforts to promote black 
production were to be compulsory which, in a local context, 
placed much of the executive burden on traditional chiefs, 
k ·1 d N t.. C . . 119 local blac counc1 s, an a 1ve omm1ss1oners. Perhaps 
the most radical measure to promote black agriculture came 
with the enactment of the African Land Husbandry Act of 1951, 
designed to secure individual black farming and grazing 
rights to destock black cattle holdings. In 1956 all these 
efforts were capped by a "Five Year Plan", incorporating many 
·of the previous marketing, prO<;luction and trade reforms .·120 
Government efforts to promote black agricultural 
production had little, if any, economic effect and was con-
121 firmed by government reports. Although very little 
119 Murray, pp. 303-312 and Holleman, pp. 44-76. 
120 Holleman, pp. 45-54. See also the What the Native 
Land Husbandry Act Means to the Rural African and to Southern 
Rhodesia: A Five Year Plan That Will Revolutionize African 
Agriculture (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1955}. ·Govern-
ment expenditure on black agriculture in. the 1941-1949 period 
was about 2.5 million; it rose to 15.8 million in the fol-
lowing nine years. Mcmta·gue Yudelman, Africans on the Land 
(Cambridge: Harvard Ur.iversity Press, 1964), p. 159. 
121First and Second Report of the Select Committee on 
the Resettlement of Natives (Salisbury: Government Printer, 
~959 and 1960); A Note on the Economics of African Development 
.!_n Southern Rhodesia with Special Rfderence to Agriculture 
(~alisbury: Government Printer, 1960); Report of the Commis-
S1on of Inquiry into Alleged Discontent in the Mangwende 
130 
statistical information about black agriculture is available, 
it is estimated that cash sales of black producers after 1957 
d t t . 122 remaine s a 1c. There was a modest increase in black 
agricultural production overall, but a possible surplus-effect 
was negated by population increases in the reserves. There 
are other reasons for the economic failure of the government's 
reform efforts. One reason was the shallow and self-righteous 
government views on the reason for the limited black produc-
tion, namely that it was caused by lack of commitment to the 
industrialized way of life. Another cause for the failure 
of rural black reform was the government's overestimation of 
its administrative capacity in rural areas. Although the 
government's administrative presence in the rural areas 
increased, it added responsibility to the already overbur-
dened Native Commissioners. The government attempted to ease 
this burden by creating local black councils by the African 
Councils Act of 1957. These councils were composed of local 
chiefs and other local blacks, but they suffered from a lack 
of local support. The government also miscalculated the size 
of black holdings that would be suitable to intense cultiva-
tion. Black farmers on average were allocated six acres, 
Reserve (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1961); and Report of 
the Advisory Committee: The Development of the Resources of 
Southern Rhodesia with Particular Reference to the Role of 
African Agriculture (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1962). 
122 
Most figures consist of estimates. Only cash sales 
through official marketing agencies are recorded. Nelson, 
p. 293. 
lTI 
compared to the white farm size minimum of 750 acres of 
already deteriorated land. The result was that cultivation 
caused further soil depletion. 123 
Perhaps the most important reason for the failure of 
the government's reforms in general and the African Land 
Husbandry Act in particular was political opposition. The: 
government attempted to secure individual black farming rights, 
but this aim conflicted with the customary basis of black 
society. By custom the allocation of black farmland took 
place within the context of tribal wards, where chiefs par-
celled out communally-held land to individual use. Individual 
farming rights undermined the security of rural tenure (it 
indeed did not even recognize tribal ward distinctions) and 
undermined the tribal structure and authority. Destocking 
was also controversial: by custom cattle-holdings are 
indicators of rural black status and wealth and the slaughter 
or sale of cattle could not be accomplished by voluntary 
124 
means. 
Given that the government's efforts to improve black 
agricultural production adversely affected all blacks' 
security in rural communal land, undercut the authority of 
local traditional leaders, and was implemented in a coercive 
manner, it is not surprising that these efforts 
123 Holleman, pp. 56-72. 
124 Ibid. 
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encountered sustained black opposition from both the rural 
and urban areas. A nationalist leader indeed remarked that 
the African Land Husbandry Act was the best recruiter the 
. 125 
nationalists ever had. 
The lack of political support and faulty economic 
reasoning thus undermined government efforts to effect a 
capitalist breakthrough in black agricultural production. 
Already overstrained by the 1950s, the structure of black 
agriculture could not absorb the population increases in 
rural areas. This resulted in the absence of young men from 
126 the reserves, who sought wage labor opportunities else-
where, and a reliance of rural dwellers on cash gifts from 
l b . f . d d l t. 127 wage- a or1ng r1en s an re a 1ves. By the early 1960s 
it was indeed calculated that the reserves could not meet 
their own subsistence needs: the reserves then became net 
importers of subsistence food needs. 128 
125 George Nyandoro as quoted by Ken f.rown, Land In 
Southern Rhodesia (London: Africa Bureau, 1959), p. 2. 
l26w . . h e1nr1c , pp. 21-22. 
127 The transfer of funds from urban wage-laborers to 
rural friends and relatives is known as a "remittance nexus" 
and is expected to constitute a considerable proportion of 
rural dwellers' income. Clarke, pp. 44-51. 
128Bratton remarks that this "destruction over time of 
the capacity of African agriculture to produce a surplus sets 
Rhodesia apart from Kenya ••• A reconstruction of African agri-
culture and a successful incorporation of African cultivators 
into a capitalist 'peasant' mode was undertaken after the Mau 
Mau rebellion by means of the spread of cash-cropping." 
Michael Bratton, "Structural Transformation in Zimbabwe: 
133 
As previously discussed, white agricultural technology 
before 1945 was similar to black agricultural technology; 
the differences between the two agricultures derived more 
from differential access to state aid and different farm 
size. 129 Large portions of legally reserved white farmland 
was also unoccupied (and hence uncultivated) and even large 
portions of occupied land were uncultivated. 130 The initial 
response to demand-pressures generated by the Second World 
war was thus poor: increases in production did occur but 
they fell short of demands and food rationing and imports 
. d 131 were requ1re • 
The government's response to these pressures was, first, 
to change its policy with regard to immigration. Although 
still selective as far as the origins of immigrants was con-
cerned (i.e. "loyal British subjects"), a more vigorous 
immigration policy was adopted to attract potential farmers. 
Land acquisition was easiest for veterans of the Eecond World 
War, but acquisition was more difficult for younger immi-
grants who were required to first work on existing farms 
Comparative Notes from the Neo-Colonisation of Kenya", Journal 
of Modern African Studies 15 (December 1977): 604-605. Here-
after cited as "Structural Transformation". 
129Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, "The Roots of Rural 
Poverty: Historical Background" in Palmer and Parsons, pp. 8-9. 
130 Before 1945 less than three percent of the arable 
land in white farming areas was under cultivation. Nelson, 
p. 283. 
1952. 
131 Ibid., p. 285. Maize imports were required until 
134 
l .f . f 1 d h" 132 before qua 1 y1ng or an -owners 1p. The results of 
the farming-oriented immigration policy were generally dis-
appointing, as most immigrants preferred to settle in towns 
as wage-labourers. While the number of farmers did increase, 
h b f 1 d . d lt.· t d 133 much of t e est arm an rema1ne uncu 1va e . 
Second, the government encouraged better cultivation 
on existing farmland. White soil depletion was, like that of 
black farmers, criticized and similarly encouraged by the 
Natural Resources Board and extension officers of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture. At the National Farmers Union Congress 
in 1946 Huggins switched public criticism of white farmers 
to their production techniques and stated that government 
policy henceforth would encourage more intense cultivation 
of holdings not exceeding 1,000 acres. In order to guarantee 
reasonable prices for increased production, the government 
would continue its support of rational marketing practices 
134 
and also maintain export controls. 
In terms of output and value, agricultural production 
by white farmers did increase: between 1937 and 1958 the 
volume of production·increased by 259 percent, and its value 
132Ibid. 
133 The number of farmers in 1944 was 3640 and by 1965 
it rose to 6266. Some of these white farmers owned more than 
one farm. Clarke, pp. 21-22. 
134 Gann and Gelfand, pp. 193-195. 
135 
135 bY 1,000 percent. Before 1945 maize and tobacco were the 
twin pillars of agricultural production. Between 1944 and 
1954 the volume of maize and other non-tobacco products· 
increased by an average of 60 percent. In this period there 
was thus some agricultural diversification, as the sugar 
1 . t . . d 136 b t . d t b and cotton cu t1va 1on 1ncrease , u ma1ze an o acco 
nevertheless remained the chief products: maize accounted for 
39 percent of the total cropland, and tobacco accounted for 
137 19 percent. 
Much of the increase in white agricultural production 
can be attributed to improved production techniques. With 
regard to tobacco, producers switched from burley and turkish 
tobacco to a flue-cured virginia-type, and increased their 
use of pesti- and herbicides and fertilizer. The two pro-
vinces of Mashonaland, which came to produce more than 80 
percent of all white maize and tobacco production, 138 for 
135 Palmer, "The Agricultural liistory of Rhodesia", 
p. 244. 
136 Nelson, p. 285. 
137 Bratton, "Structural Transformation" p. 602. 
138Most of the crop production in Zimbabwe is geo-
graphically concentrated in Mashonaland North and South. In 
1965, for example, these two provinces "produced 87 percent 
of all white-grown maize, 84 percent of the Virginia tobacco, 
and 58 percent of the milk". Nelson, pp. 288-289. The low-
est crop yields are found in the Midlands, Victoria and Mata-
beleland provinces, where cattle ranching is the white agri-
cultural pre-occupation. This is in large part a reflection 
of the ecological conditions: the more fertile Mashonaland 
136 
example uses 80 .percent of all white use of fertilizer. 139 
With regard to maize there were similar improvements as 
farmers adopted a locally developed hybrid maize type, _and 
h f f t .l. d h b. d t• .d 140 icnreased t e use o er 1 1zer an er 1- an pes 1c1 es. 
The period between 1945 and 1965 also witnessed the 
increase of large-scale commercial farming. Foreign and 
domestic-owned plantation (or estate) farming increased 
especially in the southwestern and -eastern provinces 
(Matabeleland North and South, Victoria and Manicaland), 
where sugar, cotton, tobacco, tea and citrus are also locally 
processed. These vast estates of companies like the Lonrho 
Group, Liebig Corporation, Huletts and Anglo-American 
operated as competitors to individually and locally-owned 
~ixed farms. 141 Despite the increases in agricultural pro-
duction, white farming remained vulnerable in at least three 
respects. 
First; white agriculture remained a labor-intensive 
industry. In the period between 1946 and 1974 the number of 
black farmworkers in fact·increased by 252 percent, casting 
doubt on the use of improved managerial and production tech-
niques as the sole explanations of improved production. The 
bas an average farm size of 3,000 acres while the more arid 
other provinces with its cattle ranching and mixed farms have 
an average farm size of 6,000 acres. Bratton, "StructlU'al 
Transformation ... p. 602. 
139 Nelson, p·. 288. 
140Ibid., p. 289. 
141 Bratton, "Structural Transformation" pp.. 602-603. 
137 
number of black farmworkers rose from 142,000 to 272,000 
between 1946 and 1961. The two Mashonaland provinces, where 
. production is particularly high, employ 60.5 percent of all 
142 permanent black farmworkers. Under these conditions it 
is not surprising that white farming organizations lobbied 
d t 1 Of black laborers. l43 to secure an a equa e supp y 
Second, since the domestic and the CAF-created market 
remained small and tobacco especially enjoyed high world 
market prices, agricultural production became thoroughly 
geared to the export market. This shift is in large part 
due to the emergence of tobacco as the main agricultural 
crop; in 1945 the value of tobacco sales, for example, was 
3.9 million pounds but by 1960 it rose to 29.5 million 144 
pounds. This five-fold increase in value, coupled with the 
increase in tobacco production, made white agriculture the 
chief earner of Zimbabwean foreign exchange by the early 
1960s. 145 This reliance on exports of a few agricultural 
primary products rendered Zimbabwe's economy vulnerable to 
142 Clarke, pp. 24-26. 
143 Loney, pp. 69-73 and Arrighi, "Political Economy 
of Rhodesia," pp. 353-255. 
144 Palmer, "Agricultural History of Rhodesia," p. 
244 (fn. 155). 
145 Tobacco accounted for 47 percent of the total value 
of agricultural production in 1965. Nelson, p. 286. 
138 
fluctuations in the world market economy. 
Third, although cultivation was more extensive in 1965 
than in the pre-1945 era, less than one-sixth of the total 
arable land in white farmland was under cultivation. The 
reason, the government reported, was that many white farmers 
preferred to increase but then maintain production at certain 
"target-income"-levels. This resulted in artificial land 
scarcity, uncultivated land and agricultural inefficiency. 146 
Thus white agricultural production under the impact 
of government pressure did increase dramatically after the 
Second World War. White agriculture became more capital-
intensive and adopted improved production techniques. Yet it 
remained vulnerable. Compared to volume increases, value 
increases were disproportionately high, reflecting the high 
world market prices for tobacco. Farmers also continued to 
rely on increasing numbers of black farmworkers. The result, 
as confirmed by government reports, was that white agriculture 
not only QPerated at less-than-full-potential, but that it 
was also vulnerable in its lack of mechanization (or over-
reliance on black labor) and the fluctuations of the world 
market economy. 
146Ibid., pp. 280-281. 
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3 2 Political Pressure and Reform? 3. • . 
During and after the Second World War efforts to 
incorporate Zimbabwe with the northern territories gain~d 
momentum, as the strategic, political and economic arguments 
for the creation of a central African union became more 
forceful. Zimbabwe desired a close form of such a union, in 
the form of amalgamation with copper-rich Zambia. 147 The 
British government investigated this possibility by way of 
the Bledisloe Commission"in 1938 but concluded that although 
the socio-economic position of blacks in Zimbabwe was better 
than"in the northern territories Zimbabwe's race policies 
were apparently set on a course more similar to South African 
race policy. The then existing and anticipated future 
direction of Zimbabwe's race policy made a close form of 
union impossible. The British government, as indica ted before, 
hoped for a liberal-counterweight in race policy in central 
Africa and hoped that Zimbabwe would "liberalize" its race 
policy so as to overcome its divergence from northern race 
1 . 148 po 1cy. 
Zimbabwe's race policy between 1923 and 1945 has been 
described as a "dual", "two-pyramid"- or "gradual"-policy. 
147
chanock, pp. 190-248 
148Ibid. 
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Race policy was rooted in the principle and practice of land 
apportionment, which created separate and legally specified 
land areas where land ownership was exclusive to one or the 
·other race. The black population was seen as being naturally 
at home in the native reserves and the government had a 
pastoral view of the nature of rural black society. Govern-
ment policy aimed at the preservation of the traditional 
political, social and economic way of life in rural areas. 
By implication politically active blacks in non-traditional 
ways and in non-traditional areas were viewed in a negative 
light. 149 This pastoral view of rural society also implied 
that blacks did not naturally belong to the urban areas -
which was reflected in poor urban housing conditions, poverty 
and other unsatisfactory living conditions and the introduc-
tion of pass laws in 1936. 
British policy between the Bledisloe Commission and the 
creation of the CAF witnessed the demise of the liberal 
counterpoise-idea. To a certain extent the Eledisloe Commis-
sion's findings about the socio-economic conditions of blacks 
in its northern protectorates already embarrassed the British 
government, who wished to contrast it with more illiberal 
conditions in Zimbabwe. Huggins nevertheless protested the 
149For a full discussion of pre-1945 race policy in 
Zimbabwe, see L~ys, pp. 258-270, who argues that racial ideas 
Permeated but did not dominate white political thought. See 
also Richard Gray, The Two Nations (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1960), pp. 3-194. 
141 
commission's findings, which led to a one-man commission of 
inquirY of central African race policies by Lord Haley. In 
1941 the confidential report of Lord Haley still maintained 
that divergent race policies existed, but argued that they 
were not conclusive differences and that there was increas-
ing public and private recognition in Zimbabwe that blacks 
were an integral part of Zimbabwean society. There was also 
promise of improvement in the socio-economic conditions of 
blacks. At the same time the British High Commissioner in 
south Africa reported on the increase of anti-imperial and 
'segregationist sentiments among Afrikaners. By comparison 
white Zimbabweans were more acceptable as imperial and, 
hopefully, racial allies. Such an alliance should not be 
precluded because of the "alleged errors" in racial affairs; 
in fact, white Zimbabweans should be given greater self-
t . . 1 tt 150 governmen 1n rac1a rna ers. 
The generally favorable tone of government inquiries 
between 1938 and 1945 about Zimbabwe's racial affairs diluted 
British pressures for race reforms. The hope of a harmonized, 
liberal and British-supported race policy for the CAF dis-
appeared. By 1951 the conference negotiating CAF stated that 
the timing and method of the constituent territories' race 
Policies still differed and that the new race policy of the 
150
chanock, pp. 230-238 and Palley, pp. 331-336. 
142 
CAF would simply be one dedicated to the economic, social and 
political advancement of blacks in partnership with whites. 151 
Zimbabwe's race policy of this period reflected the 
relaxation of British demands for racial concessions. Faced 
with electoral challenge from the Liberal Party in the post-
war election, Huggins campaigned for a raise in voting quali-
fications, which would further restrict the number of black 
voters, while proposing to have black interests in parliament 
represented by two white members. In 1950 the government 
dropped the latter proposal, but it did raise the voting 
. t. . 1951 152 1 d. t d . th qualif1ca 1ons 1n , ea 1ng o a ecrease 1n e num-
ber of black voters. 153 
The 1951 increase in voting qualifications was the high 
point of Zimbabwean governments' efforts to limit black 
political participation. In 1956 the commission on electoral 
reform (the Tredgold Commission) recommended another increase 
in voting qualifications, but suggested the creation of a 
"special roll" of voters with lower qualifications. Special 
roll voters could not, however, count for more than half 
151 Palley, pp. 333-336. 
152Ibid., p. 308. Property 
to 500 pounds and annual income to 
ability to read and speak English. 
required. 
qualifications were raised 
120 pounds as well as the 
Citizenship was also now 
153 Leys, p. 192. Leys reports that more blacks could 
have participated, based on government reports on the number 
of blacks who met the voting qualifications. Ibid., p. 197. 
143 
154 
of common roll votes. While the Electoral Amendment Act 
of 1957 did not follow all the Tredgold Commission's recom-
mendations, it did introduce a second preference voting 
system and did create a special voting role which could not 
count for more than 20 percent of common roll votes. By the 
end of 1960 the total number of black voters increased to 
3,129 (out of a total electorate of 75,061) and by 1961 to 
5,177 (out of a total electorate of 88,820). 155 Government 
policy to increase the number of black voters was part of the 
"liberal", "inter-racial", or "middle class" or "partnership" 
strategy. This middle class policy was largely prompted 
because the UFP faced electoral challenge and wanted to 
extend its support base. This extension would take the form 
of creating and then enfranchising a black middle class. The 
sequence of this policy was·important: socio-economic improve-
ment would precede black enfranchisement. 
The government's middle class policy of the 1950s, it 
is submitted, can best be understood as a response to the 
loss of white political support the government experienced 
in the wake of its post-1945 reforms. These reform efforts 
included, among other things, the encouragement of black 
agriculture and secondary industries. With regard to black 
154 Palley, pp. 308-312. 
155 Leys, pp. 270-277. 
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agriculture, this entailed an increase in government aid and 
services. With regard to secondary industries, its develop-
ment implied far-reaching changes in race policy. Unlike 
white agriculture, secondary industries required a stable and 
skilled labour-supply, coupled with the need to provide 
adequate housing and other socio-economic opportunities for 
blacks·in urban areas, which were judged as unacceptable by 
a government report in 1944. 156 A wave of strikes and urban 
labor problems accentuated the need for government-induced 
reforms of labor and living conditions. 157 
~To stabilize and secure a skilled labor force, the 
government introduced a Native Urban Act, focusing speci-
ficially on better housing conditions and adequate wages. 
These reforms encountered significant white opposition 
emanating primarily from rural employers of cheap, seasonal 
156
see the Report on the Question of Native Housing 
and Implementation of the Land Apportionment Act in the 
Urban Areas of the Colony (Salisbury: Government Printer, 
1944). 
157
see Report of the Commission to Investigate the 
Grievances Which Gave Rise to the Strike amongst the African 
Employees of the Rhodesia Railways and Certain Other Matters 
Affecting Africans Employed in Industry (Salisbury: Govern-
ment Printer, 1946) and the Report of the Commission Appointed 
to Inquire into and Report upon All Matters Concerning Recent 
Disturbances in the Colony (Salisbury: Government Printer, 
1946). For a more complete discussion of the government's 
industrialization policy, see the Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into the Protection of Secondary Industries in 
Southern Rhodesia (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1946) 
The government moved to secure white labor stability - after 
several white strikes - with the Industrial Conciliation Act 
of 1934. It facilitated the mediation of white labor problems, 
but excluded black workers. 
145 
and unskilled labor. White farmers resisted the imposition 
of rural minimum wages and complained (with smallworking 
miners) of the shortages caused by labourers leaving for 
better-paid urban wage labor. General shortages of black 
labor did indeed exist, leading to a national conference in 
November 1950 on labor shortages. In response the government 
introduced Labor Boards to regulate the supply of black 
laborers, but labor problems continued. White rural-based 
opposition thus remained strong and, finding expression in 
the Liberal Party, they waged a two-year battle over the 
imposition of the Native Urban Areas Act. The bill finally 
became law in 1946. 158 
Thus the Zimbabwean government did attempt certain 
race-related reforms in the 1950s. The policy changes were 
prompted not by direct pressures from the British government-
if anything, British pressure abated--but by the indirect 
consequences of foreign economic pressure. Policy-changes 
also did not take the form of increasing formal black poli-
tical opportunities, but rather aimed at improving urban 
black labor and living conditions. These latter improve-
ments were the supposed roots of a black middle class. The 
government's reforms, however, generated significant rural 
opposition. Rural blacks opposed it because it threatened 
tribal structure, custom and authority and white farmers 
opposed it because it threatened their supply of cheap black 
labor. 
158 Gray, pp. 209-314. 
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3 .4. 1960-1962: A Government in Crisis 
By the early 1960s government reform efforts had been 
in operation for more than 15 years. These efforts, as shown, 
encompassed a wide range of measures, extending the govern-
ment's interventionist capacity and aims. The results of this 
intervention were, however, mixed. 
The most promising development was the diversification 
of the Zimbabwean economy. A manufacturing industry developed 
from a 5.8 percent share of the value of Gross Domestic 
Product in 1960 to a 16.9 percent share in 1960. Manufactur-
ing was still surpassed, however, by the share (in terms of 
value) of agriculture (18.8 percent) mining (6.7 percent), 
construction (7.3 percent), electricity and water (3.3 per-
cent), and commercial and service industries like hotels and 
restaurants (47.9 percent) accounted for the remaining 
159 
shares of the GDP value. 
Yet the economy continued to be vulnerable. One vul-
nerability was its reliance on exports of a few primary 
products to the world market. The mining industry was 
virtually excluded from modernizing efforts and its contri-
bution to the national income declined from about ten percent 
in the early 1950s to approximately five percent in the early 
1960s. Part of this decline can be attributed to the inabil-
ity to increase output, which was hampered by obsolete 
159 Nelson, pp. 250-251. 
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equipment and the limited amount of foreign capital available. 
Thoroughly geared to the world market prices, Zimbabwean gold 
miners saw the price of gold remain stable in relation to 
production costs. Lacking profits from gold sales, the govern-
ment encouraged the increased exploitation of low value 
minerals like asbestos, copper, coal and chrome, but these 
minerals could neither be mined nor exported in bulk. The 
result was that the mining industry came to be dominated by 
a few large foreign-owned companies, smallworking miners 
were eliminated, and there was an increasing interest in the 
bulk production and export of low-grade and low-value min-
erals. This mining inclination was facilitated by improving 
rail access to South African and Mozambican ports. 160 
The manufacturing industry itself was also vulnerable. 
The Zimbabwean market remained small and was only slightly 
and temporarily enlarged by the creation of the CAF. Domes-
tic consumers consisted of a small number of whites with 
sophisticated buying habits and substantial buying power, and 
a large number of blacks with limited buying power, and demands 
for low-quality consumer goods. For a period after the Second 
World War domestic manufacturing opportunities were created 
by the post-war difficulties of foreign and especially 
EuroPean manufacturers. As the export capabilities of the 
European manufacturers increased while the buying power of 
160Ibid., pp. 309-310 and Arrighi, "Political Economy 
of Rhodesia," p. 354. 
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the blacks did not (i.e. there failed to develop a black 
161 
middle class), the Zimbabwean manufacturers faced chal-
lenge from imports of high quality goods. The result was 
that the Zimbabwean manufacturing industry by 1960 was geared 
to the production of a limited range of low quality consumer 
162 goods. 
The afrility to import high-quality consumer goods and 
industrial equipment depended on the ability of agricultural 
and mining exports to earn foreign exchange. Both were sub-
ject, however, to fluctuations in the world market. Although 
some agricultural diversification did occur, tobacco remained 
the main crop and the chief earner of foreign exchange. 
Efforts to increase the productive capacities of black far-
mers were perhaps the most dismal failure. While capital 
investments in black agriculture increased, efforts were 
plagued by shallow reasoning, administrative overextension, 
local black opposition, population pressure and resulting 
soil depletion. The contribution of black agriculture to the 
GDP indeed declined: in 1954 it contributed an 8.7 percent 
share, declining by 1958 to 6.7 percent, and by 1964 even 
f 163 urther to 6.4 percent. 
161Black buying power declined in the 1945-1965 period. 
See Arrighi, "Labor Supplies" pp. 215-217. 
162 Nelson, pp •. 312-315. 
163w . . h e1.nr1.c , p. 23. 
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The government itself was also vulnerable, for it had failed 
to create, enfranchise and attract the support of a black 
middle class. Political support was still confined to whites 
but, among them, a rural-based opposition was generated by 
the government's reform efforts. A rural-based black opposi-
tion also existed in response to the government's reforms. 
3.4.1· Foreign Pressure 
The dissolution of the CAF brought renewed foreign 
economic and especially political pressure on the Zimbabwean 
government. The breakup of the CAF, as stated before, was 
due to the conflicting political forces it contained, and its 
dissolution would have economic and political consequences 
for Zimbabwe in particular. With regard to the political 
consequences, the breakup of the CAF implied --for the first 
time in Zimbabwean history since the early settlement--the 
existence of Zimbabwe as an independent or autonomous political 
unit. The achievement of such a status, according to British 
policy, would require some race-related political changes 
within Zimbabwe. With regard to economic consequences, the 
dissolution of the CAF would deprive the Zimbabwean economy 
in general of economic benefits and, in particular, create 
economic difficulties for the Zimbabwean government. It was 
the government's response to these pressures that led to the 
Rhodesian Front's electoral victory in 1962. 
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The Zimbabwean government's policy towards blacks was 
challenged by the British government in two major respects. 
First, the British government stated that the post-CAF 
territorial constitution of Zimbabwe should contain a commit-
ment to improvements in the political and socio-economic con-
ditions of blacks. This was not a demand for a black-dominated 
government, which would require the total reconstitution of 
the government of Zimbabwe, nor was there a demand that such 
a black-dominated government should precede the granting of 
independence. The British government simply wished to extract 
a public commitment from the existing government to increase 
the opportunities for black political participation and im-
prove the material conditions of blacks. Second, the 1 
British government demanded that the constitutional expres-
sion of such a commitment should, like the constitution itself, 
be supported by the majority of Zimbabweans (i.e. not only 
the voters and especially not only the voting blacks). 164 
The Zimbabwean government's response to these pres-
sures constituted a break with past race-related·policy. 165 
164James Barber, pp. 20-90 and Bowman, pp. 37-43. 
165 James Barber, p. 89 states: 
For the first time black and white had negotiated together 
about the future of their country. For the first time 
there was a clear acceptance that Africans would sit in 
the Legislative Assembl·y. For the first time the fran-
chise was entrenched in the Constitution. For the first 
time there was a legal acknowledgement that all races 
should enjoy individual equal rights. 
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At the constitutional conference to develop the new constitu-
tion, the UFP (representing the Zimbabwean government) expres-
sed its broad agreement with British policy that blacks 
should play a more important role in Zimbabwean affairs. 
The proposed constitution consequently contained a declara-
tion of rights, as well as a constitutional council to review 
future legislation for violation of these rights. As far 
as the franchise is concerned, it introduced an A-roll of 
voters with high qualifications who elected 50 members of 
the parliament, and a B-roll of voters with lower qualifica-
tions who would elect 15 members. In exchange, the British 
t ld t . . t 166 governmen wou cease o exerc1se 1 s reserve powers. 
There was some white criticism of the proposed 1961 
constitution from all sides of the political spectrum. The 
'Dominion Party led by Winston Field argued that it was a "sell-
v 
out" to black interests. Ian Smith resigned from the UFP 
because of the introduction of a "racist" franchise and 
opposed the UFP as an independent member of parliament. 
Others, like Garfield Todd, argued that restrictions on black 
Political activity were still too high. 167 Yet in a referen-
dum on the constitution 41,949 voted affirmatively and only 
21,846 against its implementation. White electoral opposi-
tion was clearly weak, leading some observers to remark 
166 
Palley, pp. 413-628 contains a full discussion of 
the 1961-constitution. 
167 James Barber, pp. 89-103. 
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that the UFP would face no white opposition in the next 
. 168 
elect1ons. 
Despite its apparent success with the white electorate, 
the new constitution met with strong black opposition. At 
the constitutional conference blacks were represented by the 
{National Democratic Party of Joshua Nkomo, who initially 
endorsed the·new constitution and, to express its disapproval, 
boycotted the constitutional referendum. This set the seal 
of failure on the government's "middle class"-policy, for 
blacks were also to oppose and boycott later elections. 
Anticipating no significant white opposition, the 
government made a more determined attempt to attract the 
black support the British government demanded for the 
acceptance of the 1961 constitution and the achievement of 
independence. Foreign economic pressure was now coupled with 
political pressure. The CAF was being dismantled - it was 
\officially dissolved in December 1962 - and this would again 
restrict the market for Zimbabwean goods and, in particular, 
deprive the Zimbabwean government of the disproportionate 
share of public revenues it received from the CAF. Public 
debt in Zimbabwe indeed rose significantly during the 1960-
1965 period, amounting to US $416 million in 1965. 169 The 
dire economic consequences anticipated from the breakup 
168 Ibid., p. 148. 
169 Nelson, pp. 260-261. 
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of the CAF coincided with government reports of the steadily 
diminishing capacities of black farmers. 
To satisfy British demands for black support and to 
counter the present and expected economic difficulties, the 
UFP set out to demonstrate its commitment to black socio-
economic and political advancement. It endorsed the aboli-
f tion of racial discrimination, refashioned its administra-
•· 
tive machinery for black affairs, and campaigned for the 
direct representation of blacks in the Legislative Assembly. 
Appearing at a United Nations conference in October 1961, 
Whitehead even claimed that the 1961 constitution and govern-
ment action would result in black majority rule within 15 
years. Finally, at its Congress in November 1962 the UFP 
announced its intention to abolish the Land Apportionment 
Act of 1931. In future the only reserved land, it proposed, 
would be black reserves and national land. Reserve land 
k 
for whites, in other words, would be abolished. 170 
The UFP (the Zimbabwean government) entered the 1962 
elections with a commitment to the 1961 constitution and an 
intent to abolish the Land Apportionment Act of 1931. Of 
these two commitments, the latter was by far the most radical. 
As observers point out, the race-related changes of the 1961 
constitution contained several loopholes, leading to the con-
clusion that black advancement was still not guaranteed but 
170The campaign to attract black support was known as 
the "Build-A-Nation-Campaign." See James Barber, pp. 112-146. 
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would proceed at the discretion of whites. 171 The repeal of 
the Land Apportionment Act, however, would transform Zimbab-
' wean society. This transformation could have included the 
following: white farmers would have no guaranteed access to 
the best farmland, white farmers would have no guaranteed 
access to black labor supplies, black farmers could become 
economic competitors, and white urban wage-workers would 
face economic competition from blacks from the reserves and 
, urban blacks released from the restrictions of racial job 
restrictions. The latter would include competition for pub-
lie employment. Thus urban but especially rural Zimbabwe 
would be transformed. 
Given these prospects, the white opposition underwent 
a rapid recuperation. In March 1962 the Rhodesian Front was 
created and by December 1962 developed a potent nation-wide, 
mass-based party organization. 172 Scholars agree that the 
RF's political support base consisted almost entirely of 
rural whites and urban wage-workers before 1962 and, even 
aft 1962 1 d 11 d . t d th t . t" 173 er rura we ers om1na e e par y organ1za 1on. 
By contrast the UFP lacked a strong party organization to 
extend its support base beyond senior bureaucrats and 
171 Bowman, p. 40 and Palley, pp. 564-628. 
172 Bowman, pp. 92-97. 
173
on the RF's base of political support, see Ibid., 
pp. 97-105; Nelson, pp. 168-170; and Arrighi, "Political 
Economy of Rhodesia," pp. 364-367. 
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self-employed manufacturers. In the 1962 elections the 
UFP, with its radical reform program and narrow political base 
base, was defeated by the RF ·which, equally, had a racially 
restricted support base but a reactionary political program. 
As the preceding discussion shows, the rFP-government 
(the "Establishment" or executive-bureaucratic alliance) 
encountered increasing foreign economic and political pres-
sure during the 1960-1962 period. Its response to these 
pressures, coupled with the apparent demise of the rural-
based opposition, led to the radicalization of its reform 
program. Although legitimate doubt can be cast on the 
sincerity or genuineness of some political reforms, the pro-
posed repeal of the Land Apportionment Act and its implica-
tions resurrected the rural-based white opposition. Faced 
with a black boycott and diminishing white support, the 
government's reform program and its mode of governing was 
defeated. 
f 3.4.2. 1962-1965: Rhodesian Front Government 
The RF after 1962 changed the mode of governing in 
Zimbabwe, suspended the reform program, and sought to win 
independence from Britain, even by means of a unilateral 
declaration of independence--all on the basis of a parlia-
mentary majority that initially consisted of only six seats. 
174 Bowman, pp. 33-37 and James Barber, pp. 154-168. 
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With regard to the mode of governing, the RF introduced 
party government into white Zimbabwean politics. At the low-
est level of its party organization members belonged to·party 
branches headed by committees with non-parliamentary leaders. 
These branches were the focal points of RF-activity, for they 
financed their own activities, acted as a sounding board 
for local grievances and kept their own membership lists. 
Most importantly, local branch leaders had access to national 
party committees. At the national level this populist, non-
parliamentary impetus was somewhat balanced. There was a 
national congress of ten parliamentary members and nominated 
branch delegates who met annually and had the power to effect 
organizational changes and to develop party principles (which 
served as the guidelines for government policy). The congress 
appointed a national executive, again only partly composed 
of members of parliament (ten). Five office-holders and 50 
representatives from A-roll constituencies accounted for the 
remainder of the executive. There were also other national 
committees, like the National Standing Committee (a practical 
version of the executive), a Party Finance Committee, a 
secretariat and several other subcommittees. 175 
With this party-organization as the backbone of the 
RF's parliamentary majority, the RF moved to impose legisla-
tive control over the Zimbabwean public service. The 
175 Bowman, pp. 92-97. 
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legislature appointed select committees to investigate the 
public service, whose reports were largely critical of 
" · · · 1 t l 76 T RF t . 1 "corrupt sen1or c1v1 servan s. o ensure -con ro , 
the party placed its own supporters on the Public Service 
Board, which oversaw public service appointments and promo-
tions. The RF also moved to sever the public service's ties 
to organized.interest groups. This not only included 
. . t 1 . k . . . t t 177 b t 1 econom1c 1nteres groups, 1 e m1n1ng 1n eres s, u a so 
rural groups like the Rhodesia Farmers Union. The RFU 
henceforth existed solely as a commodity co-ordinating 
b d 178 0 y. The RF clearly was opposed to a bureaucracy with 
independent sources of political power. 
The other source of reform, an independent executive, 
was also brought under party-discipline. The leader of the 
RF was made directly responsible to the party-executive and 
indirectly to the party-congress, where non-members of par-
liament held majorities. These restrictions on the political 
initiative of the prime minister were.evident in the ouster 
of Winston Field and in the later criticism of Smith. Thus 
176
see the Legislative Estimates Committee (Sub-Com-
mittee on the Public Service), Evidence and Proceedings, 
September to October 1964 (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1964) 
and the Legislative Assembly, The Third Report of the Estimates 
Committee (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1964). 
177
see the First and Second Reports 
mittee on the Mining Industry (Salisbury: 
1963 and 1964). 
of the eelect Com-
Government Printer, 
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political decision-making came to be located, not so much 
in the parliamentary caucus, but in the "closed confines of 
the Rhodesian Front." 179 Finally, the RF extended its reach 
into local, rural politics by introducing partisan political 
. t h 1 1 d . . 1 1 . 1 180 activ1ty o t e oca an mun1c1pa eve s. 
With regard to public policy, the RF was a staunch / 
defender of .the preservation of the Land Apportionment Act 
of 1931. Yet it abandoned its campaign opposition to the 1961 
constitution. In its negotiations with the British govern-
ment on independence it indeed claimed independence on the 
basis of the 1961 constitution but, like its predecessor, was 
rebuffed because it lacked the support of the majority of 
Zimbabweans. Unlike the UFP who sought to secure that sup-
port by a "middle class"-strategy, the RF then sought the 
vsupport of traditional black leaders whom they regarded as 
the representatives of all blacks - part of a pastoral and 
conservationist view of rural society once more in vogue. 
When the support of these leaders was rejected, the RF pre-
pared for UDI. Despite opposition from manufacturing and 
industrial interests on the grounds that UDI would have 
109. 
178 Murray, pp. 365-367 and Bowman, pp. 67-69 and 105-
179 Bowman, p. 109. See also pp. 67-69 and 105-109. 
180 Murray, pp. 361-367. 
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severe adverse economic effects181 and even a lack of unani-
mitY within the cabinet, 182 UDI was officially announced in 
Nc,vember 1965. 
Except for the continued commitment to achieving inde-
pendence (though by radical means), the RF thus fundamentally 
altered the mode of governing and the public policy directions 
in Zimbabwe. These reversals were not accompanied by attempts 
~to broaden the RF-support base beyond whites. For political 
support it relied on a highly disciplined party-organization_ 
open to populist influences; when it dealt with the blacks, 
it was through the traditional leaders in rural areas. 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the composi-
tion of the population in Zimbabwe is largely the result of 
the dynamics of South African society. South Africa housed 
the Zulu Empire, from which a breakaway faction (the Matabele) 
arrived in Zimbabwe and conquered the original black popula-
tion (the Mashona). Later the discovery of gold and the 
181 Bowman notes that these reports were not requested 
by the government and were "virtually forced upon it by con-
cerned business groups." (p. 181). Only the report of the 
group representing office workers was supportive of UDI. The 
reports of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association, the Rhodesia 
Institute of Directors, the Associated Chamber of Commerce 
of Rhodesia and the Association of Rhodesian Industries all 
expected UDI to have adverse economic consequences. See Bow-
man, p. 79. See also the Economic Aspects of a Declaration 
of Independence (Salisbury: Government Printing Office, 1965) 
by the Office of Prime Minister Smith. 
182 Bowman, p. 89. 
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resulting gold boom in South Africa inspired hopes of similar 
wealth in Zimbabwe, leading to the arrival of whites and their 
conquest of both the Mashona and Matabele. Despite their 
links to South Africa, Zimbabwean whites consistently opposed 
the establishment of close political ties with South Africa, 
preferring to maintain close links with the British imperial 
presence in southern Africa. Thus they first chose qualified 
self-government with links to Britain, as opposed to incorpora-
tion with South Africa, and later chose to establish political 
and economic links with northern territories in the Central 
African Federation. 
Politics in pre-1965 Zimbabwe was almost exclusively 
the preserve of whites. Yet the whites did not form a mono-
lithic mass, nor was there a vigorous tradition of popular 
control over public affairs. Politics and public policy-
making in particular was characterized by the dominance of 
the executive (especially the chief executive or prime minis-
ter) and the public bureaucracy, and the weakness of political 
parties and the legislature. The p~blic bureaucracy indeed 
developed into a powerful political actor with an interven-
tionist posture even before the ~econd World w~r. With the 
prime minister, it madeand executed public policy in Zimbabwe 
and this public policy reflected the influence of white far-
mers and mining interests, as well as Zimbabwe's cooperation 
With British aims in southern Africa. The political leverage 
of white farmers and mining interests was largely a reflection 
1 6 1 
of Zimbabwean society prior to the Second World War, while 
the imperial leverage was a result of Zimbabwean whites' 
agreement with British aims in southern Africa. 
Apart from the Zimbabwean government's obviously 
narrow support base, it was also economically vulnerable. 
The gold boom had failed to materialize, as did economic 
benefits of gold's replacement, namely agriculture. With 
its reliance on the export of a few primary products (gold, 
tobacco and maize) arid the absence of secondary industries, 
the pre-1945 Zimbabwean economy resembled that of a colonial 
economy of the export-type. 
- During and after the Second World War Zimbabwe experi-
enced strong pressure from the world market economy and 
political pressure from the British government to implement 
racial reform. The political pressure was quickly diluted 
and disappeared, but economic pressure was sustained. Given 
its powerful bureaucracy and its interventionist posture, 
the Zimbabwean government introduced and maintained economic 
modernization policies during the post-war era, particularly 
with regard to agriculture and the development of manufactur-
ing industries in Zimbabwe. Although the government main-
tained its commitment to modernization, the results of its 
Policies, by 1960, were mixed. Some economic diversifica-
tion did occur, but each of the economic sectors were still 
vulnerable. With regard to agriculture, the productive 
capacities of black farmers were steadily diminishing, 
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reflecting political opposition to the government's reforms 
as well as questionable economic reasoning in effecting the 
desired capitalist breakthrough in black agriculture. While 
white agriculture did increase its output in volume, the 
value of this output was largely determined by world market 
conditions, but as world market prices for tobacco rose, 
white agriculture became thoroughly geared to the export 
market. With regard to manufacturing, its contribution to 
the GDP increased, but it concentrated on the production of 
a limited range of low quality goods (for the black market) 
and still faced competition from high quality imports. 
The Zimbabwean government's reforms generated con-
siderable political opposition from both blacks and whites. 
This opposition emanated primarily from the rural areas where 
reforms threatened black rural custom, structures and authority 
and threatened white farmers' supply of black labor. For the 
government, the loss of white support was more important in an 
immediate political sense and it attempted to adjust by 
adopting an inter-racial electoral strategy. This, however, 
met with black disinterest and opposition- with the result 
that the government's support base remained narrow. 
The breakup of the CAF brought renewed pressure from 
foreign sources. In contrast with the foreign pressure of 
the Second World ~ar and its aftermath (which was primarily 
economic), the foreign pressure of the 1960-1962 period 
was primarily political. The form of this pressure came in 
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British demands for political reforms in the development of 
a post-CAF constitution for Zimbabwe, as well as demands for 
political reforms for the achievement of independence •. Under 
these pressures the Zimbabwean government's reform program 
radicalized, moving from some formal increases in black 
political participation to the proposed repeal of the Land 
Apportionment Act and the abolition of guaranteed white access 
to farmland. 
Faced with the prospect of a rural economic and poli-
tical transformation in Zimbabwe, the rural based opposition 
grew rapidly. As a proportion of the electorate, white far-
mers alone could not defeat the government, but opponents 
of the government developed a potent party-organization that 
could incorporate other opponents like urban wage workers. 
This party organization not only defeated the UFP, it trans-
formed white politics in Zimbabwe by fundamentally altering 
the mode of government, the direction of public policies, 
and the way by which independence could be achieved. 
As the preceding discussion indicates, the historical 
development of white politics, including the events lead-
ing up to the declaration of UDI, was not simply animated 
by a fear of the black threat or racism. The historical 
development indeed shows that the Zimbabwean government as 
an executive-bureaucratic alliance first attempted economic 
reforms and only then attempted political reforms. These 
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reforms were not prompted by domestic pressure, but by 
foreign pressure, and were to be defeated by a rural based 
opposition who felt threatened by those reforms. Black. 
political activity did exist; its nature and possible threat 
to the government is the subject of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
BLACK ZIMBABWE 1888 - 1962: 
THE CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL ACTION 
This chapter examines black political action in Zim-
babwe between 1888 and 1962. This period is divided into 
three periods, namely the 1888-1900 period which witnessed 
black resistance to the imposition of white rule; the 1900-
1945 period; and the post-1945 period which culminated in 
the emergence of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) 
and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) before UDI. 
In each of these periods discussion is focused on (a) the 
organizational attributes of black political action, 
especially the emergence of an elite that seeks to ally it-
self with or encourage mass political action; and (b) the 
general conditions under which political action took place, 
particularly the conditions that prevailed when ZAPU and 
ZANU emerged. 
Before turning to the discussion, one point needs to 
be clarified. The question why black Zimbabweans after 1888 
felt themselves unfairly or unjustly treated, either as 
individuals or collectively, plays a minor part in the fol-
lowing discussion. Since successive Zimbabwean regimes after 
1888 were expressly and implicitly committed to racial, polit-
ical and other forms of inequality, they inevitably created 
165 
166 
reinforcing layers of hardship, deprivation and subservi-
ence for black Zimbabweans. Much of the existing literature 
on Zimbabwe deals with these questions, often stressing the 
point that the blacks' experience of land shortage, racial 
discrimination, wage gaps, and socio-economic cleavages 
between blacks and whites eventually led to political anger 
and violence. 1 On the basis of the above, blacks' perception 
of their subservient position and political anger is thus pre-
sumed. The focus of this chapter, rather, is on the nature 
of black collective action and is therefore unconcerned with 
socio-economic, cultural and political structures except inso-
far as they affect the likelihood and nature of black collec-
tive action. 
1.1. 1888-1900: White Arrival and Black Response 
At the time of the white arrival, the number of blacks 
2 in Zimbabwe was conservatively estimated at 500,000, most 
of whom were incorporated in the Mashona and Matabele poli-
tical orders. Although the Matabele king Lobengula had by 
this time signed the Rudd Concession, which was interpreted 
to open Matabeleland to whites, Rhodes' party entered Mashona-
land, where the supposed mineral wealth of Zimbabwe lay. 
1 
. See, for example, Reginald Austin, Racism and Apartheiu 
1n Southern Africa: Rhodesia (Paris: UNESCO Press, 1965); 
Eshamel Mlambo, Rhodesia: TheStrugg1e for a Birthright (Lon-
don: C. Hurst, 1972); and Montague Yudelman, Africans on 
the Land (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). 
2 Nelson, p. 40. 
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The Mashona political order of the 1890s had long 
outlivec its glorious days. The Mashona were now a predomi-
nantly agricultural people who were required to pay tri-
bute to the Matabele king but since the late 1880s the 
Mashona acquired firearms and a number of chiefs of the north-
eastern areas entered into alliances with the neighbouring 
Portuguese in order to resist Matabele power. However, the 
Mashona lacked a central political authority; they lived in 
small chiefdoms scattered mainly in the hilly northern and 
eastern areas and this political-geographical independence of 
groups resulted in intra-Mashona rivalries. While there was 
a degree of unity on account of linguistic and religious 
similarities, the lack of political cohesion made the Mashona 
vulnerable to attacks by the Matabele and the whites (such 
as the Portuguese warlords or prazeros and South Africans). 
Indeed, the location of Mashona settlements, in high, rugged 
areas, suggests a desire to offset the vulnerability created 
by the absence of political unity. 3 
By contrast, the Matabele order was smaller but highly 
centralized. Geographically all the major centers of the 
Matabele were situated within approximately 60 miles from 
Bulawayo, which was the seat of the royal house. The Mata-
+ bele king ruled as an absolute monarch, advised by a council 
3Robin H. Palmer, "War and Land", p. 86. 
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of elders, and dependent on military figures (commanders 
and chiefs) to carry out his wishes. Less important or 
menial duties were performed by former captives who swore 
allegiance to the king. In effect the Matabele order was a 
rigid political and social hierarchy. The king's distri-
~butive power over cattle and other goods was the key to his 
absolutism, and warriors of the military regiments would 
establish their claims to cattle and other rewards by their 
warmaking skills. Thus cattle was a measure of social and~ 
political power, wealth and prestige, and warmaking the 
major means of acquiring cattle, as was reflected in the size 
of the Matabele army in 1890 (16,000 men), 4 the size of the 
cattle herd (250,000) and the location of Matabele settle-
ments on the disease-free highveld of Zimbabwe. 5 
Prior to 1888, European contact with both the Mashona 
and Matabele was limited. The Matabele allowed few intru-
sions by traders and missionaries in their own society and 
also limited the contact of these individuals with the Mashona 
as a device to keep them isolated. 6 The arrival of Rhodes' 
4Lewis H. Gann and Thomas H. Henrikson,The Struggle for 
Zimbabwe (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 4. 
5Palmer, "War and Land", p. 87. 
6Restrictions on missionary activity by the Matabele, 
such as their banishment from Mashonaland and the exile of 
Matabele (from Bulawayo) who took an interest in missionary 
activity, is often taken as the cause of the missionaries' 
ambiguous advice to Lobengula in his dealings with whites. 
See Nelson, pp. 16-17. 
4 
169 
Pioneer Column in Salisbury met with little resistance from 
,the Mashona. This apparent acceptance of white rule has been 
explained in two ways. The first of these is that, while 
the 200 men of the Pioneer Column were entitled to land (farms 
of 3,175 acres), few actually claimed farms as they preferred 
to search for minerals. By October 1892 only 300 farms in 
the area were occupied and even these did not result in the 
displacement of the Mashona who lived on them. Since the 
Mashona's "immediate tenure was very largely undisturbed", 
they thus accepted the whites. 7 The second explanation is 
that the Mashona were disturbed by land seizures, but that 
their decentralized political structures and their geographic 
dispersal prevented a quick and unified response. 8 Moreover, 
white interest in Mashonaland waned as the promise of the 
mineral wealth remained unfulfilled and as white farmers en-
countered cultivating difficulties with the shallow and sandy 
soil of the area. White interest thus shifted to Matabeleland. 
1.1. The Matabele Uprising of 1893 
During 1892 relations between the BSAC and the Mata-
bele deteriorated, not because the whites intruded on Matabele 
land but because Matabele raiding parties disrupted mining 
· operations in Mashonaland. An incident at Fort Victoria in 
7Palmer, "War and Land", pp. 90-91. 
8 Loney, p. 39. 
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JulY 1893 prompted the BSAC to send a delegation to Lobengula, 
but they were shot and the BSAC wanted to punish the Mata-
bele. The whites of Fort Victoria, however, refused to. take 
up arms for the BSAC and their cooperation could only be gained 
by the Victoria agreement of August 1893, which entitled 
those who fought for the BSAC to a farm in Matabeleland and 
a share of the cattle captured. With the additional help of 
500 British volunteer troops, the BSAC invaded Matabeleland 
when Lobengula declared war and, within a month, scored an 
9 
easy victory over Lobengula's forces. This easy victory is 
usually attributed to the BSAC's superior military technology 
d th II b . bl b d 1 ' M t b 1 1 h. lO A d an e a om1na y a a a e e genera s 1p. s compare 
to the 670 men of the BSAC, all of whom were armed and most 
(400) mounted, the Vatabele army of 16,000 was largely un-
mounted and armed with spears. Instead of opting for a war of 
attrition against the advancing BSAC columns, the Matabele 
generals chose to fight set battles and were decisively 
defeated. 11 
The war of 1893 had calamitous consequences for the 
Matabele. The most immediate of these was the crisis in 
political authority as Lobengula died in retreat and the Mata-
bele could·not agree on his successor. Eventually the void 
9 Nelson, p. 20. 
1
°Frederick Selous as quoted by Gann and Henrikson, p. 5. 
11 Ibid.' pp. 2-6 
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was filled by the Matabele high priest Umlugulu but, since 
his power did not include the right to allocate cattle, his 
position was more tenuous. The political, social and 
economic order was also altered by the loss of four-fifths of 
the cattle herd by way of war booty and an outbreak of cattle 
12 disease. Furthermore, the shaken Matabele order was still 
subject to punitive actions by the BSAC's military police. 
In 1894 the BSAC replaced rule by its military police with a 
regular system of administration by way of the Southern 
Rhodesia Native Department13 which, in the first years of its 
existence, was kept busy by the changes wrought by the arrival 
of the whites. In Matabeleland the Native Commissioners 
"were kept busy registering, branding and distributing cat-
tle", while the Mashonaland commissioners were preoccupied 
with the collection of the newly-instituted hut tax. 14 
In addition, the Native Commissioners were kept busy 
with the resettlement of blacks in reserves. As argued before, 
the creation of reserves (or land apportionment) was a defen-
sive measure, designed to guarantee blacks a minimum of land 
against white encroachments. In the area around Bulawayo 
12 Terence 0. Fange~ Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-
97, pp. 105-116. 
13Palley, pp. 138-141. 
14Ibl.·d., R 116 anger, p. • 
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more than 900 farm grants had been given by 1894, and a Land 
commission was appointed to settle matters. The result was 
the creation of the Gwai and Shangani reserves. In Mashona-
land the whites also claimed land around major centers, like 
Salisbury, Umtali, Fort Victoria and ME,•lsetter, but as yet no 
reserves were created. Much of the initial effect of land 
alienation was cushioned by the fact that, although many 
whites claimed land, few farms were immediately pegged out 
or occupied. Most blacks in Mashona and W.atabeleland were 
thus not immediately displaced, nor were they forced into 
the reserves; white farmers needed the labor of blacks in 
close proximity and the mining operations also required labor 
and the food produced by black farmers. 15 
Yet the manner in which the reserves were allocated 
boded ill for their long-term consequences. One problem was 
the ignorance of desirable population-soil ratios. The Native 
Commissioners could not accurately assess the size of the 
black population, did not conduct thorough examinations of 
the ecological conditions of land allocated to blacks, and 
knew little about black methods of cultivation or how they 
were suited to the soil in the reserves. Another problem 
was the introduction of wage labor to meet the demands of 
miners and farmers. Although this was also to have far-
reaching consequences, its immediate impact was also 
15Palmer,"War and Land", pp 91-92. 
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cushioned as black participation in the labor market was of a 
"discretionary" nature, i.e. it was not essential to the sub-
sistence needs of the black population. 16 Indeed, blacks 
initially played an important role not as laborers but as 
producers of agricultural goods sold on the small, local 
cash markets created by white settlements. 17 
The Mashona and Matabele orders thus changed under the 
impact of the white arrival. Most changes took place in the 
Matabele order, especially those that were due to the 1893 war; 
by comparison, Mashona life was largely undisturbed and they 
were inhibited by their political and geographic structures 
from rising up against the whites. When the Matabeles 
launched a second attack on the white settlers, however, they 
were joined by the Mashona. 
1.2. The Chimurenga 18 of 1896-1897 
In March 1896 the Matabele army started a march toward 
Bulawayo and, after killing most of the whites in Matabele-
land on the way, besieged the town by mid-April. By the end 
of June the Mashona joined the uprising. The whites responded 
by scoring a number of victories over the Matabele, whereupon 
16Arrighi, "Labour Supplies", pp. 191-193. 
17There is some disagreement over blacks' familiarity 
With market opportunities, but there is general agreement 
that blacks were initially successful participants in the 
cash market. See Ibid., pp. 183-198; Kosmin, pp. 268-288; 
and Phimister, pp. 255-267. 
18chimurenga means uprising. 
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theY concluded a peace treaty with senior Matabele chiefs. 
Mashona resistance continued, though they were forced to 
retreat to the caves in the eastern mountain regions and their 
resistance also eventually disintegrated. 19 
The causes and organizational form of the uprisings of 
~896-1897 are a subject of considerable scholarly dispute. 
With regard to its causes, Ranger, after reviewing the pres-
sures unleashed by the white arrival, argues that the causes 
20 
of the uprising "can hardly seem much of a mystery." Both 
Mashona and Matabele suffered l.,and_alJen::tJ;ion, tl:.l~ir self-
esteem collapsed, they were disarmed and forced to work, and 
.their cattle were seized. 21 While Ranger's broad correlation 
between pressures caused by the white arrival and the upris-
ings has remained essentially unchallenged, the crucial cor-
relation between land seizures and resistance has been 
questioned. According to Palmer: 
no direct correlation can be drawn between the extent of 
land alienated and the outbreak of resistance in 1896, 
since some paramounts who had suffered great loss of land 
did not join the rising, while others who had lost no 
land came out in revolt. In Melsetter, surprisingly, 
there was no rising; in Fc•rt Victoria Chiefs Zimuto and 
Chikwanda, whose lands had been alienated, did not rise; 
19The most extensive accounts of the risings can be 
found in Ranger, RE~olt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-1897, 
pp. 127-310. 
20Ibid., p. 132. 
21 Ibid., p. 141. 
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while at Enkeldoorn Chief Chirumanzu, who bad lost land, 
stayed out, and Chief Mutekedza, who bad not, became a 
leading "rebel"22 
Instead of land grievances, Palmer suggests that more potent 
pressures to resist were supplied by the .tlJlt. _t_a~, forced 
labor, indiscriminate floggings of employees by employers, 
the general ill-treatment of the W.atabele as a conquered 
people, and -the brutality of the military police. Moreover, 
the opportunity for the uprising was provided by the lessen-
ing of repressive forces; most of the military police left 
Zimbabwe towards the end of 1895 to participate in the 
Jameson Raid aimed at toppling the Kruger regime in the 
Transvaa1. 23 
With regard to the organization of the uprising, Ranger 
argues that the leadership element was provided by religious 
vfigures, particularly the Mwari cult and spirit mediums, and 
since religious influences cut across tribal lines the 
religious figures created unity and a combination of forces 
between the Mashona and Matabele. As mass, supra-tribal 
action, the risings are thus the precursors of modern 
t . 1· · z· b b 24 R • · t t t· h b na 1ona 1sm 1n 1m a we. anger s 1n erpre a 1on as een 
22Palmer "War and Land", p. 92. See also David N. 
Beach, "'Cbimurenga' The Sbona Rising of 1896-1897", The 
Journal of African History 20 (1970): 395-420. 
23Tbe military police bad a black component who "paid 
off a number of old scores." Palmer,"War and Land", pp. 92-93. 
24 Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-1897, pp. 
345-386. 
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challenged by other scholars. A study by Beach on colla-
boration showed that not all blacks resisted; in fact, 
blacks who cooperated with the whites played a crucial role 
in the defeat of the risings, as well as in the early 
development of Zimbabwe. 25 More recently a study by Cobbing 
argues that there is no evidence of supra-tribal organiza-
tion, nor evidence that the Mwari cult had planned and co-
ordinated the risings. Rather, the scale, organization and 
26 leadership of the risings were subject to local factors. 
While there thus is agreement that the pressures 
generated by the white arrival were the causes of the up-
risings, there is little agreement as to who participated in 
them (and why), how widespread they were or by whom they 
were led· Ranger's argument that all blacks were involved 
seems strained, while the view that local factors influenced 
the actions of blacks and their leaders seem more persuasive. 
A clear picture of the conditions conducive to collective 
actions thus does not emerge. It is nevertheless clear that 
the scattered Mashona communities of Mashonaland were more 
immune to BSAC's counteractions; as compared to the Matabele, 
their resistance could only be crushed by lengthy, difficult 
25Beach, passim. 
26 Ibid. , and Julian Cobbing, "The Absent Priesthood: 
Another Look at the Rhodesian Risings of 1896-1897'~ The Jour-
nal of African History 18 (1977), especially pp. 82-84. 
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1 t . 27 and bruta counterac 1ons. 
As in the case of the 1893 war, the uprisings of 
1896-1897 had several consequences for blacks. Angered ·by 
the role of BSAC officials in the Jameson Raid, the British 
government took a more active interest in Zimbabwe, appointed 
a permanent resident, reformed the public service, strength-
ened the Native Department, and kept the BSAC officials under 
close rein. Of particular importance, the British govern-
ment believed the uprisings to be connected to land griev-
ances and therefore wished to have adequate r~se!ves created, 
and to have blacks not living in them protected against local 
whites. With regard to blacks living on white land, a High 
Commissioner's Proclamation No. 19 of 1896 required that 
blacks enter into agreemepts with white farmers, fixing the 
rents owed by the tenant farmers, and limiting the number of 
tenants on a single farm. These agreements were approved by 
the Chief Native Commissioner, who was to arbitrate disputes. 
After a two-year period, white farmers could thus demand 
rent from blacks living on their property. In Matabeleland 
a large number of blacks lived on white farms, and by 1907 
approximately 40,000 were required to enter into formal 
agreements with their landlords and to pay a hut tax. In 
Mashonaland a much smaller number of blacks lived on white 
27 . 
The BSAC forces eventually dynamited the caves. 
The leading Mashona spirit mediums were executed for their 
role in the uprisings. 
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farms and only about 750 were affected by the proclamation. 
When agreements were made, they tended to be informal or 
verbal. Although there was a possibility that landlords 
could violate these agreements, there was a strong incentive 
not to do so, for the Mashona tenant farmers could retaliate 
by moving to the larger and more accessible (because they 
were scattered) reserves. 28 
With regard to the reserves, their creation was now 
more difficult than before. There was still a desire to 
guarantee blacks a certain amount of land, but the amount 
of land available was lessened as a result of white influx, 
there now was a strategic consideration of not concentrating 
blacks in impregnable areas, nor could the reserves be in 
areas where minerals had been found. Native Commissioners 
were also uncertain as to wher~ blacks' traditional homes 
were, as the uprisings and previous land alienation dis-
placed blacks. Bureaucratic factors added to the already 
complex picture, for while white land assignment was the 
responsibility of the Survey Department, black land assign-
ments were handled by the Native Department. In short, the 
reserves were essentially an ad hoc arrangement made by local 
officials under the direction of the British government, who 
regarded them as a provisional measure subject to future 
changes. Yet, for reasons earlier discussed, the British 
28 Palmer, "War and Land", pp. 96-97. 
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government later accepted land apportionment in a somewhat 
revised form as permanent. In Matabeleland, most of the tra-
ditional areas of the Bulawayo region were now white farms, 
while the reserves, constituting about 17 percent of the 
Matabeleland area, were located in the arid regions to the 
north and northwest of Bulawayo. In Mashonaland, the reserves 
were larger,.constituting 37 percent of the area, but the 
quality of the land was in most cases also questionable. 29 
The risings and their aftermath thus accentuated the 
changes in the black orders: The Fative Department adminis-
tered black affairs under a somewhat reformed system; the head 
tax, previously imposed only in Mashonaland, was extended to 
Matabeleland; the reserves, previously confined to Matabele-
land, became a reality in Mashonaland; and blacks living 
outside the reserves on white land were now regarded as 
tenant farmers and required to pay rent. Together, these 
factors strengthened the disruptions of the old black orders. 
2. 1900-1945: White Rule and Black Political Action 
After 1897 neither the Mashona nor the Matabele made 
any 11 t . d tt t t . t. h. t 1 30 co ec 1ve, arme a emp s a res1s 1ng w 1 e ru e. 
29Ibid., pp. 97-102. 
30There were acts of local defiance. In Mashonaland, 
for example, Chief Mapondera refused to levy taxes and har-
rassed local officials. His resistance, like that of another 
Mashona leader, Chief Kunzwi-Nyandoro, eventually declined. 
Mtshali, pp. 77-78. Loney states that there were repeated 
rumors of impending black revolt till after the First World 
War. Loney, p. 91. 
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Blacks were forced to accept the political reality of white 
rule and, since they operated under progressively different 
societal conditions, black political action changed in form. 
With the increasing white land acquisition and the 
weakening of tribal society, a movement developed among the 
Matabele to create a national .homeland, to be governed by a 
restored Matabele king. This Matabele National Home Move-
ment31 was, for the most part, led by one of the pretenders 
to the throne, Nyamanda, and focused most of its appeals on 
the British monarchy, especially after the British Privy 
Council began its hearings on the question of unalienated 
land in Zimbabwe. Nyamanda's claims were supported by the 
Fingo community, a 8outh African group which had settled in 
Zimbabwe in the 1890s and whose attempts at buying land were 
frustrated. The Fingoes enlisted the services of a black~ 
South African lawyer and also gained the support of the 
Ethiopian religious movement of southern African. South 
Africa's African National Congress also supported the land 
claims of black Zimbabweans and expressed their concerns in 
their petitions to British authorities. 32 South Africans, 
however, were thereafter barred from any political activity 
31Also known as the Matabele Horne Society. 
32There was considerable migration, particularly 
among the southern Matabele, to and from South Africa. In 
South Africa Matabele activity for a while centered on the 
Ndebele Rhodesia Society and the Rhodesia Native National 
Congress. Nelson, pp. 24-25. 
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in Zimbabwe. Nyamanda then pressed for concerted but non-
violent action from Matabeles, but after the Privy Council 
ruled that all unalienated land belonged to the Crown and 
the coming of responsible government, the activities of the 
Matabele Home Movement declined. 33 
The political maneuvering surrounding the introduction 
of responsible government in Zimbabwe gave rise to several 
organizations seeking to advance black interests. In 1911 
a black named Chirimuhuta founded a Southern Rhodesian 
Native Association to protest arbitrary behavior against 
blacks, and in 1919 Jerry Sobantu organized an African Voters 
League to unite black voters. In 1923 a Rhodesia Bantu 
Voters Association was created to offer white political 
parties electoral support in exchange for legislation favor-
ing black interests. This RBVA drew its support mainly from 
the Matabele, as did welfare associations like the Gwelo 
Native W~lfare Association and the Southern Rhodesia Native 
Welfare Association. In Mashonaland a Rhodesia Native 
Association was created in 1920, focusing its activities 
on the rural areas. There was also an attempt to create 
an African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia in 1919, 
but this was unsuccessful; an African National Congress of 
Southern Rhodesia (initially called the Bantu Congress) was 
33 Ibid., pp. 25-26 and Mtshali, pp. 80-82. 
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finally created in 1930 by Aaron Jacha. 34 
The African National Congress (ANC) and the other 
organizations mentioned above were the first black organiza-
tions that tried to enter electoral politics in Zimbabwe. 
As such they were disinterested in the mass of black Zim-
babweans who could not vote; they 
tended to be run by and appeal to the new African elite 
who were greatly concerned to gain from the whites social 
recognition as "advanced natives" in contrast to the 
"uneducated masses." The aims and attitudes of these 
early associations clearly imply that they were resigned 
to white rule and had committed themselves to mans 
aspects of a new, European-modelled way of life.3 
While some black leaders, like W.artha Ngano of the Rhodesia 
Bantu Voters Association, made efforts to overcome the self-
conscious elitism, organizations remained focused on the 
emerging urban elite. In addition, their activities were 
primarily focused on the Matabele in general and the Bula-
. t. 1 36 wayo area 1n par 1cu ar. 
In the urban areas black workers found a voice in the 
Rhodesian Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (RICO). 
Like many black organizations, RICO was founded by South 
34The dates of the creation of the ANC vary, but most 
agree that it was towards the late 1920s as opposition to the 
Land Apportionment Act. 
35J. van Velsen,"Trends in African Nationalism in 
Southern Rhodesia", Kroniek van Afrika 4 (June 1964): 141. 
36Ibid. See also Terence 0. Range~The African Voice 
in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930 (Evanston, Illinois: North-
western University Press, 1970), pp. 64-137. 
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African activists and by 1929 had branches in Bulawayo and 
Salisbury. RICO's attempt to create an economically-based, 
supra-tribal organization was disrupted by government repres-
sion, mainly by having its leaders imprisoned or South 
African activists deported, and by 1939 this crippled the 
organization. RICO was nevertheless significant in that it 
was the first black organization to seek mass support. While 
it did not engage in strikes, RICO abandoned the moral-
Christian appeals of the previous organizations and attacked 
their elite, established churches and the missionaries for 
collaboration with the white power structure. In this regard 
RICO and other union activity (like the railway union of 
black employees) became an important training ground for 
f t t . . t 37 u ure ac 1v1s s. 
Black political activity in the rural areas often 
focused on religious organizations. Although the established 
churches (Anglican, Methodist and Roman Catholic) did some-
times voice black grievances, 38 blacks were frustrated by 
their sympathy with white political interests and therefore 
sought refuge in religious cults (like the Mwari cult) or 
joined independent African churches, all of which had a strong 
37Range~ The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-
1930, pp. 138-193. 
38Missionary activity resorted under the authority of 
the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference, created in 1906 
by 15 church bodies. It controlled the Southern Rhodesia 
Missionary Conference of Christian Natives, established in 
1928. 
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millenarian appeal. The Mwari cult, for example, advocated 
food-hoarding as preparation for a cataclysmic intra-wh~te 
battle. The first significant independent church to develop 
was the Kitawala cult, led by Romo Nyirenda, who developed 
a black version of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society 
(the Jehovah's Witnesses). When Nyirenda was executed in 
Zimbabwe in 1926, the "halo of martyrdom increased the 
cult's attractiveness to many Africans."39 While it rarely 
engaged in overt political activity, 40 the Kitawala cult 
spread during the 1930s and they (like many other millenarian 
movements such as the Zionist Church and the Vapostori Move-
ment) were particularly influential in Mashonaland. 41 
There were thus several types of black political 
activity between 1900 and 1945. Of these organizations, two 
observations can be made. First, only one organization (RICO) 
managed to gener·a te a secular, mass appeal; the others were 
more narrowly based on tribal, regional or self-conscious 
39Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 152. 
400 t• . ne excep 1on was 1ts role during a strike at the 
Shamva mine in 1928. S~e Ranger, The African Voice in South-
ern Rhodesia 1898-1930, pp. 147-153. 
41 For an account of the Mwari cult and the independent 
African churches, see M.L. Daneel,The God of the Matopo Hills: 
An Essay on the Mwari Cult in F.hodesia (The Hague: Mouton, 
1972) and M. L. Daneel, Independent Churches in Rhodesia (The 
Hague·: Mouton, 1970). 
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class goals. S~cond, by 1945 most of the secular organiza-
tions were dormant, in contrast to the millenarian movements, 
which flourished in the 1930s. The limited nature of.the 
secular organizations, especially when compared to the 
vibrant South African organizations which often acted as 
patrons of the Zimbabwean organizations, raises the question 
concerning .the conditions under which they operated. 
By 1945 the changes set in motion by the white 
arrival had fundamentally altered black life. First, the 
process of land alienation and taxation continued. With 
regard to land alienation, the initial rather haphazard 
creation of the reserves was legally entrenched by the 1920 
British order-in-council, assigning black$ to live on about 
25 percent of the total land. Blacks could purchase land 
outside the reserves (i.e. purchase unassigned Crown land) 
but most were too poor to do so. Later, after the findings 
of the Morris Carter Land Commission, a Land Apportionment 
Act was passed which limited the land available to blacks 
outside the reserves by creating the African Purchase Areas 
of about 8 percent of the total land area. 42 This land 
division remained in effect until 1969. 
As stated before, the ecological quality of the land 
assigned to blacks was in most cases questionable, although 
42Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, pp. 37-58. 
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the reserves of Mashonaland were larger and more scattered 
than the small, consolidated reserves of Matabeleland. 
Government policy in no way intended for these reserves to 
be a basis for agricultural or any other development; they 
were regarded as a refuge for blacks against white encroach-
ments, but even this refuge was regarded as temporary. 
Government policy was characterized by a doctrine of assimi-
lation and progress: blacks would become detribalized, 
assimilate into the white work force, and therefore enter 
into the spiral of socio-economic progress. 43 For this 
reason there was initially no attempt to force blacks into 
the reserves, although the government took a dim view of 
blacks who lived outside of the reserves and did not work. 
For these blacks, taxes were introduced as a work incentive. 
The result of land alienation and taxation was a demographic 
crisis. After an initial period of black farming prosperity, 
the combined effect of taxation and the limited productive 
capacities of remote and generally infertile land forced 
many blacks into wage labor on white farms and in urban 
areas. For those unwilling to enter wage labor the reserves 
became the only and, in view of the population increase, the 
increasingly impoverished refuge of blacks. The government's 
policy of "proletarianizing"44 the blacks was thus achieved 
43 Mason, pp. 255-294 and 313-315. 
44Black's delayed entry into wage labor (or "delayed 
proletarianization") is best treated by Arrighi, "Labour 
Supplies" pp. 183-222. 
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at the cost of introducing a cycle of over-population and 
under-production in the reserves. There were still labor 
shortages, forcing the government and employers to rely on 
foreign migrant labor and labor regulation by the Rhodesian 
Native Labour Bureau. Matabeleland was most exposed to the 
pressures of wage labor, since its economic order was 
thoroughly disrupted by the risings of 1896-1897 and because 
Bulawayo and its surrounding area developed faster as an 
industrial and commercial center than Salisbury. This pro-
duced relatively high wages as an attraction, which in turn 
led to considerable labor migration among the southern 
Matabele. By comparison Mashonaland with its larger and 
more fertile soil and the reserves' access to railways and 
other market opportunities preserved, at least for a while, 
the productive capacities of black farmers. Hence their 
entry into wage labor came later than the Matabele. 45 
Second, the crisis in political authority continued. 
As stated before, the death of Lobengula created a void in 
Matabele political order and they were later incorporated 
in the administration of the BSAC's Native Department. In 
1898 a Native Regulations Act was passed, which outlined 
the reforms in the administration of blacks. According to 
this system, direct administration by white commissioners 
45Palmer, "The Agricultural History of Rhodesia", pp. 
228-230. 
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was made necessary by the "decaying force" of tribalism: 46 
tribal customs would become progressively weaker as blacks 
entered wage labor and as tribal organization was weakened 
by the loss of land and cattle. Therefore direct rule by 
commissioners, who blended central bureaucratic rule with 
local hierarchies and who exercised power in a paternal way, 
was necessary. By the early 1920s the overwhelming majority 
of blacks (90 percent) fell under the authority of these 
. . 47 
comm1ss1oners. 
In the 1920s, however, the view that tribal life and 
48 
organizations was "beyond recall" was reversed. Following 
testimony of the native commissioners before the Morris 
Carter Land Commission, government policy switched to a view 
which regarded the reserves as the permanent homes of blacks, 
approved of tribal customs and tried to preserve it, and 
restored the "authority" of the tribal chiefs. 49 Thus the 
initial policy of assimilation was replaced by a pastoral 
view of black rural society. Black society as it existed 
before the arrival of the whites was indeed still beyond 
recall, but government policy simply "restored" it in the 
46 Mason, pp. 313-315. 
47The commissioners were never a law unto themselves, 
but they did exercise considerable bureaucratic autonomy. 
Holleman, pp. 19-30. 
48 Gray, pp. 31-38. 
49Ibid., pp. 150-168. 
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form that it was understood and desired by whites. 50 The 
result was that approximately 50,000 blacks were moved to 
the reserves during the 1930s. 51 
Third, tribal leadership emerged from its hiatus at 
a time when an educated elite had emerged in the urban areas. 
In the rural areas, black education was the responsibility 
of missionaries who, under the Native Education Ordinance 
of 1907, offered a maximum of four years primary education. 
From a figure of 4,000 in 1907, black educational enroll-
ment increased to 40,000 in 1918, to 100,000 in 1929, and 
to 164,000 in 1945. 52 Since there were no secondary black 
educational facilities in Zimbabwe, many students who wished 
to pursue further studies were sent to South Africa. This 
combination of a Zimbabwean missionary school education and 
a South African secondary and tertiary education remained 
a prominent feature of the emerging elite's background till 
well into the 1970s. 
How did these changes affect black political activity? 
Perhaps most important, there was an elite group but one 
that did not seek to ally itself with or encourage mass 
50This point is often made by D.G. Clarke. See also 
Murray, pp. 279-280. 
51The division of Zimbabwe into one sector capable of 
industrialization and one a pastoral non-productive sector 
is known as the two-stream policy. Gray, pp. 151-152. 
52 Nelson, pp. 138-139. 
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political action by blacks. Traditional elites tried to 
restore themselves, but this attempt failed as the Mashona 
and Matabele tribal leaders weakened under the impact of 
direct white rule in which they, however involuntarily, were 
incorporated. While the decline of the tribal leadership 
created a vacuum, it was not filled by the emerging urban 
elite, who were consciously elitist and exhibited little 
desire to act as spokesmen for the mass of rural blacks. 
Yet, even if there were an elite seeking to ally itself with 
rural blacks, the conditions under which blacks lived were 
hardly conducive to mass political action. First, col-
lective action was djscouraged by the number of regulations 
governing black life. Black tenant farmers worked under con-
tract which, if broken, could lead to expulsion. To enter 
urban areas, blacks were required to obtain passes and when 
they did so and entered urban (or rural) employment, they 
fell under the authority of the Master Servant Act of 1901 
which provided for a number of penalties (including imprison-
ment) for blacks who did not perform satisfactorily. Clearly, 
blacks lived under the easy reach of employer and landlord 
punishment, as well as within the reach of the native com-
missioners and the collection of officials {chiefs, headmen 
and messengers) they commanded. Thirdly, black politics 
was still influenced by a loss of morale brought on by the 
brutality of the repression of the 1896-1897 uprisings. This 
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loss of morale was particularly evident among the Mashona. 53 
3. 1945-1962: The Challenge to White Rule 
After 1945 many of the organizations of the pre-war 
era continued their existence. The Matabeleland Home Move-
ment, for example, still existed as a defender of traditional 
values, and .the millenarian movements in Mashonaland expand-
d 54 e . The Second World War did not have the "immediate 
galvanizing effect that it had in many other parts of 
Africa" 55 in Zimbabwe; yet it did contain the roots of sub-
sequent activity when the government policy started to 
stress industrialization and the modernization of black agri-
culture. 
In the urban areas government policy was to create a 
stable and skilled black labor force and, to this end, 
adopted the Native (Urban Areas) Accomodation and Registra-
tion Act of 1946. This act gave blacks some voice in urban 
townships by creating elected black advisory boards, and 
many urban leaders concentrated their efforts on getting 
elected to them. One group successful at this electoral 
activity was the union leaders of RICO, now renamed the 
Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union and led by 
Charles Mzingeli Moyo, and the Rhodesia Railways African 
53Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-
~, pp. 1-2. 
54 Nelson, p. 32. 
55Gibson, p. 154. 
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Employees' Association, created in 1944 and led by Joshua 
Nkomo. While RICO and the Railways Association flirted with 
the notion of multi-racial, class-based politics during the 
war years, they became more militant and pro-black after the 
war. In October 1945 a strike occurred among the 2,400 
railway workers in the Bulawayo area, which was the center 
of the Railways Association's activities, and over the next 
two weeks gained momentum among all black railways employees. 
In April 1948 a second major strike occurred, with Bulawayo 
again as focal point, but which now included employees from 
mining, municipal and other sectors. Alarmed by these 
strikes, the government appointed a commission of inquiry 
into urban blacks' grievances and then incorporated some of 
th . . ' 1 . t •t b 1. 56 e comm1ss1on s proposa s 1n o 1 s ur an po 1cy. 
The post-war strikes and electioneering for the 
advisory boards rejuvenated black organizations like RICO, 
the ANC and the British African Voice Association (the 
latter created in 1947 and centered on the Bulawayo area), 
but in the years leading to the creation of the Central 
African Federation (CAF) their support and organizational 
activity again declined. 57 The Voice ARsociation was banned 
56 Gray, pp. 291-302. 
57The black organizations of Malawi (then Nyasaland) 
and Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) opposed the creation of 
the CAF and, with the support of RICO, the British African 
Voice Association and the ANC of Zimbabwe, founded an All-
African Convention. After the creation of the CAF in 1953 
the All-African Convention disintegrated. Gibson, p. 154. 
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in 1952, although its leader Benjamin Burumbo remained a 
highly effective and symbolic spokesman, while the ANC under 
the leadership of Thompson Samkango and later Stanlake 
Samkango remained an elitist organization whose activities 
consisted mainly of appeals to the government for favorable 
legislation for blacks. 58 By 1955 the ANC in fact dwindled 
to one branch in Bulawayo under the leadership of Joshua 
Nkomo, and it was further weakened in 1956 when Dunduza 
Chisiza, a leader of the ANC of Malawi (then Nyasaland) who 
had encouraged and advised the Zimbabwean ANC, was expelled 
from Zimbabwe. 59 
Yet, prior to his expulsion, Chisiza's work with the 
younger ANC members resulted in the creation of a City Youth 
League in Salisbury, led by George Nyandoro and James 
Chikerema. The Youth League's young and militant membership 
presented a challenge to the moderate remnants of the ANC 
who were sympathetic to the government's attempt to foster 
a black middle class. 60 Moreover, the Youth League attracted 
58 Thompson Samkange was also a leading figure in the 
Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference. 
59Gibson, pp. 154-155. 
60The-~outh League's opposition to parliamentary-style 
politics was reflected in their publications, Mukayi Africa 
(Wake-Up Africa) and Chapupu (Witness) Bowman, p. 50. 
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considerable political support and all of its candidates 
were elected to the advisory boards in elections in Salisbury, 
and it was successful in organizing a bus boycott. To pool 
their resources the ANC and the City Youth r.eague thus 
amalgamated in September 1957 to form a new (or reconsti-
tuted) ANC under the leadership of Nkomo as president. 
Nyandoro and Chikerema were included in the top leadership 
"t. 61 pos1 1ons. 
The new ANC presented a breakthrough in black orga-
niza tional activity. Af; previously indicated, most black 
organizations (with the exception of some leaders of RICO) 
were elitist and made little attempt to associate with the 
mass or rural or uneducated blacks. To a degree, the new 
ANC still epitomized this approach by participating in the 
elections for the black members of the federal parliament of 
the CAF, but the elite clustered around the ANC also 
encouraged mass black action as a means to pressure the govern-
ment within Zimbabwe. In acting as spokesmen for blacks 
as a whole, the ANC had an automatic constituency in the 
urban areas, as they inherited the constituencies of mori-
bund organizations, but they also acquired a rural consti-
tuency. In the rural areas the government's measures to 
increase black agricultural production emphasized soil 
61 Loney, p. 101. 
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conservation measures, destocking and the granting of indi-
vidual farm rights, encountered black opposition. Destock-
ing, for example, amounted to the self-destruction of black 
status and wealth, individual tenure undermined the security 
of communal tenure, and black chiefs' power was undermined 
by eliminating their power to allocate land. Thus the 
measures aimed at increasing black agricultural production 
could only be implemented in a coercive manner, which in 
h d d bl k ' ·t· to them. 62 turn ar ene ac s oppos1 1on 
The ANC's appeal to blacks as a whole was facilitated 
by the fact that most urban blacks remained tied to the 
structure and security of rural tenure. Urban conditions 
and government policy discouraged the migration of families 
to urban areas and thus few black families resided in towns. 
The remainder of the urban population consisted of young 
male migrants who came to the towns to supplement their rural 
income. Upon accomplishing their target objectives, these 
males rejoined their families in the rural areas and hence 
had an interest in the security of rural tenure. By in-
eluding rural issues in their platform the ANC therefore 
appealed to the vast majority of blacks, both urban and 
rural. The ANC nevertheless was not a strident organization; 
instead it "deliberately projected a moderate image ••• because 
62For a full discussion, see chapter 2. 
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they did not wish to alarm the whites. The ANC's statement 
63 
of principles was almost deferential in tone." 
The promise of an urban elite that seeks to ally it-
self with rural discontent was shortlived, not because the 
ANC bungled its opportunities, but because of events else-
where in the CAF. During the first half of 1959, a wave of 
violence swept through Malawi as its ANC demanded majority 
rule. This violence led to the declaration of a state of 
emergency in the CAF and the banning of the respective ANCs, 
including the one in Zimbabwe. In February nearly 500 ANC 
members in Zimbabwe were arrested or detained, including 
Nyandoro and Chikerema. These arrests and detentions were 
made possible by a new Preventitive Detention Act, which 
empowered the government to detain any person who had - even 
as a spectator - been involved in the violence of 1959, and 
the Unlawful Organizations Act. In the rural areas, organi-
zational black activity under the Native Affairs Amendment, 
Act could now only take place with the permission of the 
1 1 . . 64 oca comm1ss1oner. 
63Ibid., p. 51. For support of this view, see the 
statement of principles, policy and program and the presi-
dential address of the first annual congress in Christopher 
Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro (edsh Zimbabwe Independence 
Movements: Select Documents (New York: Barnes and Noble, 
1979), pp. 3-20. 
64For the Zimbabwean government's view of the ANC at 
this time, see the General Report of the Review Tribunal on 
the Preventitive Detention Act (Temporary Provisions), (Salis-
bury: Government Printer, 1959), also known as the Beadle 
Report. 
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The result was a devastation of organizational black 
activity in Zimbabwe. The leadership of the ANC was deci-
mated and, even if they were intact, their access to the 
1 1 . .b d 65 rura areas was severe y c1rcumscr1 e . Furthermore, the 
restrictions and the international-legal ramifications of 
the breakup of the CAF led many of the remaining black 
leaders to believe that they could only-be successful if 
they could enlist the aid of the British government and 
international organizations and opinion. Their focus of 
actions shifted, in other words, from the rural areas to an 
international context. 66 
In January 1960 the few remaining leaders met to form 
a new organization, the National Democratic Party (NDP). 67 
The NDP was an urban-oriented party aiming mainly at the 
creation of universal franchise ("one man, one vote") in 
Zimbabwe through the intervention of the British government. 
Initially the urban focus of the ANC seemed to be effective, 
for in July and October 1960 a series of riots occurred in 
Salisbury, Bulawayo and Gwelo, which could only be quelled 
by the intervention of the Zimbabwean army. However, as in 
65For the effects of this legislation, see Phillip 
Mason, Year of DHcision (London: Oxford University Press, 
1960), pp. 218-223 and Bowman, p. 5~ who states that the 
nationalists never recovered from this stunning blow. 
66John Day, International Nationalism (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 14-16. 
67Among these leaders were Nkomo (who was abroad at 
the time of the banning of the ANC and who did not return to 
Zimbabwe until October 1960), Enos Nkala (a Matabele laborer), 
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the case of the violence of the previous year, the urban 
unrest resulted in the government's adoption of repressive 
measures: the Vagrancy Act empowered the government to 
68 
arrest any unemployed blacks, the Emergency Powers Act 
empowered the government to rule by decree in six~month 
emergency periods and, according to the sweeping measures 
of the Law ~~d Order (Maintenance) Act the government could 
restrict public meetings, censor black and other publica-
tions, arrest blacks without a warrant, and overrule the 
judicial system in matters affecting the public security. 69 
With its earlier measures, the government now had a vast 
array of repressive measures that could and were used 
. bl k ' . t. 1 t. . t 70 aga1nst ac s organ1za 1ona ac 1v1 y. 
Herbert Chitepo (a lawyer), Ndabaningi Sithole (a minister, 
teacher and author) and Leopold Takawira (a Mashona teacher). 
Bowman, p. 52. 
68This law was aimed at the increasing number of blacks 
who had been rendered landless by the reforms of the 1950s, 
sought refuge in the urban areas or roamed the countryside, 
and who became enthusiastic supporters of the ANC and NDP. 
69 Barber, pp. 54-56. 
70
urban collective action was also inhibited by the 
realities of urban geography in Zimbabwe. Bla.cks lived in 
townships that housed few consumer and other facilities 
necessary for day-to-day living. When urban unrest occurred, 
it was relatively easy for the government to eventually 
isolate most blacks in the townships and prevent their access 
to, for example, food and employment. Prolonged periods of 
urban collective action was thus difficult if not impossible 
to sustain. See Francis Nehwati "The Social and Communal 
Background to 'Zhii': The African Riots in Bulawayo, South-
ern Rhodesia in 1960'~ African Affairs 69 (July 1970): 250-
254. 
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The NDP'sremaining tactical options now focused on 
international action and, in particular, the possible interven-
tion of the British under the authority that they claimed 
as guardians of black affairs in Zimbabwe. Thus Nkomo led 
the NDP-delegation to the constitutional conference which 
was to devise a post-CAF constitution for Zimbabwe. The re-
sulting 1961 constitution was initially endorsed by the NDP 
delegation. According to its provisions, a multi-racial 
constitutional council was created to monitor violations of 
the declaration of rights included in the constitution and 
blacks acquired 15 seats in an expanded legislative assembly. 
In exchange, Britain would suspend its reserve clauses con-
cerning black affairs. 71 When these provisions were made 
public, the other members of the NDP urged a "total rejec-
tion" of the constitution and, during the remaining months 
of 1961, the NDP continued to attack the constitutional 
arrangements and ur~ed black voters not to participate in the 
referendum on it or indeed in any other electoral activity. 
In December 1961 the government then banned the NDP. Almost 
immediately (on December 17, 1961) the black leaders regrouped 
and formed the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union. 72 
Thus the post-war era and particularly the late 1950s 
Witnessed the emergence of a black Zimbabwean elite and 
71 See chapter 2. 
72Gibson, p. 157. 
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organizations that initially sought to ally itself with and 
encourage rural (and other) political action. The elite in 
its successive organizations, however, came under increasing 
government scrutiny, resulting in the banning of organiza-
tions and the arrest and detentions of the leader- and mem-
bership. The government also restricted the access of the 
elite to the. rural and urban areas. The result was thenar-
rowing of the tactical scope of the elite and its organiza-
tions. On the domestic scene, the elite made one attempt to 
participate in electoral-constitutional type politics, but 
this attempt was aborted when other members of the elite 
objected. This left only one option, namely to try to per-
suade the British government or other international orga-
nizations to intervene in Zimbabwe on behalf of the blacks. 
The emergence of ZAPU by the beginning of 1962 (and 
its rival ZANU shortly afterwards) marked the beginning of 
a struggle that would include the unilateral declaration of 
independence by the Smith regime, the UDI-period, and a 
period marked by the beginning of guerrilla warfare. Since 
guerrilla warfare as a collective black action was announced 
in 1965 and only seriously began in the 1970s (as will be 
discussed in the following chapters), this raises the ques-
tion of the conditions under which ZAPU and ZANU operated 
at the time of their founding. 
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3.1. The Conditions of Black Political Activity 
Studies of the black population structure of Zimbabwe 
have convincingly shown that the structure is derivative of 
land apportionment. 73 Thus the black population can be 
divided into blacks living on the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs 
or native reserves), the black farmers of the African Fur-
chase Areas (APAs), the black tenant farmers and laborers 
who live on white farms, and urban blacks. The focus of the 
remaining part of this chapter is on the conditions under 
which these groups lived and what those conditions implied 
for the struggle of ZAPU and ZANU. 
3.1.1. The Tribal Trust Lands· 
Much has already been said about the creation of the 
reserves, their subsequent entrenchment and then diminishing 
productive capacities. By 1961 approximately 34 percent of 
the total land area was designated as reserves, and approxi-
mately 60 percent of the total black population of 3,550,000 
were listed as the permanent (de jure) residents. 74 
73The standard reference of the distribution and den-
sity of the black population is Ka~ Rhodesia: A Human Geo-
graphy. See also Gecrge Kay,"Towards a Population Policy for 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" African Affairs 79 (January 1980): 95-114 
and George Kay, The Distribution of African Population in 
Southern Rhodesia: Some Preliminary Notes (Lusaka: Rhodes-
Livingston Institute, 1964). 
74The only reliable census for Zimbabwe was the one 
in 1961/62. It sets the number of black farmers in the 
reserves at 600,000. 
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There is considerable variation among the reserves, 
such as different size, local customs, ecological capacity, 
and _proximity to towns, railways and market opportunities·. 
There are also differences in local organizational features, 
with the main divisions falling along Mashona and ¥ata-
bele lines. Mashona reserves are divided into chiefdoms, 
wards and villages (or kraals), with the population of kraals 
ranging from twelve to 200. These kraals tend to be far 
apart. Matabele reserves are also subdivided into chiefdoms, 
headmen in charge of a smaller unit, and kraalheads, but 
they tend to live in larger, more concentrated settlements. 75 
Differences, however, are overshadowed by similarities. 
F.eserves all have agricultural subsistence economies, a high 
and skewed population density, socio-cultural attributes 
that stress conformity and cohesion, and all administratively 
incorporated with the white governmental machinery. 
The local agricultural economy consists of small plots, 
cultivated by blacks by non-mechanized, labor-intensive tech-
niques, ·and/ or blacks tending to their small herds of cattle. 
The proceeds of cultivation and herding are consumed locally. 
With the dwindling of the ecological capacities of the land, 
many blacks were forced into wage labor, and thus a large 
portion of the adult male population is perpetually absent 
from the reserves. This skews the population: 45-50 percent 
75 Palmer, "War and Land", pp. 86-87. 
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of the adult males are absent at any one time, leaving a 
high proportion of children, old people and women. These 
absences have not relieved the population pressure. Between 
1941 and 1961 the black population of Zimbabwe rose from 
76 1,400,000 to 3,550,000; in terms of population density, 
blacks increased from 10 per square mile in 1941 to 15 per 
square mile .. in 1951 and finally to 25 per square mile in 
1961. 77 Thus, by 1959 approximately 30 percent of the blacks 
who were entitled to land were in effect landless. 78 The 
unavailability of land exacerbates cultural strains and 
rural vagrancy, but these are mediated by the conformity and 
cohesion of tribal life. 79 
With regard to the political-administrative position 
of the reserves, the government's policy moved from one 
stating that traditional-tribal life was "beyond recall" to 
one upholding tribal life as the Native ~ffairs Department 
understood it. Accordingly, the authority of the tribal 
leadership was upheld, but they were incorporated in the 
government's system of black (or native) administration. 
76 Nelson, p. 61. 
77
weinrich, pp. 18-22. 
78Yudelman, p. 123. 
79 
See Michael Gelfand, African Crucible: An Ethno-
Religious Study With Special Reference to the Shona-Speaking 
People (Cape Town: Juta, 1968) and Hilda Kuper, A.J.B. Hughes 
and J. van Velsen, The Shona and the Ndebele of Southern 
Rhodesia (London: International African Institute, 1955). 
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This administration was organized on a territorial basis, 
with native commissioners as heads of districts, assistant 
native commissioners as heads of subdistricts, and chiefs, 
headmen and kraalheads as paid employees and heads of smaller 
localities. Prior to the Second World War the general goals 
of the black administration were to maintain law and order, 
collect taxes, and uphold the "traditional way of life." 80 
After the Second World War the effort to increase black agri-
cultural output in the reserves strained the administrative 
capacities of the rural officials, and therefore the Native 
Department was reorganized and expanded. Commissioners now 
were assisted by officials of the Department of Agriculture, 
but this failed to solve the problem as the extension offi-
cers of the Department of Agriculture and the commissioners 
clashed over how and at what speed the reforms should be 
implemented, and as black opposition to the reforms mounted. 
To overcome these problems the government launched an 
investigation and then passed the African Councils Act of 
1957. This act was intended to solve the problan by increasing 
the responsibility of tribal leaders and thus the number of 
chiefs were reduced and councils were created, partly elected 
and partly appointed, to assist the chiefs in their duties. 
These black councils would insulate local black politics from 
the "political ferment" of national black politics, provide 
80 Murray, pp. 279-300; Holleman, pp. 19-30 and Gray, 
pp. 3-194. 
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an avenue 6f expression and provide a political-administra-
tive training ground for blacks. 81 Although some blacks did 
use the black councils as an avenue of expression, they ·also 
failed to solve the problem as the overburdened commissioners 
had difficulty in adjusting to indirect rule after the long 
experience of direct rule and as black opposition to the 
agricultural reforms was sustained. In response the govern-
ment launched further investigations, one on the effects of 
the Native Animal Land Husbandry Act and the other on the 
bureaucratic problems resulting from it. 82 The reports of 
these investigations deepened the trend toward black local 
self-government, now named "community development." Under 
this approach the number of black councils was increased, 
councils were held responsible for many of the local efforts 
to increase black production (like soil conservation measures), 
and were held responsible for the maintenance of the local 
roads and bridges, and for primary education. To finance 
these activities, the chiefs were to have limited powers of 
taxation. When the Rhodesian Front came to power it enthu-
siastically embraced the idea of community development, 
81Earlier chiefs were assisted by native boards. 
82
see the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Alleged Discontent in the Mangwende Reserve·(salisbury: 
Government Printer, 1961) and the Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into and Report on Administrative and Judicial Func-
tions in the Native Affairs and District Court Departments 
(Salisbury: Government Printer, 1961), the Robinson Commis-
sion. 
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although it abandoned the notion that it would be the vehicle 
to increase black agricultural production. 83 Bureaucratically 
the Native DHpartment was renamed the Department of Int·ernal 
84 Affairs and some internal reforms took place. 
By 1962 the position of blacks in the reserves was 
thus as follows:· First, the tribal leadership was in a dif-
ficult position. On the one hand their authority was under-
mined by the loss of their power to allocate land, the pro-
gressive weakening of tribal organization, and the fact that 
they were the paid employees, agents and servants of the white 
government. Some chiefs, for example, owed their very posi-
tion to government support when it started to reduce the num-
ber of chiefs and some had to be dismissed and others retained. 
On the other hand the position of the tribal leadership was 
exaggerated by the prolonged absences of young males from the 
85 
reserves and by the government's policy of community develop-
ment, as well as its view that the tribal leaders represented 
black Zimbabweans as a whole. This view led to the creation 
of the National Council of Chiefs in 1962. 86 Second, the 
83For the Rhodesian Front's approach to rural black 
administration, see Barber, pp. 221-247. 
84 Holleman, pp. 255-291 
85
see Weinrich, p. 22 and passim for a discussion of 
the rural black elite. 
86The point is not that tribal or any other traditional 
leaders were either pro- or anti-government as a whole; it is 
simply that, given the structural position of these leaders, 
they had little scope for independent political action. 
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local councils in time became the means for the government 
to implement goals, not an avenue for local self-expression 
and independence. It became the government's main link.with 
the local population and a way to remain abreast of local 
black political developwonts. 87 Third, after 1959 black 
political activity beyond the above channels or activity 
that undermined the authority of the local leadership and 
officials was severely circumscribed by the Native Affairs 
Amendment Act. Any meeting of more than twelve blacks, for 
example, required the consent of the local commissioner. 88 
Thus the blacks of the reserves lived under the impact 
of at least three crises. There was a demographic crisis as 
black population increases combined with the limited amount 
of land available led to severe over-population. There was 
also an ecological crisis as overpopulation further decreased 
the productive capacities of the soil and as the reforms of 
the 1950s undermined blacks' security in rural tenure. Finally, 
there was a political crisis as the traditional leadership 
of the rural areas was first undermined and then reconstitu-
ted by the government in its desired form (i.e. as paid 
public servants who had no independent political power). 
87Holleman notes that the government's information of 
rural conditions was often slanted by the bureaucratic self-
interest of the local commissioners. Holleman, pp. 34-38. 
88These restrictions were actually requested by the 
tribal leadership. See Loney, p. 188. 
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Although these crisis conditions existed, the blacks of the 
reserves had little independent political power to engage in 
collective action in order to remove those problems. Since 
some of the reserves were in remote areas they were to some 
degree out of the reach of the white government, but most of 
the blacks lived under conditions where the government had 
knowledge of local black political developments and had a 
vast array of means to repress it. There were local leaders 
and organizational forms, but these could hardly be expected 
to strike an independent course of political action. 
3.1.2. The African Purchase Areas 
Blacks could initially buy land outside of the reserves 
and, when few blacks managed to do so, the Land tpportionment 
Act reserved certain areas for black purchase. By 1961 
these purchase areas consisted of 86 widely scattered areas, 
amounting to approximately eight percent of the total land 
area. Like the reserves, the purchase areas were overpopula-
ted with an average of 21 persons per square mile. 89 
The first blacks who bought land in the purchase areas 
were mainly foreign-born blacks like the Fingoes, who could 
not claim traditional land, and Zimbabwean blacks from educa-
tional, commercial and other elite groups. As more blacks 
were displaced by the land apportionment measures, these 
89Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, pp. 37-58. 
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original inhabitants were joined by successful farmers of 
the reserves. By 1956, when the application list for black 
purchase was closed because of a shortage of land, the number 
of black farmers in the purchase areas amounted to 8,500. 90 
Since the acquisition of farmland required a period of tenure, 
government certification of farming skills and, most impor-
tantly, capital, the population of the purchase areas is also 
skewed. The main factor is age, with 85 percent of the male 
91 
cultivators of the areas older than 45 years. Although the 
quality of the soil, access to railways and roads, and market 
opportunities presented difficulties similar to those of the 
reserves, the purchase area farmers usually produced a sur-
plus. By 1965 approximately 32 percent of their production 
was consumed locally and the remaining 68 percent sold. These 
cash sales amounted to one-third of all marketed black agri-
92 
cultural produce. 
90Most of the post-1945 arrivals were "master farmers", 
i.e. plotholders with enough capital and at least three years 
of contact with agricultural extension officers. The notion 
that successful black farmers could come to own their own land 
is comparable to the freeholding peasantry (as opposed to 
copyholding peasants) in British history. William R. Duggan, 
"The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and The Rural African 
Middle Class of Southern Rhodesia'~ African Affairs 79 (April 
1980): 227-239. See also Oliver B. Pollak, "Black Farmers and 
White Politics in Rhodesia", African Affairs74 (July 1975): 263-
277. 
91 Purchase area farmers employ a small number of per-
manent black laborers or rely on female and seasonal labor. 
Pollak, p. 268. 
92Government policy favored the purchase area farmers 
over those of the reserves, with the former able to gain 
easier access to extension services, credit and market oppor-
tunities. Nelson, p. 294. 
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How did these conditions affect the political activity 
of the purchase area farmers? First, the black farmers lived 
on 200-acre plots with their families, other dependents and 
employees. Since many of these blacks are originally from the 
reserves and since purchase area farms are isolated from one 
another, purchase area residents tend to preserve their social 
and political ties with the blacks of the reserves. Second, 
although these ties are preserved, the blacks of the pur-
chase areas are an elite; blacks either bought land with 
their savings from high status occupations, or worked their 
way up through the reserves and then bought land. These 
similarities as an elite are accentuated by the common con-
cerns the farmers face after they have bought land. Third, 
it should be remembered that the purchase area farmers are, 
in both number and the land area that they command, only a 
small fraction of the black population. Compared to the 
blacks of the reserves, the blacks of the purchase area thus 
are a small and socio-culturally diverse elite who have 
similar socio-economic backgrounds and concerns. 
The elite of the purchase area has a long history of 
political activity. In the 1930s several farmers created 
organizations to advance their interests and these eventu-
11 d . t th Af . F U · 93 a y merge 1n o e r1can armers n1on. Like many 
93The African Farmers Union operated under different 
names; this title will be used here. 
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black organizations of the pre-war era, the AFU was con-
sciously elitist; the organization excluded the farmers of 
the reserves and scrupulously avoided identification with 
the poorer inhabitants of the reserves. Even the tribal 
leadership of the reserves was barred from the AFU confer-
ences. Since it usually sought government aid, the AFU was 
cautious and deferential in its dealings with the government 
which, until the Second World War, was indifferent to its 
pleas for aid. After 1945, however, the goals of the govern-
ment and the AFU coincided and, under the leadership of Aaron 
Jacha, the AFU entered a phase of active collaboration with 
the government. This collaboration included an attempt to 
merge the AFU with the white farming association (the Rho-
desia National Farmers Union). 94 
During the 1950s the AFU and its constituents were 
relatively isolated from the dislocations brought about by 
the government's efforts to reform black agriculture; indeed 
they were often held as the model of what the farmers of the 
reserves should be. The issue that brought matters to the 
fore was the presence of squatters in the purchase areas. 
When the purchase areas were created in 1930, approximately 
150,000 blacks were already living in the areas assigned 
as purchase areas and by 1960 about 110,000 of these remained. 
94 Jacha was one of the leading figures in the old ANC, 
but left it in the 1950s when it became more militant. Pollak, 
p. 272. 
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In 1960 the government's land commission recommended that 
these squatters remain in the purchase areas, as it was too 
expensive to resettle them elsewhere, and that the land they 
occupied should be called Special Native Areas. 95 The purchase 
areas, in other words, should be reduced. The AFU, however, 
thought that the squatters should either be expelled from 
the purchase·areas (like they were expelled from white farms) 
or the land that they occupied should be replaced by land 
from the category of unreserved land. Eventually the purchase 
areas were not enlarged and the category of special native 
areas was created, but the dispute forced the AFU to oppose 
the government after a long period of cooperation. The ex-
perience also radicalized the AFU-leadership, as Jacha was 
replaced by William Kona, who supported the ANC and later the 
NDP, and who opened up avenues of grass-roots participation 
within the AFU by creating strong regional branches. 96 
When ZAPU and ZANU emerged, the purchase area farmers 
thus were engaged in organizational politics and had, to a 
degree, disassociated themselves from the government. At 
least some of the purchase area farmers indeed openly support-
ed the predecessors of ZAPU and ZANU. Though the record of 
the farmers' organizational forum hardly shows a concern with the 
95The Select Committee on the Resettlement of Natives 
(Salisbury: Government Printer, 1960), the Quinton Report. 
96Pollak, pp. 269-274. 
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lot of farmers in the reserves, the farmers nevertheless 
tended to preserve their social and other ties with the 
blacks of the reserves. 
3.1.3. Blacks on White Farms 
White agriculture after 1945 changed under the govern-
ment's pressure to increase production. Two of these changes 
affected the position of blacks who lived on white farms 
(either as tenant farmers who performed certain duties as a 
permanent or semi-permanent employee). First, foreign- and 
domestic-owned estate farming increased with most ,.of thes·e -
concentrated in the southwestern and eastern provinces 
(Matabeleland North and South, Manicaland and Victoria) where 
cotton, citrus, tobacco, tea and sugar is grown. In central 
and western provinces (the low Midlands and Matabeleland) 
ttl h . .1 t th t t t f . 97 some ca e ranc es were s1m1 ar o e es a e- ype arm1ng. 
s~ccnd, the rise of corporate farming, government aid and the 
stress on improved production techniques did lead to some 
mechanization, but simultaneously white agriculture increased 
its dependency on unskilled labor. In fact, between 1946 and 
1961 the number of black farmworkers rose from 142,000 to 
272,000. These black farmworkers were unevenly distributed 
97Michael Bratton "Structural Transformation in Zimbabwe: 
Comparative Not.es from the Neo-Coloniza tion of Kenya", The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 15 (December 1977): 602-603. 
See also Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia", pp. 
352-359. 
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with most in Mashonaland North (35.2 percent of the total) and 
Mashonaland South (25.3 percent), Manicaland (15.5 percent), 
and Victoria (10.3 percent), and significantly less in Mata-
beleland North and South (7.7 percent) and the Midlands (6.0 
98 percent). The number of farmworkers included a high pro-
. (50 t) f f . k 99 port1on percen o ore1gn-born wor ers. 
Given this number of black farmworkers (272,000 or 23 
percent of the black population) and their distribution 
(heavily concentrated in the eastern areas), under what socio-
economic and political conditions did these farmworkers live? 
First, more than 60 percent of the black farmworkers are 
permanent or semi-permanent employees, with the remainder 
either casual workers or foreign-born contract workers. 100 
Second, except for the central and western areas, there was 
a high number of workers per farm with about 60 per farm in 
Mashonaland No~th, 36 in Mashonaland South, 45 in Manicaland, 
d 66 . v· t . 101 an 1n 1c or1a. Third, although these workers 
earned wages, they actually had several sources of income 
with in-kind payments, employer contributions to pension funds 
and other aids, and support from friends and relatives in 
102 
urban employment. There was no agricultural minimum wage; 
98
n.G. Clark, Agricultural and Plantation Workers in 
Rhodesia (Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1977), pp. 24-26. 
99Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
100 Nelson, p. 290. 
101 Clarke, p. 26. 
102Ibid., pp. 44-51. 
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wages and other working conditions were determined by agree-
ments made under the Vaster Servant Act and the African Labour 
Regulations Act. This gave the employer total control over 
workers as the loss of employment could mean the loss of 
tenure on white farms, basic subsistence and welfare assist-
103 
ance. Fourth, employer control extended beyond the work-
place. In ~he case of single farms, there was a strong pater-
nalist tradition whereby white farmers frequently and per-
sonally intruded in the private lives of their workers. On 
the estates, the division of farm labor brought more imper-
sonal bureaucratic control. Blacks here lived in compounds 
and were supervised by bossboys and policemen. Managers 
tended to be more aloof, with the result that the black boss-
boys and policemen played a crucial role in the mediation 
f k d . t t 104 o wor er 1scon en • 
The preceding shows that black farmworkers on estates 
and single farms fell under the all-encompassing control of 
their white employers and their assistants. When worker dis-
content arose, employers had a variety of means to contain 
it; these included hearing complaints, using the services of 
the local commissioner, using the bossboys and policemen, and 
displaying a sense of fair play expressed in the local langu-
age. Although there were labor strikes on white farms, 
103Ibid. 
104 Ibid., pp. 146-149. 
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this was not the dominant form of workers' discontent. 
Rather, workers tended to express their discontent surrepti-
tiously in the form of insolence, absenteeism, arson, theft, 
105 go-slow work and malicious damage to property. 
There was one significant attempt to unionize black 
farmworkers with the creation of the Agricultural and Plantation 
Workers Union (APWU) in Matabeleland. The activities of APWU 
were inhibited by the resistance of employers and financial 
trouble, as farmworkers did not or could not pay union dues. 
The result was that the APWU became dependent on foreign sup-
port. In addition, the activists of the APWU fomd it dif-
ficult to organize the farmworkers because they were dis-
persed in scattered areas. When the Emergency Powers Act 
then forbade rural travel by union organizers, the APWU was 
ff t . 1 . 1 d 106 e ec 1ve y cr1pp e • 
When ZAPU and ZANU emerged, the black farmworkers thus 
had no history of involvement in organizational black politics. 
These farmworkers lived on estates and single farms under the 
total control of employers and their assistants. Support of 
ZAPU and ZANU would thus entail a great risk for black farm-
workers. 
lOSibid., pp. 177-178. 
106The National African Federation of Unions and the 
African Trades Union Congress later offered black farmworkers 
some national political representation. Ibid., pp. 188-193. 
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3.1.4. Blacks in Urban Areas 
By 1962 approximately 18 percent of all blacks resided 
107 in urban areas, where they were employed in the public 
service, industry and commerce, and domestic service. These 
workers lived either in the townships or in rooms on whites' 
108 property; few blacks owned their own property in urban 
areas as they were, until 1960, forbidden to do so. Moreover, 
few blacks were born in the urban areas or are permanent 
residents; most are temporary residents f~om rural areas who 
attempt to supplement their income by wage employment. The 
urban black population is therefore skewed in terms of age 
and sex; most are young (under 45 years of age) and male, 
although the proportion of women (approximately 35 percent 
in 1964) was increasing. 109 
As previously discussed, most black organizational 
activity after the Second World War took place in an urban 
setting and it was noted that urban collective action by 
blacks was difficult to organize and sustain. Activists 
and organizers were subject to surveillance and arrest, or-
ganizations were banned, publications censored, and the 
107According to the 1962 census. 
108For a comprehensive discussion, see D. G. Clarke, 
Domestic Workers in Rhodesia: The Economics of Masters and 
Servants (Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1974). 
109 Rogers and Frantz, p. 15. 
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membership arrested or detained. When collective action did 
take place it could be repressed. Many blacks lived in 
black townships on the edge of white urban areas and thus 
could be isolated from employment, shops and access to other 
townships. Although the geophysical features of blacks' 
urban environment thus inhibited collective action, it is 
often said that the urban setting provided blacks with oppor-
tunities to develop organizations which minimized or super-
seded tribal affiliations, as it brought together blacks 
from different tribal backgrounds and gave them common socio-
. 110 
econom1c concerns. 
Although the influence of tribal factors will be dis-
cussed more fully in the following chapter, it is worth 
noting at this point that urbanization, at least as far as 
Zi~babwe is concerned, did not necessarily erase the influ-
ence of tribal and rural factors. Indeed, it is possible to 
argue that urbanization entrenched such influences. First, 
most blacks in the urban areas were temporary residents who 
maintained a strong interest in the security of rural tenure 
and hence the position and fate of rural society. In fact, 
an absence from the rural areas may have increased an aware-
ness of the security of rural tenure Second, most migrants' 
immediate concerns were not political but directed towards 
welfare needs and the organizations that focused on them. 
1108 ee, for example, Newhati. 
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These welfare associations were organized and run by ethnic 
groups. Third, blacks who migrated tended to migrate to the 
urban area closest to their area of permanent residence. and 
thus urban areas' political activites were often dominated 
by the group living in the area. In Salisbury, for example, 
the Mashonas were heavily represented in political and other 
organizations, whereas Bulawayo was dominated by the neighbor-
ing Matabele. 111 It is consequently not suprising that 
"tribalism" is often mentioned as a centripetal force in 
black organizational politics. 112 
4. Conclusion 
When ZAPU and ZANU emerged before UDI they claimed 
that they and not the tribal leadership, as the government 
claimed, represented black Zimbabweans as a whole. That 
the government claimed the support of the tribal leadership 
was not ~ising, as their effort to create a multi-racial 
political constituency with a middle class ~haracter had 
failed. Yet, even presuming that ZAPU and ZANU did repre-
sent black Zimbabweans, it was clear that collective action 
111 Nelson, p. 87. 
11 ~There are no systematic studies of the influence of 
tribal and other traditional loyalties in black politics in 
Zimbabwe. One does find fleeting references to it, such as 
in the leadership struggles of the AFU (Pollak, p. 272), the 
elections and actions of the advisory boards in urban areas, 
and in the actions of the V.atabele Home Movement and the 
Mashonaland Cultural Society (Newhati, pp. 259-260). 
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by blacks would be difficult. 
Approximately 60 percent of the black population lived 
in the reserves, engaged in subsistence agriculture and· 
maintained a strong sense of socio-cultural cohesion. But 
the local leadership and organizations (down to kraals of 
twelve people) rarely displayed a willingness to oppose the 
government or to act in a politically independent manner 
and, even if they had done so, they were within the reach of 
the government's repressive means. The position of black 
agricultural workers (23 percent of the total black popula-
tion) was even worse, as they fell under the all-encompassing 
control of their employers and their assistants. Urban blacks 
(about 18 percent of the total black population) had parti-
cipated in some collective action, but the geo-physical 
features of the urban environment discouraged future action 
and, moreover, past action had resulted in the government's 
strengthening of its repressive power. Finally, there were 
the purchase area farmers who seemed to have the greatest 
scope for independent political action, but their numbers and 
the land area that they inhabited were sma11. 113 Given these 
conditions, it was clear that ZAPU and ZANU's efforts at 
mobilization would be difficult. Furthermore, their efforts 
113There are some minorities in Zimbabwe. See Floyd 
Dotson and Lillian 0. Dotson, The Indian Minority of Zambia, 
Rhodesia and Malawi {New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press, 1969). 
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would be subject to government repression, which already had 
severely weakened the black organizations by arrests, deten-
tions and the banning of organizations. These challenges 
from without could be complemented by any internal weaknesses 
(such as tribal squabbles and financial weaknesses) that ZAPU 
and ZANU developed. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER: 
INTERNATIONAL NATIONALISM, GUERRILLA WAR 
AND THE RESPONSE OF THE REGIME 
This chapter consists of an examination of black col-
lective action in Zimbabwe and the Smith regime's response 
to that action between 1962 and 1979. With regard to black 
action, the examination focuses on four questions, namely 
(a) What was the nature, extent and effectiveness of their 
actions; (b) Whether some blacks participated more in the 
guerrilla war than others, for example, the blacks of the 
reserves, purchase area farmers, farmworkers or urban dwel-
lers; (c) What organizational forms were generated by the 
guerrilla war; and (d) What was the character of the black 
elite that sought to ally itself with and/or encourage black 
collective action. The natural counterpart to these questions 
is the response of the Smith regime; here the focus is on 
what actions the regime took with regard to public security 
and its effectiveness. To facilitate discussion of these 
questions, the period between 1962 and 1979 is subdivided 
into two periods, that period between 1962 and 1970, and that 
between 1970 and 1979. 
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1. 1962-1970: International Nationalism 
During the first half of 1962, most of ZAPU's activi-
ties were directed at the generation of international support, 
especially that of the British government, which ZAPU believed 
to be the formal sovereign in Zimbabwe and which appeared to 
be the only government capable of influencing the white 
regime. This emphasis on foreign-diplomatic activity led the 
ZAPU leadership, and Joshua Nkomo in particular, to be absent 
from Zimbabwe for most of the first half of 1962. Within 
Zimbabwe there were some violent incidents, including petrol 
bomb attacks, a strike in Salisbury, attacks on cattle dips 
and other property, the burning of a forest in the eastern 
part of Zimbabwe, and disruptions of railroads. 1 These inci-
dents, however, were "irregular and infrequent." 2 
When Nkomo returned to Zimbabwe in July, ZAPU could 
claim some success at securing international support from the 
United Nations and the Afro-Asian nations, but its attempt to 
3 influence the British government was thus far unsuccessful. 
Within Zimbabwe ZAPU's position became precarious when the 
1 Anthony R. Wilkenson, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe" in 
Basil Davidson, Joe Slovo and Anthony R. Wilkenson, Southern 
Africa: The New Politics of Revolution (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1976), p:-227:--·-·--·-·-
2 Barber, p. 141. 
3 See Day, International Nationalism, pp. 25-43. 
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Whitehead (or Urtited Federal Party) regime launched an inves-
tigation of ZAPU and its report blamed ZAPU for most of the 
violence of 1962. 4 Even if it was not responsible for this 
violence, ZAPU indeed did plan on some violent action in the 
future, because it sent supporters abroad to acquire military 
training and made preparations to smuggle arms into Zimbabwe. 
These men would form the nucleus of the military wing of ZAPU. 
During September 1962 a "Zimbabwe Liberation /,rroy" started to 
advertise its existence by distributing leaflets, but as yet 
the ZAPU leadership denied any connection with it. Despite 
these denials, ZAPU was banned in September 1962. 5 
With the banning of ZAPU the UFP regime amended its 
Unlawful Organizations Act so that it, among others, prohi-
bited the leadership of an organization declared illegal to 
reconstitute itself under another name, and amended the Law 
and Order (Maintenance) Act to widen its scope and to increase 
the severity of punitive measures. This included a mandatory 
death sentence for setting fire to a residential building, 
vehicles and aircraft, regardless of whether it was occupied. 
4 See the Report on the Zimhiliwe African Peoples' Union 
(Salisbury: Government Printer, 1962). 
5Gibson, p. 161. 
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on the grounds of these provisions, this law became known 
as the "hanging bill." In addition, the regime detained 
many of ZAPU's leaders. 6 Because of the prohibition on. the 
reconstitution of an illegal organization, ZAPU decided to 
remain as such and Nkomo, who was in Zambia at the time of 
the arrest of ZAPU's leaders, prepared to locate it in Tan-
zania as the seat of a Zimbabwean "government-in-exile." The 
location and designation of ZAPU, however, was rejected by 
the Tanzanian president (Julius Nyerere) and other African 
leaders. Rebuffed, ZAPU found a home in Lusaka, Zambia, 
where Nkomo was joined by the rannants of the ZAPU membership 
and by former ANC members who were released by the Rhodesian 
Front regime when it came to power in December 1962. 7 
With ZAPU now based in Zambia, its leadership became 
divided over leadership and tactics, much of which was focused 
on Nkomo's personality and leadership style. While the move 
to Zambia had reasonable grounds, i.e. government actions 
made effective action within Zimbabwe impossible, Nkomo was 
6 Including Takawira, Mugabe and Moyo. 
7The release of the detained nationalist leadership 
was part of an initial conciliatory approach by the Rhodesian 
Front. See Barber, pp. 196-220. 
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accused of avoiding altogether a struggle within Zimbabwe, 
directed by ZAPU as an underground movement. Instead, so 
the criticisms went, Nkomo preferred to concentrate on foreign-
diplomatic actions, which not only brought dubious success 
(it "converted those already converted") but deprived ZAPU 
of a strong leadership element when it was still struggling 
to establish itself. 8 Nkomo reacted to these charges by call-
ing a mass rally in Salisbury in August 1963, where he publicly 
castigated the discontented ZAPU leaders, like Robert Mugabe, 
Leopold Takawira, Mouton Malianga, Ndabaningi Sithole, Nathan 
Shamuyarira and Enos Nkala. In response, Mugabe, Takawira, 
Malianga, Sithole and Herbert Chitepo formed the Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU) on August 9,1963, with Sithole 
as president. This development led Nkomo to form the Peoples 
Caretaker Council (PCC) to operate within Zimbabwe: outside 
9 
of the country, the PCC operated under the name of ZAPU. 
Between August 1963 and August 1964 there was wide-
spread violence in Zimbabwe and by the end of 1964, 4,435 
contraventions of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act had been 
recorded. This was the "worst year on record for violence and 
8 Day (pp. 112-119) accounts Nkomo's travels and cites 
critics who argue that Nkomo travelled because he feared he 
would be arrested within Zimbabwe. 
9 Ibid., p. 22. 
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10 the breakdown of law and order": schools were burnt, pro-
perty in rural and urban areas destroyed, and people were 
intimidated, stoned and killed. Most of these incidents 
involved or were directed against blacks, particularly on the 
part of ZAPU and ZANU supporters who battled each other. 11 
In response, the Smith regime prohibited ZAPU and ZANU from 
holding mee!Jngs, and later started to detain their leader-
ship, including Nkomo, Mugabe, Sithole and other members. 12 
Finally the PCC (or ZAPU) and ZANU were declared illegal in 
August 1964. The PCC then suspended itself as an internal 
wing of ZAPU and the remaining leaders gathered in ZAPU's 
headq.uarters in Zambia, where James Chikerema became acting 
president assisted by Nyandoro, Moyo and Silumdika. 13 
With Sithole and W.ugabe absent, the remnants of ZANU also fled 
to Zambia, where Herbert Chitepo assumed the leadership. 
Although there was a striking difference between the 
rhetoric of ZAPU and ZANU, with the latter usually more 
10The Director of African Affairs in Salisbury as 
quoted by Barber, p. 210. 
11navid Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for 
Zimbabwe (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), pp. 70-71. 
and Wilkenson, pp. 228-231. 
12A total of 1,791 were detained between January 1964 
and June 1965. Bowman, p. 60. 
13The dissolution of internal party arrangements 
occurred at the Cold Comfort experimental farm, and later 
became controversial. 
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14 
militant, their actions or strategies were quite similar. 
Both mainly engaged in foreign-diplomatic activity to secure 
international support, and attempted to secure British sup-
port and possibly intervention to prevent a possible UDI or 
to prevent the British transfer of the CAF's armed forces to 
the Smith regime. 15 Yet ZAPU and ZANU did prepare for a 
guerrilla struggle within Zimbabwe: ZAPU sent recruits to 
the Soviet Union, China and North Korea, while ZANU recruits 
were sent to Ghana. 16 Except for one ZANU attack by the 
"Crocodile Conunando" in July 1964 in the Melsetter area, 17 
however, there were no noteworthy guerrilla incidents within 
Zimbabwe. 
ZAPU and ZANU's emphasis on foreign-diplomatic activity 
and their infighting before UDI is often slngled out for 
criticism. Given government repression, it is argued, the 
best tactic would have been to regroup, preserve unity, and 
develop an underground structure as preparation for guerrilla 
struggle. Was the emphasis on foreign-diplomatic activity 
then inappropriate? It should be remembered that the 
-----,:;-:--------
14Gibson, p. 175. For a sample of these differences, 
see Christopher Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro, pp. 64-113. 
l5Day (p. ~2-103) characterizes this activity as "in-
ternational nationalism." 
16 Ibid., pp. 104-111. 
17For an account of this incident, see Davis M'Gabe, 
"The Beginnings of Guerrilla Warfare" in W. Cartey and M. 
Kilson (eds) The Africa Reader: Independent Africa (New York) 
Vintage Books, 1970). 
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constitutional status of Zimbabwe prior to UDI was genuinely 
ambiguous. On the one hand, Britain claimed to exercise 
"reserve powers" over a territory described in contradictory 
terms as a ''self-governing colony", while on the other hand, 
the Smith regime claimed that the 1961 constitution amounted 
to a state of independence. Thus ZAPU and ZANU were in a 
tactical dilemma. If Zimbabwe were a colony, a foreign-
diplomatic offensive was entirely appropriate, since similar 
actions by other nationalist groups in Britain's African 
colonies had resulted in independence. However, if Zimbabwe 
were independent and sovereignty exercised by the Smith 
regime or the white minority, ZAPU and ZANU had to develop 
power through, for example, the development of a guerrilla 
army, that could threaten the Smith regime from within Zim-
babwe. In this respect the Emith regime would react dif-
ferently than the metropolitan power; they would resist 
claims for political equality and are formidable adversaries 
in doing so. For them the question would be not whether to 
resist black nationalist demands, but how to do so. 18 Stated 
differently, the termination of foreign or colonial rule can 
be achieved without necessarily establishing a position of 
physical, coercive or military superiority, while the down-
fall of an independent, domestic regime is unlikely if it 
18Kenneth W. Grundy, "Black Soldiers in a White Military: 
Political Change in South Africa", The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 4 (September 1981): 296. 
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cannot be defeated in physical-military terms. 19 With ZAPU 
and ZANU's leadership experience in foreign-diplomatic acti-
vity and their restrictions within Zimbabwe, it is not 
surprising that they chose the colonial version of the Zim-
babwean dispute. 20 Their misjudgment, rather, was in being 
"mesmerized" by potential British rule and intervention 
even after Britain clearly indicated that it would not inter-
21 
vene and in underestimating the adverse effects of pro-
longed absences by the leadership. 22 
Why did ZAPU and ZANU spend so much time in battling 
each other rather than the Smith regime? Internal schisms 
and rival movements characterize many southern African 
liberation movements; their nature and causes tend to be 
interpreted differently. First, it is argued that internal 
schisms are a by-product of regime repression. Since re-
pression eventually forces groups into exile, they have 
difficulty in waging an authentic guerrilla struggle and then 
suffer morale problems and exaggerate their claims of 
19
on this crucial strategic distinction, see Rejai, 
p. 19; Robert Taber, The War of the Flea (Bungay, Suffolk: 
The Chaucer Press, 1970), pp. 90-91; and Andrew Mack, 
" Sharpening the Contradictions: Guerrilla Strategy in 
Irr:perialist Wars'~ Race and Class 17 (Autumn 1975): 161-177. 
20 Day, pp. 120-125. 
21 Gibson, p. 156. 
22 Day, pp. 125-128. 
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"success." These and other indignities and anxieties of 
exile naturally engender epithets and charges of treason, 
collusion with "agents of imperialism", "revisionism",-
and "adventurism." 23 Second, it is argued that liberation 
movements - in exile or operating from within - are bureau-
cratic or political institutions in which demand for status, 
roles and positions exceeds supply. This leads to intense 
competition for positions, whereby candidates attempt to 
beat competitors by questioning their loyalty, commitment, 
honesty and character, and invoke linguistic, tribal, regional, 
racial and class considerations to demonstrate a greater fol-
1 . 24 OW1ng. Third, some have argued that tribalism is not 
simply a matter of revolutionary job competition, but that 
rivalry among tribal and other ethno-linguistic groups 
find expression in organizations. This leads to struggles 
among the leadership and the membership at large, defe·ctions 
and eventually the creation of rival movements. Particular 
h t d t t t . 1 . 1 25 groups t en en o overrepresen a par 1cu ar soc1a group. 
23John A. Marcum, "The Exile Condition and Revolutionary 
Effectiveness: Southern African Liberation Movements" in 
Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale (eds.), Southern Africa 
in Perspective (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 274. 
24 See the study of Mozambican liberation movements by 
Walter C. Opello, "Pluralism and Elite Conflict in an Inde-
pendence Movement: FRELIMO in the 1960s" Journal of Southern 
African Studies 2 (October 1975): 66-82.' 
25J. Bowyer Bell, "The Future of Guerrilla Revolution 
in Southern Africa", Africa Today 19 (Winter 1972): 12-13. 
Bell specifically includes the Zimbabwean movements in this 
statement. 
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To see the initial split between ZAPU and ZANU as an 
irrevocable division of Mashona and Ma tabe•le political 
loyalties, with the former located in ZANU and the latter in 
ZAPU, seems strained. Although almost half of ZAP1''s execu-
tives left to join ZANU there was no exodus among the local 
branch leaders of the membership. Not onJy did ZAPU retain 
most of its membership, it continued to attract support in 
urban areas that had large concentrations of Mashona and 
Matabele. E\·en the dissatisfaction with Nkomo cannot easily 
be explained in tribal terms, as Nkomo is a member of the 
Kf·.langa, a branch of the Mashona confederation but one which 
liveE• in the western part of Zimbabwe and has close ties with 
the Matabele. Nkomo himself also apparently did not engage 
in tribal exclusivism. 26 Yet, even if the original split was 
not primarily due to tribal exclusivism, it was clear that 
the organizations' exile condition, their close proximity in 
Lusaka, the relative paucity of organizational positions and 
regime repression provided a fertile ground for internecine 
warfare. By 1965 ZAPU and ZANU seemed the bitterest of 
enemies, whose differences could not be resolved by the re-
conciliation attempts of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU). The OAU then recognized and supported both 
26
scholars agree that the initial split was not pri-
marily over tribal matters. See Bowman, p. 55; Wilkenson, 
p. 228; Nelson, p. 179; and Gibson, pp. 161-162. 
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. t. 27 organ1za 1ons. 
When UDI was announced in 1965, ZAPU and ZANU were in 
a difficult position. As the previous chapter showed, .blacks 
in the various areas of Zimbabwe were unlikely to engage in 
any spontaneous or locally organized action. In addition, 
the successive regimes had armed themselves with a battery 
of repressjve means and used them to pre-empt any collective 
action - urbc:.n or rural - by blacks. While ZAPU and ZANU 
regrouped, they were now based abroad, led by substitute 
leadership, engaged in internecine warfare, and emphasized 
foreign-diplomatic action more than preparation for guerrilla 
struggle. UDI and events in its aftermath presented a stun-
ning defeat for this strategy. Britain remained unwilling 
to intervene and even the independent African nations, who 
were converted to the nation&.list cause, could not be 
persuaded to sever diplomatic relations with Britain as a 
retaliatory measure. As far as the United Nations was con-
cerned it did react, but it was only after more than a year 
that the Secu1·i ty Council determined that the Zimbabwe~n 
situation was, as argued by ZAPU and ZANU in terms of Article 
39 of the UN Charter, a threat to international peace and 
security. The Security Council, however, still refused to 
authorize the use of collective international force in 
27The OAU's African Liberation Committee did favor 
ZAPU in its financial allocations. Martin and Johnson, p. 71. 
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terms of Article 42. Sanctions were instituted, but these 
b k b t . 28 were ro en y many na 1ons. 
Thus ZAPU and ZANU were faced with a situation that 
necessitated action ain•ed at the overthrow of the Smith 
regime as tt..e defacto sovereign power in Zimbabwe. At the 
same time the OAU adopted a policy whereby it would favor 
only those liberation groups that waged effective political-
military struggles within their respective territories. 29 
ZAPU and ZANU now had to attempt guerrilla struggle within 
Zimbabwe. Between 1966 and 1970 ZAPU and ZANU clashed with 
the regime's security forces on seven major occasions, with 
six of these incidents directed by ZAPU. Only the first 
incident (or incursion) was directed by ZANU, which led to 
a clash with regime security forces near Sinoia in April 
1966. ZANU infiltrat€d other groups and these survived un-
detected for a longer time, but they too were eventually 
discovered and arrested and killed. These actions by ZANU's 
Zimbabwe African National LiberatioD Army (ZANLA) were 
28Negotiations and sanctions will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
29This decision followed on the failure of an ALC com-
mittee (composed of Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya 
and Ethiopia) to unite ZAPU and ZANU. This committee was ham-
pered by its own internal difficulties. Zambia, for example, 
supported ZAPU, while ZANU was supported by Tanzania. Leonard 
T. Kapung~ ''The OAU's Support for the Liberation of Southern 
Africa" in Yassin El-Ayouty (ed.),The Organization of African 
Unity After Ten Years: Comparative Perspectives (New York: 
Praeger, 1975), pp. 138-139. On the OAU an~ ALC's views on 
Zimbabwe, see Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity 
(London: Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1977), pp. 45-63 and 
122-127. 
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denounced by ZAPU, whose Zimbabv'e Liberation Army (ZLA) had 
not yet made any incursions. In July 1967 ZAPU forces, 
• 
accompanied by members of the South African ANC, infiltrated 
Matabeleland North and made their way to the Wankie Game 
Reserve in the south of the province. By August and September 
they were detected by the regime's security forces, attacked 
and eventually captured and killed. During 1968 ZAPU again 
made infiltrations, one entering Zimbabwe from west of Lake 
Kariba into Matabeleland North, and three to the east of the 
lake. These were also detected by the regime's security 
forces and captured and/or killed. During 1969 there were 
no reported clashes within Zimbabwe, leading observers to 
conclude that neither ZAPU nor ZANU could wage an effective 
30 guerrilla campaign within the country. 
This apparent demise of ZAPU and ZANU as effective 
guerrilla forces can be explained in reference to their 
mobilization efforts, their organizational forms, internal 
problems, and the nature of counter guE·rrilla warfare by the 
Smith regime. 
30
wilkenson, pp. 232-244; J. Bowyer Bell, "The Frustra-
tion of Insurgency: The Rhodesian Example in the Sixties," 
Military Affairs 35 (February 1971): 1-5; Gibson, pp. 164 
178; Kees Maxey, The Fight for Zimbabwe (London: Rex Collings, 
1975); and Michael Morris, Armed Conflict in Southern Africa 
(Cape Town, South Africa: Jeremy Spence, 1974), pp. 28-42. 
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1.1. Mobilization 
There is no evidence to suggest that ZAPU and ZANU 
intended to infiltrate trained recruits as agents for local 
political mobilization during the period between 1965 and 
1970. Initial infiltrations from Zambia were not covert or 
intended for local political targets, nor were attacks of 
the "hit and run" variety. Attacks consisted of conven-
tionally-styled positional warfare, rationalized by the 
organizations as "facing the government squarely" or a 
"policy of confrcntation." 31 This led to heavy losses and 
demoralization. 
There were several reasons for ZAPU and ZANU's taste 
for confrontation. One (and perhaps the most important) 
reason was the OAU's stipulation that it would recognize and 
support only the effective liberation organizations. Con-
sequently the 
polarized liberation movements, in order to gain the 
support of the OAU, had to seem to be fighting. So 
armed men were sent into the territories at precisely 
the time an OAU organ was about to meet ••• (and) leaders 
of the liberation movements would go to the OAU and 
claim to be waging an armed struggle ••• In other words, 
revolutionary effectiveness was sacrificed for propc.gan-
distic reasons.32 
The influence of international (as opposed to local) factors 
is also evident in the targets of the infiltrating groups. 
31
IIEz S. Reid,"African Nationalism in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe" in Potholm and Dale, p. 44. 
32 Kapungu, pp. 138-139. 
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Both ZAPU and ZANU avoided the Tonga reserves adjacent to 
Lake Kariba and preferied to risk a long and difficult route 
to the more distant reserves in the vicinity of Bulawayo and 
the farmworkers in the vicinity of Salisbury. These targets 
may be partly explained by the lure of urban areas, but more 
obviously by the fact that ZAPU and ZANU were conscious of 
their ethnic stereotypes and tried to overcome them for 
international consumption. Thus ZANU (or ZANLA), which was 
said to be dominated by Mashona, entered Matabeleland, while 
33 ZAPU with its Matabele stereotype, entered Mashonaland. 
While these may have been laudable attempts to create supra-
tribal organizations, it demonstrates the importance of 
international factors in the respective organizations' stra-
tegic thinking. Another r€ason for the taste for confrontation 
was that the exile in Zambia had produced a psychological 
attitude of, impatience, reinforced by the misguided belief 
that the Smith regime, like the colonial regimes in former 
struggles in Africa, would quickly succumb to the pressure 
f . 1 34 o v1o ence. Finally, it is said that ZAPU, which directed 
most of the armed clashes, was mainly trained in the Soviet 
Union, whose training de-emphasized guerrilla warfare in 
rural areas, whereas ZANU (or ZANLA) received most of its 
33
wilkenson, p. 241. 
34Martin and Johnson, p. 11. 
,. 
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training from Chinese instructors, who were familiar with 
the tenets of guerrilla warfare and the need for political 
b .]. t. 35 mo 1 1za 1on. 
Mobiliz&.tion efforts in the areas adjacent to Zambia 
would be difficult. Geographically Lake Kariba constitutes 
a large part of the Zambia-Zimbabwe borde:·r and crossing it 
by boat would expose the guerrillas to detection from the 
air. This left only two options for entry into target 
areas: one to the west of the lake into the Matabeleland 
North province, and the other east of the lake into Mashona-
land North. As Tables I and II show, the northern areas of 
Mashona- and Matabeleland North are largely depopulated, 
because the land is designated as national land (game 
reserves) or as unassigned land. The more densely populated 
reserves lie directly east of LakE: Kariba or further south. 
Thus guerrillas had to spend much of the initial part of 
their infiltration in steep (especially in Mashonaland North), 
waterless, and otherwise inhospitable terrain without the 
assistance of the local population - and hence deprived of 
the means and ends of guerrilla warfare. 
Clearly Zambia was of limited value as a base for 
infiltration, although it was the only neighborhing state 
willing to host ZAPU and ZANU. When infiltration did take 
place, the actions seemed premised more on international 
than local factors, with ZANU and ZAPU preferring dramatic 
35Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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confrontations to score points with an international audi-
ence. Even if mobilization were seriously attempted, it 
would be difficult, as the area adjacent to Zambia is geo-
physically inhospitable and largely devoid of population. 
1.2. Organizational Forms 
By late 1970 most of the strategic assessments of the 
progress of· ·zAPU and ZANU reflected a gloomy pessimism. The 
diagnosis, in most cases, was that the respective organiza-
tions needed to place greater emphasis on mobilization 
efforts within Zimbabwe and, in order to do so, they needed 
to become political parties. 36 
ZAPU originally intended to be a political party that 
operated within Zimbabwe and, before it was banned, it 
formed a military wing, known first as the Zimbabwe Libera-
tion Army (ZLA) and later as the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolu-
tionary Army (ZIPRA), that was covertly directed by a member 
of the ZAPU executive. When ZAPU was banned it operated for 
a time within Zimbabwe under the name of the Peoples Care-
taker Council (PCC) and, when it was threatened with banning, 
its leadership met at the Cold Comfort experimental farm, 
dissolved existing internal organizational arrangements and 
discussed arrangements if banning were indeed to occur. 
When the PCC was then banned, the remnants of ZAPU gathered 
36 See, for· example, Kenneth W. Grundy, Confrontation 
and Accomodation in Southern Africa (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1973), pp. 180-183. 
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in LusakE under the arrangements made at the Cold Comfort 
meeting. Chikerema was the acting president in Nkomo's 
absence and headed a national executive, with each of the 
members of the executive at the head of functional areas, 
such as youth affairs, education, military affairs, and so 
forth. Authority over ZIPRA was exercised by a high command, 
headed by a military commander (or head of staff). The 
actual planning and waging of the guerrilla struggle was 
placed under the authority of a War Council, representing 
military and civilian-political leaders. 37 
The Cold Comfort meeting was not a constitutional 
conference; it simply made practical arrangements which, in 
the absence of Nkomo and under the conditions of exile, 
had deteriorated to disarray and mismanagement. These 
internal problems were publicly aired in three documents. 
The first document, "Observations on Our Struggle" W8.S pre-
sented by Moyo (ZAPU's national treEsurer and second in 
command in the military department) and criticised the in-
discipline and self-indulgence of ZIPRA members, the dicta-
torial leadership style of Chikerema, and the Zambian intel-
ligence forces' penetration of ZAPU. To correct these prob-
lems, Moyo proposed that military-style discipline should 
37G.b 1. son, pp. 169-170. 
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be imposed, the War Council should be strengthened by in-
cluding more ZIPRA forces and particularly the members of 
the high command, recruitment efforts should be increased, 
and ZAPU should review its strategy of confrontation. In 
the second document, "Reply to Observation on Our Struggle" 
Chikerema defended hjs leadership style by noting that the 
Cold Comfort meeting did not create formal structures but 
resigned itself to Nkomo's judgment on such matters. Since 
Nkomo then appointed Chikerema, hjs position could not be 
questioned. While Chikerema did admit that ZIPRA lack~: 
leadership, sound administration and cohesion, he accusE~d 
Moyo of trying to manipulate the positions within it so as 
to establish his own influence. Therefore Moyo was relieved 
of his command, as were his supporters on the executive 
committee (Nyandoro and Silundika). Chikerema's actions 
led to a third document, "On the Coup Crisis Precipitated by 
J. Chikerema", wherein Moyo and Silundika disassociated 
themselves from Nyandoro and called for the collective 
exercise of authority within ZAPu. 38 
As these documents indicate, there were sevE·ral 
causes of the internal problems of ZAPU, which together 
reveal its internal dynamics. First, the rivals on the ZAPU 
executive were supported by tribal groups, with the Zezuru 
38This section is based on Ibid., pp. 169-173. 
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(a branch of the Mashona) conspicuous supporters of Chikerema 
and the Matabele supporting Moyo and Silundika. Indeed, 
ZAPU could only maintain a facade of md ty by housing the 
rival factions in separate military camps and political 
ff . 39 o 1ces. Second, it was clear that the internal rivalries 
were fueled by the highly informal organizational form of 
ZAPU. Nkomo's leadership style derived from his personal 
authority, but Chikerema's imitation of it was clearly unsuc-
cessful. Third, it became evident that the rjvals on the 
executive were maneuvering to gain control over the 400-man 
ZIPRA contingent, 40 but their very rivalry made them incap-
able of doing so. 
ZANU's organizational form was originally set by a 
party congress, attended by 22 members, at Gwelo in May 1964. 
It crea tec1 a central commit tee, with members respon~>ible for 
functional areas, and appointed Chitepo as president. When 
ZANU was banned in September 1964, the central committee 
instructed Chitepo to organize a military wing, known as 
ZANLA, which was headed by a military high comm£.nd and a 
commander. The daily operations of the struggJe fell under 
the authority of a Revolutionary Council, composed of 16 
members and headed by Chitepo. 41 
39Martin and Johnson, pp. 29-30. 
40Ibid., p. 30. 
41G.b 1 son, pp. 180-181. 
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Like ZAPU, ZANU experienced internal problems in 
Lusaka and accusations were made of the self-indulgence of 
leaders, a lack of resolve, tribalism, and personality · 
clashes. The discussion of these problems at ZAPU's first 
annual review conference nevertheless resulted in the 
reaffirmation of Chitepo as leader, but led to an internal 
reorganization as the Revolutionary Council was replaced 
by a Supreme Council, known as DARE (short for Dare re 
Chimurenga). The civilian-political leaders also attempted 
to assert their leadership over ZANLA by having a member of 
the central committee, the secretary of defense, chair the 
DARE meetings. 42 The reorganization did not solve all of 
ZANU's internal problems, as Chitepo continued to be the 
target of criticism, the "politicians" on DARE were accused 
of a preoccupation with foreign-diplomatic action and pre-
ference for dramatic guerrilla confrontations, and tribalism. 
With regard to the latter, two-thirds of DARE were indeed 
Mashona, as well as many of tte other top positions within 
ZANU. There was not, however, a single branch of the 
Mashona that dominated ZANu. 43 
By 1970 ZAPU and ZANU were thus in a period of orga-
nizational transformation as they struggled to adjust to 
the exile environment in Zambia, tried to transform 
42Ibid., pp. 181-183. 
43Gann and Henrikson, p. 106 (fn. 36). 
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themselves into entities capable of waging effective guer-
rilla warfare (i.e. they had to develop a military component 
or had to become armies rather than parties), and as the· 
leadership underwent a transition with the positions of the 
former prominent leaders now filled by less known figures. 
In view of these transitions, it was inevitable that inter-
nal problems and rivalries would be exacerbated. Most pro-
minent among these was the tension between the guerrillas 
and the civilian-political leaders (the "politicians"), 
with the latter being accused of avoiding a genuine guerrilla 
struggle within Zimbabwe. Even within the ranks of the 
political leadership there were rivalries, caused by a 
variety of factors including personality, tactics, leadership 
style and the use of tribal support in bids for power. Yet 
neither ZAPU nor ZANU were, as stereotyped, exclusive Mata-
bele or Mashon~ organizations. Tribal attachments were used 
rather than dominated. 
1.3. Leadership 
The leadership of ZAPl! and ZANU were primarily drawn 
from the ranks of urban and professional blacks; teachers, 
44 in particular, were heavily represented. Most of the 
leadership had by 1970 acquired experience of foreign travel. 
The various branches of the Mashona are predominant, as could 
44Mugabe, Sithole, Silundika and Takawjra were among 
the teachers. Chitepo was a lawyer. 
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be expected from a black population which is about 71 per-
45 
cent Mashona and about 16 percent Matabele. Most of the 
leadership was spawned by the black organizational activity 
of the 1950s. Moyo, Nkomo, Takawira, Mugabe and Sithc.le all 
had experience in the ANC and the NDP, while Moyo and Nkomo 
were also formerly active in black trade union politics. 
Many indeed.~pent most of their adult lives as organizational 
t .. t 46 ac 1v1s s. 
Since most of these leaders were former office-holders 
of black organizations, it left each with soo1e experience 
of organizational politics, but also with a personal follow-
ing and personal-political ambitions. While most of the top 
leadership was in detention between 1962 and 1970 (and there-
after), the secondary leadership who moved into their vacated 
organizational positions moved in an organizational environ-
ment where new offices and roles were created. This encouraged 
the cultivation of personal followings, rivalries and other 
power-seeking behavior and, although this equipped many with 
in-fighting skills, the attempt to wage guerrilla war required 
and generated a new leadership component. By 1970 many of 
the ZP.PU and ZANU recruits had returned from training abroad, 
but they had not yet moved into important decision-making 
positions. It was nevertheless clear that the political 
45 Nelson, p. 74. 
46Nyandoro and Chikerema were orginally active in the 
Youth League in Salisbury. See the previous chapter. 
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leadership was rethinking its strategy of foreign-diplomatic 
actions combined with some dramatic military confrontations. 
In early 1970 ZAPU's Chikerema stated that they were now 
preparing for a protracted guerrilla struggle that required 
political mobilization and covert rural organizations. Chikerema 
gave no indication as to how ZAPU would accomplish this, given 
that ZAPU was internally divided and Zambia had severe limitations 
as a base for infiltration. There was no mention of ZAPU's 
earlier cooperation with the South African ANC or, 47 more 
importantly, that ZAPU would attempt to make contact with the 
Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) of Mozambique. 
Since 1968 FRELIMO had been successful at establishing its pre-
sence in the northwestern province of Mozambique, Tete, which 
was adjacent to the northeastern areas of Zimbabwe. A working 
relationship with FRELIMO could allow ZIRPA forces to enter 
48 Mashonaland North and South. ZANU's leadership made no public 
mention of a change in strategy; indeed the most startling 
strategic statement came from Sithole, on trial for advocating 
the murder of Ian Smith, who said: "I wish to disassociate my 
name in word, thought or deed from any subversive activities, 
from any terrorist activities, and from any form of violence." 49 
47G.b 1 son, pp. 168-169. 
48FRELIMO in fact saw ZAPU as its natural ally but the 
internal problems of ZAPU prevented it from making any last-
ing contact with FRELIMO. Martin and Johnson, pp. 15-16. 
49Ibid., p. 148. 
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Nevertheless ZANU continued to send recruits to their train-
ing camp at Itumbi in Zambia, where they were trained by 
Tanzanian and Chinese instructors. 50 ZANU had not made ·any 
noteworthy incursions into Zimbabwe since 1966, but it 
established a working relationship with FRELIMO, which per-
mitted a small contingent of ZANLA forces to join FRELIMO 
operations~~ observers and trainees. 51 
Thus the leadership that was in effective control of 
ZAPU and ZANU in Zambia was only a fraction of the leadership 
spawned by black organizational activity of the 1950s. The 
competitiveness of this elite was encouraged by the transi-
tional organizational environment in which they found them-
selves. Guerrilla war also required new leadership skills 
and, although training was underway, a new style of leader-
ship had not yet emerged. ZANU's leaders did have one 
important success, namely th~ir contact with FRELIMO; if 
FRELIMO then could establish its control in Mozambique, 
this would widen the tactical possibilities for ZANU. 
1.4. Counter Guerrilla Warfare 
When UDI was declared the Zimbabwean defense establish-
ment was divided into three components, namely the regular 
50
with little mobilization and recruitment within 
Zambabwe, ZAPU and ZANU found recruits within the large exile 
and refugee communities of Zimbabweans in Zambia. Gann and 
Henrikson, p. 97. 
51Martin and Johnson, pp. 17-18. 
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(or standing ) force, the territorial (or citizen) force, 
and the British South Africa Police. 
The regular force consisted of the Rhodesia Army and 
the Rhodesia Air Force. The Rhodesia Army numbered approxi-
mately 3,500 men and was organized into two battalions, the 
all-white Royal Rhodesia Rf:giment and the Rhodesian African 
Rifles of about 1,000 black troops under the command of 
white officers. These were both infantry battalions, and 
resorted under the authority of a military headquarters. The 
Rhodesia Air Force by 1969 consisted of approximately 1,000 
men, organized into seven squadrons, with about 80 aircraft. 52 
The territorial force consisted of approximately 10,000 white 
men, organized into eight infantry' battalions and support 
units. These men were called up for nine months of national 
service, after which they were assigned to certain units, 
attended parades, or could be activated. The British South 
Africa Police consisted of approximately 6,400 men in perma-
nent employ. The BSAP was a quasi-military force; its mem-
bers were trained in light infantry tactics and carried light 
arms. A considerable proportion of the BSAP was black, either 
as policemen or as messengers. In addition to the permanent 
employees of the BSAP, there was a reserve police force, which 
expanded during the 1960s; its largely white membership rose 
52 The development of the air force occurred under the 
CAFand, when it was dissolved, the air force was transferred 
tothe Zimbabwean defense establishment. 
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to about 28,500 in 1970. In equipment, training and doctrine, 
the Zimbabwean military establishment was deeply influenced 
by the British military tradition. 53 
A rough division of labor existed among the above 
military components. The regular army and the air force were 
responsible for security in the border areas, while the BSAP 
was responsible for ordinary crime control and other matters 
affecting the public security in internal areas. Both of 
these responsibilities were aided by a well-organized intel-
ligence system, which included a network of urban and rural 
bl k . f 54 ac 1n ormers. 
When the first infiltration of guerrillas occurred, the 
Zimbabwean military establishment's only exposure to guerrilla 
warfare was service as a volunteer unit in the Malayan Emer-
55 gency. During the ensuing period (1966 and after) the 
security forces nevertheless countered the guerrilla threat 
53 Internation~l Institute for Strategic Studies, The 
Military Balance, 1969-1970 (London, 1970), p. 53 and Richard 
Booth, The Armed Forces of African ~tates, Adelphi Papers, 
No. 67 (May 1970). For the historical development of the Zim-
babwean armed forces, see Lewis H. Gann, "From Ox Wagon to 
Armored Car'~ Military Review 48 (April 1968): 63-72. 
54Besides the intelligence network, small parties of 
security forces masquerading as guerrillas were also allowed 
to roam the countryside. See Roy Christie, For the President's 
Eyes Only (Johannesburg: Hugh Keartland Publishers, 1971), 
pp. 10-30 and Martin and Johnson, p. 9. 
55This unit included Peter Walls, later the supreme 
commander of the regime's security forces. 
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in a way that was touted as a model for counter-guerrilla 
warfare elsewhere. Acting on the information of its intel-
ligence network and air surveillance, tracker units would be 
dispatched by helicopter to identify the position of guer-
rillas, and then other units (or the tracker unit) would 
ambush, capture and/or kill the guerrillas. Three units dis-
tinguished themselves in these actions, namely the Grey's 
Scouts, a highly mobile infantry unit; the Selous Scouts, 
essentially a tracker unit composed of blacks and whites and 
trained to roam the countryside for long periods of time; and 
the Special Air Services, an airborne commando unit with intel-
ligence and light infantry duties. 56 
In assessing the effectiveness of the counter guerrilla 
operations it is important to remember that the initial guer-
rilla attacks were small and rather clumsy. Moreover, the 
regime's security forces were supported by South African 
men and equipment after ZAPU announced that it had formed a 
military alliance with South Africa's ANC. The South African 
para-military contingent was responsible for security in the 
border area west of Lake Kariba, and was assisted by South 
African helicopters and spotter planes. Estimates of the 
size of the contingent vary, but even a conservative estimate 
56
see particularly Bell, "The Frustration of Insurgency: 
The Rhodesian Example in the Sixties"; Russel W. Howe, "War 
in Southern Africa", Foreign Affairs 48 (October 1969): 150-
165; and Gann and Henrikson, pp. 64-66. For a contrasting 
View, see Fire Force Exposed (London: Anti-Apartheid Movement, 
1979). 
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of 1,000 men gave South Africa a substantial role in the 
Zimbabwean operations. 57 The cost of the para-military 
contingent was borne by South Africa. 58 An assessment of 
the regime's security operations also has to account for 
its cost. There was a gradual rise in defense expenditures, 
from approximately Rh $20 million in 1964 to approximately 
Rh $40 million in 1973. In 1967 the defense expenditures 
amounted to about 6.5 percent of the annual budget, rising 
to about 9 percent in 1973. 59 With regard to manpower, the 
size of the regular force and the BSAP did not noticeably 
increase, but the police reserve and especially the terri-
torial force and its commitments expanded. National service 
was forced to increase to a twelve-month period of active 
duty (up from nine months), after which the trainees were 
60 
subject to one-month or longer short tours of duty. These 
'
57While guerrillas claimed that there were 8,000 South 
African troops by 1972, other accounts estimate the number 
at 5,000 in the same year, rising to between 7,000 and 10,000 
by 1973. Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI), 
Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict (New York: 
Praeger, 1976), p. 109. Nelson estimates the number at 1,000 
by early 1970 (p. 347). 
58
wilkenson, pp. 328-329. 
59
see Ibid., p. 306; Nelson, p. 336 and Kenneth W. 
Grundy, "The Social Costs of Armed Struggle in Southern Pfrica" 
Armed Forces and Society 7 (Spring 1981): 456. Hereafter cited 
as "Social Costs". These figures are drawn from the Central 
Statistical Office in Salisbury. It is likely that they do 
not reveal disguised military expenditures or South African 
budget support. 
60Grundy, "Social Costs", pp. 447-448. 
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commitments we~e a drain on the Zimbabwean economy, but the 
war itself did not seem to increase emigration as there was 
a net overall gain in immigration during the 1965-1970 
. d 61 per1o . 
In view of the self-destructive behaviour of ZAPU and 
ZANU of this period, the size of the South African contin-
gent, and the costs (although still modest) of the security 
operations, the regime's "success" at countering the guer-
rilla threat was clearly a qualified one. Yet the regime 
viewed the decline of guerrilla activities during 1969 and 
1970 as an unqualified success. Instead of a simple boost in 
mor 1 th 1 d . t f"d 62 a e, ey aspe 1n o overcon 1 ence. 
1.5. Summary 
By the end of 1970 there thus was little evidence that 
ZAPU or ZANU was engaging in a serious and sustained attempt 
at mobilizing rural blacks in its cause. There was some 
infiltration, but these efforts were rather clumsy and aimed 
more at scoring foreign-diplomatic victories than on local 
mobilization. With no visible increases in local or rural 
black activity it is thus clear that rural blacks would not 
become more active at the mere existence of ZAPU and ZANU. 
The blacks of the reserves, the purchase area farmers and 
61
see Wilkenson, p. 307 and William G. Kuepper, G. 
Lynne Lackey and E. Nelson Swinerton, pp. 5-6. 
62Gann and Herikson, p. 67 and Martin and Johnson, p. 96. 
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and the farmworkers seemed to change little from the posi-
tion in 1965. With regard to organizational form, both ZAPU 
and ZANU were in a transitional period complicated by the 
conditions of exile and elite competitiveness. ZAPU and ZANU 
were neither fully armies or political parties; they were 
more informal organizations characterized by the tension 
between their military and civilian-political components. 
The leadership (or elite) of ZAPU and ZANU was, despite the 
similarity of their socio-economic backgrounds and their 
past experiences, characterized by highly competitive 
behavior by substitute leaders. There was no single reason 
for this competitiveness; it appears to be a combination of, 
among other things, the pressures of the exile environment, 
personality factors, organizational setting, and personal 
ambitions nurtured by a long involvement in organizational 
black politics. 
Given these features, the counter guerrilla actions 
clearly scored a victory by default, but the Smith regime 
did not view it as such. Rather, they overlooked the cost 
of their operations and overlooked the possibility of renewed 
guerrilla actions. In short, the regime became complacent 
because they thought that they had scored a military victory. 
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1971-1979: Guerrilla Warfare 2. 
In the period between 1971 and 1972 security forces 
reported no armed clashes with the guerrillas, but several 
signs pointed to the increase of guerrilla activity. In the 
areas bordering on Zambia, ZIPRA concentrated on the use of 
landmines against civilian and military vehicles. In retalia-
tion, the Smith regime demanded guarantees from Zambia that 
guerrilla infiltration cease and, when this was not forth-
coming, closed the border with Zambia. 63 In the northeastern 
areas bordering on Mozambique there were reports of armed 
clashes and infiltration, and the Smith regime expressed 
alarm at the failure of the Portuguese forces to contain 
FRELIMO in Tete. 64 By the end of 1972 (December) the Smith 
regime indeed admitted that guerrilla actions were increasing, 
and said that the situation was "far more serious than it 
65 
appears on the surface." 
63Despite Zambia's refusal to prevent guerrilla in-
filtration, Smith reopened the border, but the Zambian govern-
ment regarded the closure as permanent. For a full account, 
see The Rhodesia-Zambia Border Closure, January-February 1973 
(London: International Defense and Aid Fund, May 1973). 
64
wilkenson, pp. 273-274. 
65Ibid., p. 258 and Maxey, p. 108. According to BSAP 
statistics (Wilkenson, p. 231) there was a rise in the contra-
ventions in the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act from 130 in 
1970 to 396 in 1972 and finally to 636 in 1972. These figures 
do not necessarily reveal a rise in rural political activity, 
as they include urban unrest associated with the arrival of 
the Pearce Commission and the creation of the African National 
Council by Bishop Muzorewa. 
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Between 1971 and 1972 there were no signs, however, 
that ZAPU and ZANU would reconcile their differences. The 
continued internecine warfare led to a threat by President 
Kaunda of Zambia in late 1971 that, unless they settled their 
differences, he would expel them from Zambia. In response 
some of the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU formed the Front for the 
Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), but FROLIZI was actively 
supported by only James Chikerema, leading to charges that 
FROLIZI was a Zezuru clique. FROLIZI nevertheless did 
manage to establish a training camp and infiltrated a few 
"11 66 guerr1 a groups. As a political force of unity, however, 
it collapsed. 67 
With ZAPU and ZANU unreconciled, the period between 
1970 and 1972 witnessed the rebirth of overt organizational 
black activity within Zimbabwe. 68 During 1970 the British 
and Zimbabwean governments announced the conclusion of a 
settlement and in 1971 a British commission, led by Lord 
Pearce, arrived in Zimbabwe to test blacks' acceptance of 
•t 69 1 • To organize black opposition to the proposals an 
African National Council (ANC) was created by the Reverend 
66A second attempt at a unified front came when ZAPU 
and ZANU announced the formation of a joint military command 
(JMC). 
67
see Tony Kirk, "Politics and Violence in Rhodesia" 
African Affairs 74 (January 1975): 3-38. 
68
up to this point blacks found electoral expression 
in the multi-racial Centre Party, who returned seven members 
of parliament. 
69Negotiations will be discussed in next chapter. 
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canaan Banana and Bishop Abel Muzorewa. The ANC quickly 
demonstrated its urban viability by organizing meetings, 
providing blacks with information, and by advertising its 
opposition to the proposals. The subsequent British rejec-
tion of the settlement proposals further enhanced the stature 
f th ANC d M . t• 1 70 o e an uzorewa 1n par 1cu ar. 
When ZANU then claimed responsibility for an attack 
on a white farm in the northeastern districts in December 
1972, it was against a background marked by the emergence of 
the ANC within Zimbabwe and the deteriorating position of 
the Portuguese forces in Mozambique. These and other 
domestic and international events influenced ZAPU and ZANU's 
subsequent mobilization efforts, their organizational form, 
the behaviour of their elite, and the nature of the regime's 
counter guerrilla operations. 
2.1. Mobilization 
In the two years after the attack of December 1972, 
ZANLA used the Tete province of Mozambique to infiltrate the 
northeastern areas of Zimbabwe. This border area consists of 
a 150 mile long and 40 mile wide set of black reserves, as 
well as the small Chesa purchase area, and its rugged geo-
physical features facilitate guerrilla operations. By 
70 : On the creation of the ANC, see Eshmael Mlambo (ed.) 
No Future Without Us: The Story of the African National 
Council (London: The African National Council, 1973). 
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mid-1973 ZANLA had in fact firmly established its political 
71 influence over the area. 
ZANLA initially acquired its freedom of movement in 
the northeastern areas by making covert contact with the 
religious and political authorities of local areas. Thus 
ZANLA made contact with the relevant spirit mediums and, in 
honour of their role in these and past actions, named their 
operational sectors after them, 72 and made contact with 
sympathetic chiefs, ward- and kraalheads. 73 With the support 
of the inhabitants of the reserves and the purchase areas, 
ZANLA then launched a variety of actions. They robbed 
74 
stores; ambushed security forces (often after these hit 
landmines); abducted and/or killed civilians; and, acting on 
the information supplied by farmworkers, attacked white 
75 farmers and their property. These actions were undertaken 
71Maxey, pp. 98-131; Wilkenson, p. 284; and Martin and 
Johnson, pp. 73-91. 
72
on the nature and importance of the spirit mediums 
in the guerrilla struggle, see Terence 0. Rc.nger "The Death 
of Chaminuka: Spirit Mediums, Nationalism and the Guerrilla 
Wf:·.r in Zimbabwe•; African A:ffairs 81 (July 1982): 349-369. 
73An early supporter in the northE:astern areas was 
Chief Chiweshe of the Chiweshe reserve. Unsympathetic tribal 
leaders frequently became targets for attack. Gann and 
Henrikson, pp. 90-92. 
74There is some evidence that 
spersed with the guerrilla warfare, 
discipline led to criminal actions. 
75 Jbid., pp. 268-270. 
social banditry was inter-
and that guerrillas' in-
Wilkenson, p. 269. 
... 
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bY full-time and part-time (or locally recruited) guerrillas, 
both of whom were assisted by women and mujibas (landless, 
unemployed or otherwise available young men) who acted as 
local scouts and contacts. Full-time recurits were heavily 
drawn from local villages and particularly from the migrant 
and refugee communities in Zambia and Mozambique. Judging 
from the number of abductions and press-gangings, it was 
clear that ZANLA experienced some recruitment problems at 
h . t. 76 t 1s 1me. 
Although ZANLA had acquired freedom of movement within 
the reserves and the purchase areas of the northeastern dis-
tricts, they did not attempt to create "liberated areas", 
as characterized by geo-political control and the creation 
of alternative political institutions. The reason was that 
the security forces could still detect and pursue ZANLA 
forces. 77 Yet ZANLA established a political network and, as 
long as it was supported by the local population and remained 
highly mobile, they could continue their actions in the area. 
In the western areas ZIPRA continued its mine offen-
sive, supplemented by a number of infiltrations, ambushes 
and other attacks. While the scale of their operation was 
76 Gann and Henrikson, pp. 97-99 and Martin and Johnson, 
pp. 73-91. 
77Martyn Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation 
through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilization" Journal 
of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 19 (March 1981): 69. 
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smaller than that of ZANLA, ZIPRA forces were more disci-
plined, better equipped and trained, and were capable of 
executing well-planned and -led operations. 78 Given these 
qualities, the Smith regime expected an increase in ZIPRA 
activities, especially in the southeastern areas of Matabele-
79 land. 
The Portuguese coup of April 1974 created new possi-
bilities for ZANLA. It had established a working relation-
ship with FRELIMO and, with the active support of FRELIMO 
as the future government of Mozambique or even with the 
absence of Portuguese forces, ZANLA could locate its bases 
within the sanctuary of Mozambique and infiltrate Zimbabwe 
along the long eastern border. Due to problems within 
ZANLA and ZIPRA, however, it was only two years after the 
Portuguese coup (in 1976) that they could make full use of 
these tactical possibilities. 
The Portuguese coup led to a "spirit of detente" in 
southern Africa as Zambia responded to South Africa's re-
quest for a relaxation of tensions in the area. This led 
to a summit meeting of southern African leaders at Victoria 
Falls in December 1974 to settle, among other things, the 
Zimbabwean question. As an indication of its good faith 
78This was also the view of the Smith regime. See Paul 
Moorcraft, A Short Thous~nd Years: The End of Rhodesia~s 
Rebellion (Salisbury·: Galaxie, 1979), p. 164. 
79Martin and Johnson, p. 112. 
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in the detente effort, the Smith regime released the detained 
nationalist leaders, allowing Nkomo, Sithole, Chikerema and 
Muzorewa to attend the meeting. These leaders signed a 
"unity agreement" to provide for a common bargaining position 
during the negotiations; the respective organizations (ZAPU 
and ZANU) would still exist, but the ANC, now called the 
United African National Council or UANC, would be the umbrella 
organization for the nationalists. 80 A temporary ceasefire 
was institut~d as a prelude to negotiations. Despite these 
developments, the effort at negotiations was shortlived and 
by January 1975 the ceasefire and the unity collapsed. The 
Smith regime stopped the release of detained leaders (or 
members of banned organizations) and guerrilla attacks con-
tinued. 
In Zambia, however, ZANU was wracked by internal poli-
tical and military problems. In March 1975 Chitepo, its pre-
sident, was killed by a car bomb, and the Zambian authorities 
suspected the other leaders of ZANU to be responsible and 
therefore arrested most of the DARE and ZANLA high command. 
In addition, several senior military commanders led by Thomas 
Nhari attempted a coup within ZANU and the violence that 
accompanied it led the Zambian authorities to make a sweeping 
series of arrests of ZANU (and ZANLA) members. In March 1975 
Zambia in fact banned ZANU and the other nationalist groups 
and closed their offices. The remaining guerrillas 
8
°For the text, see Nyangoni and Nyandoro, pp. 295-296. 
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were restricted to their bases and training camps. Tanzanian 
authorities responded similarly in May 1975. In Tanzania 
there was also dissatisfaction among ZANLA forces concerning 
the political leadership. Guerrillas at the Mgagao training 
camp produced a Mgagao Declaration charging that the present 
political leadership (Sithole of ZANU itself and Chikerema, 
Nkomo and Muzorewa of the UANC as umbrella organization) were 
wholly incapable of leading the guerrilla struggle. Of the 
leE.dership, only Robert Mugabe was singled out for praise. 
In Mozambique, where the transition to a FRELIMO government 
was under way and where the ramificaitons of Chitepo's murder 
was also felt, ZANLA guerrillas were effectively restricted 
to their bases and training camps. Mugabe and a senior ZANLA 
commander Tekere was under vitural house arrest in Quelimane. 
The result of these problems within ZANU was predictable, while 
the number of recruits arriving in Mozambique increased, orga-
nizational activity declined to about three active guerrilla 
groups within Zimbabwe. 81 
While the hosts of the nationalist organizations were 
agreed that the struggle against the Smith regime should con-
tinue, their attitude by 1975 was that guerrilla actions as 
hitherto characterized could no longer be supported. Con-
sequently they agreed that all the guerrillas should be con-
centrated in Mozambique under some form of unity. Thus ZIPRA 
81Martin and Johnson, p. 215. 
262 
and ZANLA were to merge into a united Zimbabwe Peoples Army 
(ZIPA), and be led by a military committee of 18 members with 
ReX Nhongo (the senior ZANLA commander) a~ chief of staff. 
It was unclear as to uhder what political authority ZIPA 
would function. Mugabe was the appointed leader of the guer-
rillas ZANLA, but ZANU's leaders~lp still formally belonged 
. . 
to Sithole and, moreover, Mugabe's movements within Mozam-
bique were restricted. ZAPU was led by Nkomo, but he advo-
cated a negotiated ending to the conflict and was involved in 
the UANC of Muzorewa. As such he did not command the con-
fidence of the guerrillas of ZIPA. 82 
By the end of 1975 there were between 5,000 and 10,000 
guerrillas of ZANLA gathered in Mozambican camps, as well as 
a much smaller ZIPRA contingent, 83 and in January 1976 infil-
tration began again. Unlike their earlier efforts, the guer-
rillas now had few recruitment problems and could infiltrate 
'Zimbabwe at more points, including the Manicaland, Victoria 
and Matabeleland South provinnes. By the end of_ 1976 ~P~ 
Proximately 1700 guerrillas had crossed the bbrd~r:into 
82The 'ANC formed a council to direct guerrilla acti~i­
ties, the Zimbabwe Liberation Council or ZLC, composed of 
Muzorewa, Sithole, Chikerema and Nkomo. 
83A figure of at least 6,000 ZANLA guerrillas and 1,000 
ZIPRA guerrillas is usually cited. See Patrick O'Meara,'~ho­
aesia: From White Rule to Independent Zimbabwe" in Gwendolen (BlCar~er and Patrick O'Meara (eds), Southern Africa in Crisis 
36 oom~ngton, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. S ~37; Gann and Henrikson, p. 103; and Robert I. Rotberg, 
-lffer the Future (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univer-
s ty Press, 1980), p. 262. 
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84 Zimbabwe and .the Smith regime admitted that the "war zone" 
85 bad doubled. In the following years (1976 to 1979) guer-
rilla actions increased. dramatically. By_ July, ZANLA guer-
rillas within Zimbabwe increased to approximately 3,000 and 
their actions resulted in the deaths of 197 security forces. 
In the western areas ZIPRA acti~ity also increased. 86 By 
March 1978 ZANLA's forces within Zimbabwe rose to 13,000 
and even higher (to about 15,000) by July 1979. 87 
While the availability of Mozambique as a host state 
increased with effectiveness of ZANLA and ZIPRA actions 
increased, there were still problems within the organizations. 
One of these was that political and military cooperation was 
tenuous. In October 1974 the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU formed 
the Patriotic Front (PF) to facilitate their negotiations 
at the Geneva conference organized by the British government, 
but this cooperation did not encourage military cooperation. 
During the preceding years ZANLA and ZIPRA bad acquired dif~ 
ferent zones of influence, received different training and 
84 Gann and Henrikson, p. 80. 
85 O'Meara, pp. 33-34. During 1976, 191 security forces 
and 45 civilians were killed. In retaliation, Zimbabwe closed 
its border with Vozambique in March 1976. Martin and Johnson, 
p. 263. 
86Rotberg; Suffer the Future, pp. 262-263. 
87The extent of ZANLA's infiltration, presented in a 
Paper at the Lancaster House conference, was confirmed.by its 
acceptance by the Zimbabwean and British governments. See 
Martin and Johnson, pp. xx-xxi. 
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were different in organization, discipline and tactical 
doctrine. ZIPA could not resolve these differences and 
violent clashes between them continued. 88 As before, these 
clashes led to detentions by the Mozambican government. 
ZANLA also had to contend with the effects of raids by the 
security forces' raids on their bases and training camps. 
By 1979 it was clear that ZIPA was in practice dominated by 
ZANLA. Many of the ZIPRA guerrillas left Mozambique and 
returned to Zambia and by the end of 1979 ZANLA was respon-
sible for most of the attacks in the northeast, while ZIPRA 
was responsible for most of the guerrilla action in the 
western areas adjacent to Zambia. 89 
Guerrilla infiltration thus occurred in two waves: 
the first occurred in the 1972/1973 period, was directed 
by ZANLA, and was geographically focused on the northeastern 
areas' reserves and small purchase areas; the second wave 
occurred in the 1976-1979 period, was again mainly directed 
by ZANLA (although ZIPRA actions also increased) and spread 
from the northeastern areas westward towards the central and 
southeastern arP.~S of Zimbabwe. Infiltration was thus 
8 8ro counter training differences, ZANLA and ZIPRA would 
in the future receive training at the same camp (Nachingwea) 
in Tanzania. 
89There is wide agreement on this point. See Gregory, 
pp. 73-74; Gann and Henrikson, pp. 54-55; Martin and Johnson, 
pp. 235-263; and Colin Legum, Western Crisis Over Southern 
Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 
219-220. Hereafter cited as Western Crisis. 
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strongly influenced by the availability of Mozambique as a 
host state. The guerrillas were supported by the blacks of 
the reserves and the purchase areas and enjoyed most of their 
freedom of action in the reserves. Black farmworkers were 
also crucial, in that they supplied information about suit-
able targets for attack. It is doubtful whether the reserves 
were liberated areas in the sense that the term is usually 
used, nor was there extensive mobilization by incorporating 
the local population into the political organization of ZAPU 
or ZANU. Both ZANLA and ZIPRA enjoyed some freedom of action 
within their separate regions of influence as a result of 
local political support but, except for recruits drawn from 
villages, the rural population's role was designed to meet 
military rather than political purposes. 90 
2.2. Organizational Form 
In 1970 ZAPU and ZANU were neither fully political 
parties nor fully armies, but were rather highly informal 
organizations struggling to transform into entities capable 
of waging guerrilla warfare. This transition was complicated 
by tensions between military and civilian-political leaders 
and other divisive factors. In the years between 1971 and 
1979, ZANU was characterized by the following organizational 
features. 
90Political mobilization increased dramatically after 
the announcement of upcoming elections. Gregory, pp. 67-91. 
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First, ZANLA remained a loosely organized military 
organization without the benefit of a stable command struc-
ture or leadership. At the highest organizational level, 
ZANLA's actions were directed by the DARE and the high com-
mand and, at lower levels, there were regional (or geo-
graphical) commands, operating under the authority of a 
provincial and operational commander and a dozen section 
commanders. This organizational arrangement, combined with 
attrition by the security forces and the intermittent 
absences of military commanders, provided an environment suit-
able for the development of personal followings and cliques. 91 
Second, while ZANLA could nominally absorb more re-
cruits, it was ill-equipped to adequately train, equip and 
command increasing numbers of recruits. Only a fraction of 
the new recruits received full training from the Chinese, 
Tanzanian and Mozambican instructors. Many of these recruits, 
moreover, came from urban environments and, when they were 
infiltrated in rural environments without maps, medicine, 
arms and other aids, their effectiveness was often limited. 
Bf:sides the resulting morale problems and psychological ex-
haustion, the guerrillas often felt betrayed by their 
91Lower level section commanders were given discre-
tionary powers as to the selection of targets. This may have 
contributed to the tendency to cultivate personal followings 
and banditry. Wr,ll-known examples of this are Kid Morongo-
rongo, Nhari and Solomon Ngoni. See Anatomy of Fear (Salis-
bury: M:-tnistry of Information, 1974). 
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leadership and thus became resentful towards superiors. 92 
Third, while some of the rank-and-file's resentments 
were vented against their military superiors, most of the 
bitterest sentiments were reserved for the political leaders. 
"Politicians" were seen as self-indulgent, deceitful, ambi-
tious and lacking resolve; in contrast, the guerrillas were 
seen as dedicated "boys in the bush" and "fighters." As 
indicated before, these tensions played a key role in the 
Nhari rebellion and the Mgagao Declaration and were heightened 
by the return of the detained political leadership after 
1975. Nkomo, who advocated a negotiated settlement to the 
dispute, and Sithole, who had denounced the guerrilla strug-
gle at his trial, were particular targets of criticism. 93 
Finally, when Sithole was released and tried to reas-
sert his leadership in ZANU, he was defeated. Sithole tried 
to replace Tongogara, who was the elected as ZANU's secretary 
of defense in 1973, held a position on the DARE and has a 
large personal following. When Sithole lost power after the 
Mgago Declaration a substitute was not elected. Instead, 
the leaders of the hosts of ZANU on two occasions asked the 
commanders of ZANLA to list their preference among the 
political leadership and, when Mugabe repeatedly held the 
92Gann and Henrikson, pp. 87-90. 
93Martin and Johnson, pp. 159-169 and 196-202. 
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confidence of the commanders, he became the leader of ZANU. 
The dominance of ZANLA within ZANU became obvious with the 
internal reform of the organization in 1977, when it ~n~ 
larged ZANLA's representation on the central committee. 
Mugabe was elected president, but eighteen of the remaining 
25 members of the central committee were either a military 
commander or had at some point undergone military training. 
Clearly, the military component within ZANU was dominant. 94 
Compared to ZANLA's loose form, ZIPRA was smaller, 
better trained and equipped, and followed a conventional 
military style as regards organization. These organizational 
features discouraged internal divisions, indiscipline and 
95 
morale problems, and left it in a bE~tter position to absorb 
the recruits of the 1976-1979 period. 96 Yet some of ZANLA's 
problems also occurred in ZIPRA. One of these was the ten-
dency to form ·cliques and personal followings, which led to 
armed clashes and subsequent deter,tions within Zambia. 
Another problem was the tension between the military and 
civilian-political leaders, although it was less pronounced 
than in the case of ZANLA. A major reason for the more 
94 Ironical1y, 1977 was heralded as the "year of the 
party." The reorganization did not lead to the softening of 
civil-military tensions, although Mugabe continued .to be sup-
ported by the senior ZANLA commanders, in particular Josiah 
Tongogara and R~x Nhongo. Legum, Western Crisis·, PI>~ 219-220. 
95
ziPRA also appears to have had sophisticated weaponry, 
as evidenced by the shooting down of a Zimbabwean aircraft. 
See "Please Don't Kill Us" and "We Shot It Down" Newsweek, 
7 September 18, 1978, pp. 45-47. 
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amicable civil-military relations within ZAPU was that 
Chikerema, who had been the target of much dissatisfaction 
in the 1966-1970 period, lost power in the 1970s and ZAPU 
was then led by Moyo and Silundika as political figures and 
f d M "l"t d 97 Al re angena as m1 1 ary comman er. 
When the ceasefire was instituted in December 1979 
ZAPU and ZANU thus were both essentially military organiza-
tions. As armies rather than parties, there were tensions 
between the military and civil-political leaders, with the 
latter accused of a variety of transgressions. In organiza-
tional style ZIPRA differed somewhat from ZANLA in that the 
former was patterned more after a conventional military insti-
tution, but both were loosely styled rather than formal 
organizations. 
2.3. Leadership 
As previously discussed, the period between 1966 and 
1970 was characterized by elite competitiveness. In the 
absence of the detained top leadership, the leadership fell 
to substitute figures who competed for positions. By the end 
of 1979 this competitiveness was even more pronounced. The 
only unity that the nationalist elite could provide was a 
facade of unity for negotiating purposes (the UANC and the 
Patriotic Front) at the Geneva and Lancaster House 
97
colin Legum (ed.),Africa Contemporary Record: Annual 
Survey and Documents 1976-1977 (London: Rex Collings, p. 
A-13-A-22. Hereafter cited as ACR 1976-1977. 
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conferences. Indeed, the Smith regime after 1976 seemed 
to owe much of its existence to the fact that there was dis-
unity among the nationalists. 
While there were certain factors at the time of the 
creation of ZAPU and ZANU that made for disunity, it is 
said that additional quarrels and the experiences of the 
following guerrilla struggle reinforced differences. Thus 
differences in personality (for example, Nkomo the "genial 
autocrat" versus Mugabe as the "intense intellectual") were 
reinforced by different operational areas (ZANLA east and 
ZIPRA west), ideological bifurcation (ZANU radical/Marxist 
and ZAPU moderate/capitalist), tactics (Nkomo's negotiations 
versus Mugabe's militancy) and their training (the Chinese, 
Tanzanian and Mozambican advisors of ZANLA as opposed to 
ZIPRA's Soviet advisors). 98 The result is a somewhat sim-
plistic view of a nationalist elite divided by irreconcilable 
differences. 
As the previous discussion has shown, all of the factors 
mentioned above did at one time or another play a role in 
problems between and within ZAPU and ZANU. Yet at other 
times the differences seem trivial, resulting more from dif-
ferences in tone than substance. Nkomo, for example, did 
want negotiations, but ZAPU and ZANU were agreed that a 
swift transfer to black majority rule was necessary. This 
98
see, for example, Gann and Henrikson, p. 44. 
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leads to the question of whether differences within and 
between the organizations were deliberately encouraged, by 
either the Zimbabwean regime or the nationalists themselves. 
Nationalists on several occasions charged that the 
Smith regime was encouraging tribalism. 99 This took the 
form of subversive actions by informers and other members of 
the Smith regime's intelligence network. Yet divisions 
persisted even after the Smith regime accepted black majority 
rule and the Muzorewa regime was installee. Consequently, 
it raises the possibility that the divisions were exaggerated 
by the nationalists themselves. 
It is important to note that the nationalist le!aders 
in detention for most of the struggle and the leaders that 
filled their positions could not take their political follow-
ing within their organization for granted. Thus the leader-
ship as a whole was forced to constantly struggle to consoli-
1 
date its positions within the respective organizations. Un-
doubtedly tthe top leadership suffered worst from this, because 
I 
they were placed in the company of competitors without any 
certainty about their following. Some of these, like Sithole, 
' 
tried to reassert their authority over ZANU but found that 
the organization was transformed during their absence. 
99 Legum, ACR 1976-1977, pp. A 13-A 33. 
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Mugabe labored to make himself acceptable to the senior 
ZANLA commanders by espousing a militant Marxist ideology 
100 
and posture. In the subsequent election, however, Mugabe 
felt that such an approach would lead to defeat by the voters 
and hence downplayed his radical aspirations. In other words, 
the leadership of the different organizations exaggerated 
and manipulated differences to suit their own ambitions and 
f th . . t. 101 that o e1r organ1za 1ons. 
Thus the competitiveness of the nat~onalist leadership 
can best be seen as organizational and personal drives for 
political power. Although this entailed the exaggeration and 
manipulation of differences, it dces not make differences less 
real. Regional, tribal, personality, tactical and ideological 
differences remain; it is simply their political expression 
and use that vary according to considerations of power. 
2.4. Counter Guerrilla Warfare 
As previously discussed, the bungled initial attempts 
at guerrilla warfare and the regime's counter actions resulted 
100
on Mugabe's Marxism and his rise to power, see Xan 
Smiley, "Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and the Rise of Robert 
Mugabe," Foreign Affairs 85 (Summer 1980): 1060-1083. Smiley 
notes that the ZANLA guerrillas initially referred to Mugabe 
not as their leader but as a "spokesman." (p. 1063). 
101This interpretation follows that of John Day, "The 
Divisions of the Rhodesian African Nationalist Movement" The 
World Today 33 (October 1977): 385-394. Day states: 
The divisions between the various nationalist factions 
originated in and are sustained by the leaders' contempt 
for each other's leadership, and by their ambitions to 
increase their own personal power. (p. 392). 
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in a qualified victory for the Smith regime during the period 
between 1966 and 1970. The fmith regime nevertheless saw 
these as an unqualified victory, with the result that a mere 
boost in morale reached immodest and complacent proportions. 
Even if guerrilla actions were to increase, the regime saw 
no cause for alarm, because it would be given advance warning 
by its intelligence network. 
The intelligence network, however, failed to detect 
several crucial developments which led to ZANLA's guerrilla 
actions in the northeastern areas, namely the change in 
ZANLA's strategy from one of confrontation to a more orthodox 
guerrilla campaign and ZANLA's development of ties with 
FRELIMO. Even by late 1973 the Smith regime still believed 
that the Zambian border areas were the critical regions for 
guerrilla activity. Regime intelligence was generated 
mainly by three sources, the Ministry of Internal Affaris 
whose district or local commissioners were in contact with 
chiefs and ward and kraal heads, an external intelligence 
wing (the Central Intelligence Organization of CIO), and the 
intelligence officers of the defense and police establishments. 
Of these, the Ministry of Internal Affairs in particular 
failed to gather accurate information during the 1970s, partly 
because its informants in the rural areas were co-opted, eli-
minated or neutralized by the guerrillas and partly because 
the department lacked adequate funds to conduct intelligence 
activities. In general the reports of the other intelligence 
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sources were more accurate, but the Smith regime placed more 
faith in the Ministry of Internal Affairs' knowledge of rural 
. 102 
affa1rs. 
As a result of this intelligence failure, the Smith 
regime struggled to regain the initiative in the years prior 
to the Portuguese coup of 1974. The organization of the 
defense establishment remained essentially unaltered. The 
counter guerrilla forces consisted of five major army units, 
namely the white Rhodesia Light Infantry, the Rhodesian 
African Rifles composed of blacks and led by white officers, 
the Selous Scouts as a predominantly black tracker unit, the 
racially mixed Grey Scouts as mounted infantry, and the 
Special Air Service as an el~te commando/paratroop unit. 
These units were assisted by the air force and the BSAP. All 
were manned by regular (or permanent) personnel, national 
servicemen, territorial forces on short tours of duty, and 
. t 103 reserv1s s. 
Whereas most of these forces up to 1970 were deployed 
in the western regions, ZANLA's actions in the northeastern 
areas led to the designation of the area as an "operational 
zone" in DHcember 1972 under the code name of Operation Hur-
ricane. In this zone counter guerrilla actions took place 
Under the authority of a Joint Operations Command (JOC), 
102
see Martin and Johnson, pp. 6-8, who note that the 
intelligence failure was later admitted by officers of the 
Smith regime. 
103 James K. Bruton, "Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia", 
Military Review 59 (March 1979): 32-38. 
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which linked the senior officers of the Ministry of Internal 
104 Affairs, army, air force and police. · In the Operation 
Hurricane area and in the other subsequent operational zones 
forces were not geographically disp8rsed. Instead the mode 
of operation consisted of "search" operations by ground and 
air forces followed by "destroy" operations (named Fire 
Forces) to engage guerrillas. By 1979, three-quarters of all 
guerrilla casualties were attributed to these Fire Forces. 105 
In addition to these search and destroy operations, 
the regime also took several measures to discourage guerrilla 
actions. First, the regime in 1972 adopted a policy of impos-
11 . f . 106 ill h . h b . t t ( ing co ect1ve 1nes on v ages w ose 1n a 1 an s as 
individuals or as a group) aided the guerrillas or failed to 
notify the regime security forces of their presence. So~e-
times these fines took the form of cash fines, but usually 
cattle was seized. Second, in the border areas the regime 
created "no go" or "free fire" zones in defoliated areas. 
104Legum, Western Crisis Over Southern Africa, p. 222. 
105Army personnel played the major role in the deci-
sions and actions on the operational zones. See Gann and Hen-
rikson, p. 65 and "Tea and Terrorists'~ Newsweek, May 8, 1978, 
pp. 52-53. For a more critical account, based on personal 
experiences, see Barry Cohen, "The War in Rhodesia: A Dis-
senter's View'~ African Affairs 76 (October 1977): 483-494. 
106Made possible by the Emergency Powers (Collective 
Fines) Act of 1973. 
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Officially these areas were nomansland, i.e., any person not 
attached to the security forces could be shot on sight. 
Other areas were subject to curfew regulations. Third, the 
regime widened and legalized discretionary powers for the 
security forces by the Indemnity and Compensation Act. 
According to this act, the belief that one's actions would 
strengthen public security or would counter "terrorism" 
absolved the person from blame. As a complementary measure 
the regime amended the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act to 
include punishment for undergoing guerrilla training (vary-
ing between the death sentence and twenty years imprisonment), 
for hosting, aiding or failing to report guerrillas (the 
death sentence to twenty years), and for committing an act 
of terrorism (the death sentence to thirty years). 107 
Fourth, the regime sought to control public information about 
the conflict by press censorship (imposed under the Emergency 
Powers Act) and the restriction of journalists. 108 Finally 
the regime adopted a policy of population resettlement in the 
107Tony Hodges, "Counterinsurgency and the Fate of Rural 
Blacks", Africa Report 22 (September-October 1977): 15-20 and 
Bruton, pp. 32-38. Except for the amnesty that accompanied 
the release of the nationalist leaders in 1974, the death sen-
tence was maintained throughout the conflict and frequently 
used against guerrillas. 
108
see Pieter Niesewand, In Camera: Secret Justice in 
Rhodesia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973) and Elaine 
:Windrich, "Rhodesian Censorship: The Role of the Media in the 
Making of a One-Party f:tate", African Affairs 78 (October 1979): 
523-534. 
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northeastern and later other areas. Under this policy blacks 
were settled in protected villages that were guarded by a 
Guard Force, a local militia resorting under the authority of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Similarly, the construe-
tion of the protected villages was the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. 109 
Since the guerrillas suffered from a variety of inter-
nal problems during the period between 1973 and 1976, it is 
difficult to gauge the overall effectiveness of the regime's 
actions. Some policies, like the collective fines and popu-
lation resettlement, were clearly counterproductive from a 
security viewpoint, 110 while other policies like the no go 
areas, curfew regulations and the death sentence for guerrilla 
training, support and actions were criticised on security and 
111 
moral grounds. 
I 
Yet, judging from the decline of guerrilla 
109Protected villages were enclosed by barbed wire, with 
guardposts and floodlights. Each usually housed about 2,000 
inhabitants, living on small plots allocated to families, and 
with access to medical, educational and other facilities. CoL-
ditions and size, however, varied. A.K.H. Weinrich, "Stra-
tegic Resettlement in Rhodesia",Journal of Southern African 
Studies 3 (April 1977): 207-229. 
1101n the Chiweshe reserve, for example, 43,000 blacks 
were resettled within one month. Many blacks resisted re-
settlement and when they were coerced to do so became resentful 
and more sympathetic towards the guerrillas, who indeed foten 
selected the villages as targets for recruitment. Hodges, p. 18. 
111Much of this criticism originated from within Zimbabwe, 
like from the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and 
the Roman Catholic Bishops' Conference. See their Rhodesia -
The Moral Issue (Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1968). Criti-
cism also came from within Parliament. Martin and Johnson, 
pp. 102-104. 
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activity to three active groups in the northeast by the end 
of 1975, it is likely that at least a measure of effective-
ness was reached. 
As before, however, effectiveness was linKed to increas-
ing costs in both money and manpower. In 1973, with only 
one operational zone (Hurricane), the army, air force and 
BSAP complained of manpower shortages. These complaints led 
to the Defense Act of 1972 and the creation of a Directorate 
of Security Manpower, which widened national service and 
short tour obligations and made evasion of them more diffi-
cult.112 In addition, the regime planned on increasing the 
b f bl k . th "t f 113 num er o ac s 1n e secur1 y orces. In purely finan-
cial terms the cost of the operations was also escaJating 
as defense expenditures rose from Rh $65 million in 1974 and 
to Rh$96 in 1976. 114 
It is against the background of rising costs in counter 
guerrilla operations that the second wave of guerrilla 
112These measures included the extension of national 
service to one year, doubling the intake of the national 
servicemen, and more duties for the increased territorial 
forces. Wilkenson, p. 281 
113Blacks constituted about 40 percent of the re~ular 
army and about 60 percent of the BSAP. Grundy, "Social 
Costs", p. 449. There also was a contingent of mercenaries 
serving with the regime's forces. See Legum, ACR1976-1977, 
p. A 50-A 51 and David Anable, "The Return of the Mercen-
aries•; Africa Report 20 (November-December 1975): 2-6. 
114 Grundy, "Social Costs", p. 457. 
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infiltration (1976-1979) occurred. In response to these in-
til tra tions the regime announced thf: formation of three new 
operational zones, Operation Trasher in February 1976 to 
cover the eastern border in the vicinity of Umtali, Operation 
Repulse in May 1976 to cover the border areas of Victoria 
province and the rail and road links with South Africa, and 
Operation Tangent in December 1976 to cover the border areas 
of the west and northwest. Operations in these areas resem-
bled those of Operation Hurricane. The only new counter 
guerrilla tactic was the border raids on guerrilla bases and 
other camps in Mozambique and Zambia. 115 
By 1979 the cost of the counter guerrilla operations 
reach major proportions. With regard to manpower, the number 
of security forces' casualties rose from 403 in 1977 to 724 
in 1978 and finally to 788 in 1979. 116 The defense establish-
ment expanded to a total of 115,000 men with most of the 
117 increases taking place in the territorial force; of these, 
115There were more than 200 of these raids by the end 
of 1977. Martin and Johnson, p. 286. 
116 Grundy, "Social Costs", p. 457. 
117The number of regular forces rose from 3,500 to 
about 5,000, while the territorial forces rose from about 
10,000 in 1973 to 45,000 in 1976 and to about 58,000 in 1978. 
Figures taken from the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, The Military Balance, 1975-1976 and 1977-1978 (Lon-
don, 1977 and 1979). 
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however, only 25,000 could be active at any one time. 118 To 
offset manpower shortages the regime was forced to widen the 
obligations for military service, including short tc·urs of 
duty for men between 51 and 60 years old and planned 
natl·onal servl·ce for blacks. 119 p· · 11 th d f 1nanc1a y e e ense ex-
penditures rose from Rh$ 146 million in 1977 to Rh$ 197 mil-
lion in 1978. Originally this burden was lightened by South 
African aid, 120 but South African withdrew its contingent 
after the Victoria Falls conference of 1975. 
The preceding shows that the counter guerrilla actions 
entered the 1971-1979 period at a disadvantage because of an 
intelligence failure. Subsequently the security forces strug-
gled to regain the initiative and in doing so developed effec-
tive search and destroy operations which, combined with the 
guerrillas' weaknesses, led to a decline in guerrilla actions 
in 1975. The socio-economic and other operations that 
accompanied the search and destroy operations, such as collec-
tive fines and population resettlement, however, were often 
crude, ineffective and counterproductive and were accompanied 
by the steadily increasing cost of the operations. This cost 
118Gann and Henrikson, p. 65. 
119Black conscription was ordered by the Muzorewa 
regime and would have produced a 25,000 force loyal to Muz-
orewa. Grundy, "Social Costs", pp. 449-450. 
120Estimated at about 50 percent of the total budget. 
Ibid., p. 456. 
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increased dramatically after the increase in guerrilla 
activities after January 1976. By the end of 1979 search 
and destroy operations were still conducted against guer-
rillas, but the overall cost of the operations bad reached 
a critical level. 
2.5. Summary 
When the ceasefire was instituted in late 1979 it was 
thus clear that guerrilla infiltration occurred in two waves 
(1971-1973 and 1976-1979), that ZANLA and ZIPRA had established 
spearate areas of influence, and that their actions within 
those areas were aimed guaranteeing the guerrillas freedom of 
action within the rural areas rather than incorporating the 
rural population into the respective organizations. Given 
the extent and location of the guerrilla actions it is clear 
that blacks of the reserves, the small purchase areas and 
farmworkers all supported the guerrillas in one or another 
form, although the guerrillas enjoyed greatest freedom of 
movement within the reserves. In organizational form ZANLA 
and ZIPRA were essentially military organizations; military 
figures dominated decision-making and were often bitterly 
hostile towards the civilian-political leaders. The leader-
ship was highly competitive but this competitiveness should 
not be seen as the irrevocable division of ascriptive and 
other loyalties; rather, the competitiveness is shaped and 
encouraged by organizational and personal drives for power. 
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Finally, on a purely tactical level the regime's counter 
guerrilla operations were an effective deterrent or at least 
an inhibition of guerrillas' freedom of movement but, given 
the limited resources of the regime, escalating costs made 
their indefinjte continuation improbable. 
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Figure IV: Population Distribution 1970 
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CHAPTER V 
SANCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS AND THE EFFECTS 
OF GUERRILLA WARFARE 
This chapter discusses the way in which the conflict 
in Zimbabwe ended. After UDI several parties tried to 
resolve the conflict and eventually the resolution came by 
highly unusual means, namely an election monitored by a 
British peacekeeping force. Why did the conflict end in this 
way? The reasons, it is submitted, can be found in the 
changing domestic, regional and international conditions in 
which the guerrilla warfare took place. These conditions 
are seen to fall into two eras, the UDI era before 1974 and 
the era after the Portuguese coup that was characterized by 
guerrilla warfare. 
1. 1965-1973: An End to UDI? 
In the era between 1965 and the Portuguese coup the 
possible ending of the conflict was subject to three inter-
woven sets of condition·s, namely the international environ-
ment characterized by British efforts to end UDI as a legal 
question, the regional environment characterized by South 
African and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese support of the 
Smith regime, and the domestic environment marked by limited 
guerrilla warfare and the entrenchment of the Smith regime. 
285 
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1.1. The International Environment 
When UDI was announced, the parties most immediately 
involved in Zimbabwe disagreed on the nature of the conflict. 
For Britain, UDI was a constitutional problem brought on by 
a rebellious and reactionary white minority's illegal seizure 
of power. For the black nationalists, UDI and the question 
of illegality was yet another manifestation of their view 
that the Smith regime (and the other white regimes preceding 
it) ruled unjustly. The Smith regime's view contradicted 
charges of illegality and injustice; their self-conception 
was that they were the only government capable of exercising 
responsible government in Zimbabwe. 
Britain claimed that the 1961 constitution did not 
grant independence, which could only come about through 
further negotiations based on the principles of: (1) un-
impeded progress toward majority rule; (2) guarantees 
against retrogressive amendments of the 1961-constitution; 
(3) immediate improvements in the political status of the 
black population; (4) progress toward the abolition of racial 
discrimination; and (5) British satisfaction that any pro-
posed basis for independence was acceptable to all the 
people of Zimbabwe. 1 
If the negotiations based on these five principles 
1
southern Rhodesia - Document Relating to the Negoti-
ations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian 
Governments, November 1963 to November 1965, Cmnd. 2807. 
Hereafter referred to as Cmnd. 2807. 
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were to fail and UDI be declared, the British government 
said it 
would be an open act of defiance and rebellion and it 
would be treasonable to take steps to give effect to 
it .•. would bring to an end relationship between her 
[Zimbabwe] and Britain, would cut her off from the 
rest of the Commonwealth, from most foreign governments, 
and from international organizations; would inflict 
disastrous economic damage upon her; and would leave 
her isolated and v~rtually friendless in a largely 
hostile continent. 
Although the British government thus threatened the Smith 
regime that a UDI would be met by a variety of punitive 
measures, it made it clear that it was powerless to prevent 
it. Specifically, the British government denied that it 
would use force as a preventive or punitive measure. 3 
While the British renunciation of the use of force 
was justifiably based on practical military4 and political coosiderations, 
it was a poor bargaining ploy5 that dEm:>nstrated the contradictory British 
position. On the one hand it claimed sovereignty in Z:ini:>abwe but, en the 
2Written exchange between Wilson and Smith, October 24, 
1964 in Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 132. For Wilson's views, see Harold Wilson, 
The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London: 
Michael Joseph, 1971). Force would only be used if requested 
by the British governor in the event of a collapse in the 
public security of Zimbabwe. Public opinion in Britain was 
also opposed to the use of force. Robert C. Good, UDI: The 
International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (Princeton, 
New ~ersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 62. 
4 See William Gutteridge,"Rhodesia: The Use of Military 
Force", The World Today 2l(December 1966): 499-503 and P.C. 
Rao, "The Rhodesian Crisis and the Use of Force", Africa 
Quarterly 6 (January-March 1967): 2B5-296. 
5Loney, pp. 133-136 and Robert Good, pp. 53-65. 
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other band declared that it was powerless to exercise that sovereignty. 
The British assessment of its power lay with the economic 
and diplomatic isolation and pressure that it could bring to 
bE!ar on the Smith regime; faced with economic chaos and dip-
lomatic isolation, it was argued, the Smith regime would 
capitulate. 
British reaction to UDI was prompt. Between November 
1965 and January it adopted a variety of measures designed to 
exert pressure on the Smith regime. An order-in-council 
announced that Zimbabwe now was a crown colony, enabling the 
British parliament to govern or at least pass laws on Zimbabwe; 
Zimbabwe was banned from the sterling monetary area; no 
British investment capital would be made available to Zim-
babwean firms; Britain banned all Zimbabwean imports and all 
trade with it was suspended; Zimbabwean import of oil was 
prohibited; and all Zimbabwean assets in Britain were frozen. 
Britain urged other states to do likewise and in November 
1965 the United Nations Security Council adopted a voluntary 
embargo against Zfmbabwe. 6 Collectively, Britain stated, these 
measures would end UDI "within weeks." 7 An end to UDI would, 
however, not be tantamount to majority rule; it would leave 
a white government in power but give it a constitutional 
guarantee that progress toward majority rule would be unimpeded. 8 
6
security Council Resolutions 216 and 217 of 1965. 
7wilson, p. 196. 
8 Cmnd. 2807, pp. 125-142. 
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Britain's handlings of the UDI-question was harshly 
criticized by the Afro-Asian nations and other members of 
the United Nations. They argued that Britain should have 
pressed for a mandatory trade embargo. The question over 
UDI was not the first appearance of Zimbabwe on the UN 
agenda. In 1962, the UN Committee of 24 (the decolonization 
committee) created a special committee9 to examine Zimbabwe's 
1961 constitution, which found that it did not provide blacks 
with adequate representation. Later this committee ruled 
that Britain did have the constitutional authority to inter-
vene in Zimbabwe and a General Assembly resolution requested 
Britain to restore the political rights of blacks in the 
territory. The Security Council also discussed the Zimbabwean 
question when it requested Britain not to transfer the 
military forces of the CAF to the Zimbabwean military forces, 
but Britain vetoed the resolution. As part of their stra-
tegy, black nationalist leaders actively participated in 
these UN debates, as did representatives of the Zimbabwean 
government, but Britain usually did not participate in the discussicns. 
Britain's support of the voluntary trade embargo was thus a 
reversal of its stance but it still did not meet the expec-
tations of other UN members, who proposed a mandatory embargo 
and/or the declaration of the Smith regime (and the situation 
9The Special Committee on the Situation with Regard 
to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 
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in Zimbabwe) as a threat to international peace and conse-
quently intervention by the UN or Britain. 10 
Britain used the UN as a secondary vehicle in its 
relations with Zimbabwe, usual1y when it wanted to publicly 
express its disapproval about its ongoing negotiations with 
the Smith regime. In December 1966, for example, Prime 
Minister Wilson and Smith met on the HMS Tiger to discuss the 
UDI question. These negotiations were based on the afore-
mentioned firm principles but resulted in the addition of a 
sixth principle to the effect that minority (white) rights 
would be guaranteed. Under the Tiger proposals, a multi-
racial intermediate government headed by Smith would be 
formed, during which Britain would test the acceptability 
of the new proposals. If this arrangement broke down, Bri-
tain reserved the right to intervene. The Smith regime re-
jected these proposals and the Tiger meeting ended in fail-
11 
ure. In reaction, the British government did not veto 
a UN resolution imposing a mandatory embargo on select Zimbab-
wean goods and a resolution stating that Zimbabwe was a 
"threat to world peace." Britain thus could intercept oil 
shipments bound for Zimbabwe through the port of Beira in 
10
see J. Leo Cefkin, "The Rhodesian Question at the 
United Nations", International Organization 22 (Summer 1968): 
649-669. 
11For the official correspondence of the Tiger pro-
posals, see Rhodesia: Documents Relating to Proposals for a 
Settlement, 1966, Cmnd. 3171, 1968 and the Relations Between 
the Rhodesian Government and the United Kingdom, November 1965-
December 1966 (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1966). For 
a discussion of the issues, see Robert Good, pp. 182-197. 
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b . 12 Mozam 1que. In May 1968 Britain again did not use her 
veto when the Security Council passed a mandatory comprehen-
sive embargo. On this occasion Britain wished to express 
disapproval of the Smith regime's execution of five blacks 
13 in defiance of a royal pardon. The hangings caused a rift 
in Britain's bipartisan approach to the UDI question and 
there was pressure on the Wilson government to abandon its 
position that independence could be granted with the Smith 
regime still in power. Some agreed that the British position 
should preclude independence without majority (i.e. no 
independence before majority rule or NIBMAR). In search of 
a quick solution, the British government softened its stance 
on the requirement that any solution should be subject to 
the population's approval as tested by the British. Accord-
ing to the meeting that took place on the HMS Fearless, such 
approval could take place under the oversight of the Smith 
regime. 14 The Smith regime again rejected the proposals, 
which led to the adoption of a NIBMAR policy by the British 
government. 15 
12
security Council Resolutions 221 and 232 of 1966. 
13
security Council Resolution 253 of 1968. 
14
see Rhodesia: Report on the Discussions Held on 
Board HMS Fearless, October 1968, Cmnd. 3793. 
15 Robert Good, pp. 201-271. 
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The failure of the Tiger- and more generous Fearless-
proposals, the ineffectiveness of sanctions16 and the 1968 
executions robbed the British government of most of its 
negotiating options. Instead of negotiating from weakness, 
the Smith regime seemed to be negotiating from strength, 
t . B ·t· h . 17 expec 1ng r1 1s concess1ons. The reasons for this 
strength and. confidence derived from certain regional and 
domestic conditions that, paradoxically,were also a source 
of potential weakness. 
1.2. The Regional Environment 
Prior to the Portuguese coup of April 1974, Zimbabwe 
was ensconced in the so-called "White Bastion" consisting of 
Zimbabwe and another white minority-ruled state (South Africa 
and its administration in Namibia), colonial territories 
(Angola and Mozambique), and small black-ruled states (Bots-
wana, Lesotho and Swaziland). Since these states were enmesh-
ed in a network of long~standing social, economic and 
political ties, it produced a strong incentive to ameliorate 
tensions and South Africa, as the most powerful state in the 
16The long-term effects of sanctions will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
17For a sympathetic view of the Smith regime's posi-
tion, see Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Independence: A Study 
in British Colonial Policy (London: Dent and Sons, 1969). 
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region, tended to set the tone and direction of most poli-
18 tical developments. 
As previous chapters showed, much of the political 
development of Zimbabwe was premised on opposition and 
reaction to South Africa's wealth and its political direc-
. 11 th . f Af · k t · 1 · 19 tions, espec1a y e r1se o r1 aner na 1ona 1sm. With 
its foreign policy emphasis of legalism and painstaking con-
formity to international custom, 20 South African officials 
were initially displeased by UDI but they stated that they 
would not apply pressure on the Smith regime through, for 
example, sanctions. As far as South Africa was concerned, 
the dispute should be settled between Britain and Zimbabwe 
18 The best study of the tension-reducing features 
of the southern African region remains Kenneth W. Grundy, 
Confrontation and Accommodation, especially p. 1-117. 
19These include the initial settlement of whites in 
Zimbabwe in hope of a "second Reef"; imperial opposition to 
the late 1890s, the intended incorporation of Zimbabwe into 
South Africa and its effects on land policies, and opposi-
tion to Afrikaner nationalism and the Kational Party regime 
in South Africa. 
20
see John E. Spence, Republic Under Pressure: A 
Study of South African Foreign Policy (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965); Edwin S. Munger, Notes on the For-
mation of South African Foreign Policy (Pasadena, Califor-
nia: Castle Press, 1965); Gerrit C. Olivier, Suid-Afrika se 
Buitelandse Beleid (Pretoria: Academica, 1977); and James 
Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945-1970 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1973). 
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21 in a friendly and realistic manner. South Africa neverthe-
less came to regard a white-ruled Zimbabwe as an essential 
buffer between itself and hostile and possible guerrilla 
actions from black African states. Thus South Africa's active 
support of the Smith regime was created by its post-1960 
military-security concerns22 and, in the ensuing years, this 
support became the single most important factor in the sur-
vival of the Smith regime. South African support took many 
official and private forms. As previously noted, South Africa 
sent a para-military contingent that played a critical role 
in the Smith regime's security operations, sent equipment and 
contributed to Zimbabwe's defense budget. 23 South Africa also 
maintained an accredited diplomatic office in Zimbabwe and con-
tinually made public and private statements of political 
21 Grundy, pp. 256-257. Grundy cites South African 
officials who describe the Smith regime as "second-rate 
political blacks" and "cowboys" who risk provocative and de-
stabilizing actions in a delicate environment. Ibid., p. 256. 
22
christopher Hill, "UDI and South African Foreign 
Policy", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 7 (July 
196 9 ) : 96 -1 0 3 • 
23These contributions were not revealed in official 
data and it~ extent thus remains a matter of speculation. 
Estimates of the para-military contingent is modestly set at 
1,000 men (Nelson, p. 347), while others set it at between 
5,000 and 10,000 men by 1973 (SIPRI, p. 109). Budget support 
is estimated at approximately 50 percent of the total budget. 
Grundy, "Social Costs", 456. 
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support. 24 Zimbabwean consumers were supplied by South 
African manufacturers, trade25 and technical cooperation con-
tinued26 and Zimbabwean firms continued to have access to 
south African capital. 27 Finally, Zimbabwe's exports made use 
28 
of South Africa's railways, roads and ports. 
In addition to South African support, the Smith regime 
relied on Portuguese support. One form of support was mili-
tary cooperation, which allowed the Zimbabwean and Portuguese 
counter-guerrilla forces to cross the border between Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique in pursuit of guerrillas. 29 Zimbabwe also 
relied on the roads and railways of Mozambique to export 
goods through Beira and Maputo which, in view of the conges-
tion of South African ports, provided a valuable alternative 
24There was no known formal military alliance between 
Zimbabwe and South Africa (and Portugal). When questioned 
about such a possibility, the South African premier replied: 
" ••. good friends do not need a pact. Good friends know what 
their duty is if a neighbour's house is on fire." Grundy, 
Confrontation and Accommodation, p. 222. 
25
see Adrian Guelke, "Africa as a Market for South 
African Goods", The Journal of Modern African Studies 12 
(March 1974): 69-98. Imports from South Africa rose from Rh 
$527 million in 1965 to Rh $121.5 million in 1971 (out of a 
trade total of Rh $282.4 million). Ibid., p. 76. 
26 John 
Vince (London: 
pp. 51-61. 
Sprack, Rhodesia: South Africa's Sixth Pro-
International Defence and Aid Fund, 1974), 
27
capital movements were faciliated by South African 
firms' subsidiaries in Zimbabwe. 
28 Grundy, Confrontation and Accommodation, pp. 49-59. 
29
wilkenson, pp. 273-274. 
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outlet. Most importantly, Zimbabwe relied on oil imports 
from the pipelines in Beira. 30 
By 1973 Zimbabwe's reliance on South Africa in particu-
.ticular reached a point at which it was described as a "sixth 
province" of South Pfrica. 31 This economic and political 
dependency revealed the weaknesses of the Smith regime. While 
there was no public criticism from the South African govern-
ment, much of the military and industrial equipment sent to 
Zimbabwean manufacturers found its access to the South African 
and Zambian market restricted. South African firms did not 
re-invest their profits within Zimbabwe and the trade agree-
ment between the two countries gave liberal terms of trade 
to South Africa. 32 Moreover, when the Smith regime closed 
its Zambian border, the ~outh African premier disavowed 
complicity with the action and implied that it was provocative 
33 
and unnecessary·. This subtle criticism can best be seen 
30
when Britain patrolled the Mozambique Channel, oil 
reached Zimbabwe via South Africa. 
3ls k . prac , pass1m. 
Security Council Committee 
tion 253 (1968) Concerning 
See also the annual reports of the 
Established in Pursuance of Resolu-
the Question of Southern Africa. 
32 Sprack, pp. 39-51. 
. 
33
south African newspapers criticized the closure as 
"overhasty", "rash" and urged South African policy-makers to 
recognize that "Rhodesia's interests are not necessarily ours." 
Kenneth Good,"Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia", pp. 33-34. 
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against the background of a shift in South Africa's foreign 
policy. To break out of its own isolation, South Africa 
launched an "outward-looking" policy to seek a political 
accommodation with, in particular, hostile black African 
. 34 
nat1ons. 
Since UDI the nations of Africa had been unremit-
tently hostile to the Smith regime on the grounds that it pre-
vented ''national self-determination" or constituted a "fla-
grant violation of the inalienable rights of the legitimate 
inhabitants" and practiced racism of "doctrines of human 
inequality."35 Consequently African nations were dedicated 
to the liberation of Zimbabwe and channelled their efforts to 
that and through the UN (as previously discussed), as well as 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the British 
Commonwealth. 
At the founding of the OAU in 1963 it was agreed that 
the OAU itself would not be responsible for the liberation 
of Zimbabwe. The OAU would simply provide aid through a 
34
see Robert Molteno, Africa and South Africa: The 
Implications of South Africa's "Outward-Looking" Policy 
(London: Africa Bureau, 1971). 
35Moses E. Akpan, "African Goals and Strategies Toward 
Southern Africa", African Studies Review 14 (September 1971): 
244-246. The Smith regime was accused of a variety of exces-
ses and transgressions. Regardless of whether it was guilty 
of those, it would be naive to conclude that Black African 
states are united in support of liberation in Southern Africa 
because they are united in their commitment to human rights. 
Many of the states that have been very strong in supporting 
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special Fund supported by the contributions of African (and 
other) nations and create a united liberation front by recon-
ciling movements through an African Liberation Committee 
(ALC). 36 From the beginning the liberation effort was plagued 
by a variety of problems. F)rst, states did not adequately 
contribute to the Special Fund, either because they were un-
willing to do so or because they objected to the ALC's use of 
37 funds. Second, the ALC's membership increased steadily as 
those states who did contribute to the Special Fund demanded 
membership in the ALC which turned concerted action into a 
series of compromises to suit members. Third, events like 
the Nigerian civil war divided the OAU and some states resigned 
from the OAU. The consequence of these problems was that 
African states preferred to bypass the ALC and to deal directly 
with the liberation movements and to provide aid in non-
monetary form, such as accommodating refugees and providing 
instructors, facilities and equipment. The most likely 
Southern African liberation, ranging from Amin's Uganda to 
Sekou Toure's Guinea, are guilty of gross violations of human 
rights in their own societies. It would be almost as naive 
to assert that Black African States are committed to the prin-
ciple of "majority rule", if by that is meant a system of 
government that allows the majority of the people periodically 
to choose their own rulers in free elections. Ali A. Mazrui 
and David F. Gordon, "Independent African States and the 
Struggle for Southern Africa" in John Seiler (ed.), Southern 
Africa Since the Portuguese Coup (Boulder, Colorado:--Westview 
Press, 1980), p. 185. 
36 See Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: 
Africa and the OAU, pp. 50-58 on the organization of the ALC. 
37 Kapungu, "The OAU's Support For the Liberation of 
Southern Africa", pp. 142-143. 
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contributors were those states that were close to Zimbabwe 
in a geographic and cultural sense, were ideologically 
sympathetic to particular groups and whose leaders' per-
. . t d h . . t . t . 38 
50nalit1es su1 e sue 1n1 1a 1ves. 
The centrifugal forces within the OAU and the large 
role that individual states consequently played in aid to 
nationalist groups in Zimbabwe complicated the contribution 
of African nations to the overthrow of the Smith regime. On 
the one hand, they provided unflagging moral support at a 
time when these groups were ineffective but, on the other 
hand, they failed to unite rival groups whose very rivalry 
contributed to their ineffectiveness. Indeed, both ZAPU and 
ZANU were recognized by the OAU and thus both were eligible 
for aid from the OAU (and other nations). 
Besides the OAU and the UN, some African nations used 
the Commonwealth to press for the overthrow of the Smith 
regime and majority rule. Since the British government 
claimed that Zimbabwe was a colonial territory, executive 
authority in Zimbabwe now was vested in the Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Relations. More importantly, a Commonwealth 
Sanctions Committee (later renamed the Commonwealth Committee 
on South Africa) was formed to monitor sanction; it sponsored 
38
vincent B. Khapoya, The Politics of Decision: A 
£omparative Study of African Policy Toward the Liberation 
~ovements, University of Denver, Monograph Series in World 
Affairs, 12 (1974-1975), pp. 26-29. 
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most of the resolutions at the UN. Indeed, the Commonwealth 
sanctions Committee became the institution which linked 
African and other Commonwealth members with British init1a-
ti~es and the opposition expressed to initiatives, such as 
the Fearless proposals, often led to changes in British 
39 policy. 
Thus the prevailing conditions in the regional environ-
ment between 1965 and the Portuguese coup supported the sur-
vival of the Smith regime. Black African Lations provided 
valuable moral and non-monetary support to ZAPU and ZANU, but 
also failed to unite and hence contributed to the ineffec-
tiveness of these groups. African nations developed an 
important channel of access to British initiatives through 
the Commonwealth but, as long as the British initiatives were 
unsuccessful, the access did not lead to concrete results. 
Zimbabwe also became progressively dependent on South Africa 
and, by the end of 1973 the Smith regime's survival seemed 
vulnerable only in the unlikely event that South Pfrica 
renounced its support. 
1.3. The Domestic Environment 
The Smith regime operated first under an independence 
or UDI constitution. It replaced the 1961 constitution as 
the queen was substituted with an "officer administering the 
39Robert Good, pp. 166-177. 
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t " governmen (Clifford Dupont) and privy council authority 
with the Zimbabwean High Court. The Constitutional Council, 
which monitored civil rights violations, was retained but 
became an all-white body. This UDI question could be amended 
40 by two-thirds legislative vote. 
Following the failure of the Tiger proposals, the Smith 
regime appoi-nted the Whaley Commission to advise it on a new 
constitution for Zimbabwe. 41 The Whaley report was completed 
by April 10, 1968 and rejected both on definite white and 
black rule; instead, it proposed a multi-racial legislature at 
best half controlled by blacks, i.e. eventual "parity."42 
The proposal for parity met with considerable opposition, 
particularly from within Rhodesian Front (RF) ranks, 43 and 
was eventually abandoned. It was replaced by a constitution 
developed by the RF, approved by the electorate in a referen-
dum in June 1969 and by the legislature in November 1969, and 
came into effect in April 1970. This constitution enlarged 
40. . . 
The UDI constitution closely resembled the 1961 
constitution. See the "Constitution of Rhodesia 1965" in 
Palley, pp. 751-759. 
41The existing 1961 and 1965 constitutions were found 
unsuitable because they failed to provide a suitable basis for 
negotiations. The Whaley Commission had a multi-racial com-
position, one black member was Charles Mzingeli Moyo, former 
leader of RICO. R. Hodder-Williams, "Rhodesia's Search For A 
Constitution: Or, Whatever Happened To Whaley?" African 
Affairs 69 (July 1970): 217-224. 
42
see the Report of the Constitutional Committee 1968 
(Salisbury: Government Printer, 1968), Tha Whaley Report. 
43Hodder-Williams, pp. 225-235. 
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the legislative assembly to 66 seats of which 50 were filled 
by whites. The remaining 16 members were black, elected by 
two rolls: a lower roll returned 8 members while the other 
8 were elected by traditional black authorities (chiefs and 
headmen). A second house was established (a Senate), exer-
cising delaying powers by 10 whites, 10 black chiefs and three 
members appointed by the president who, under Zimbabwe's new 
republican status, was the head of state. Thus racially 
segregated voting rolls were established, and the Constitu-
tional Council abolished. 44 
The RF dominated the legislature and executive of Zim-
babwe, winning all white seats in the general elections of 
May 1965 and April 1970. RF organization, as stated before, 
developed from a populist philosophy that emphasized party 
control over the legislature, executive and bureaucracy. 
Each of the 50·constituencies contained about 1,500 voters, 
of which about 400 were members of 3-4 local RF branches. 
Local branches were dominated by non-members of parliament, 
who elected members to the annual divisional and national 
RF congresses. The function of the divisional congresses was 
to filter and coordinate proposals from local branches, which 
reach the party's executive through formal proposals or 
44
see the Proposals for a New Constitution of Rhodesia 
(Salisbury: Government Printer, 1969) and the Constitution 
of Rhodesia (Salisbury Government Printer, 1969). 
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through divisional leaders who have permanent membership 
in national party institutions. The function of the national 
party congress was to elect national party executives once 
to set subscription fees. The central national party insti-
tution was the National Executive, composed of 10 members 
of parliament and 50 members elected by the divisional and 
national co~~resses. The National Committee met quarterly 
to oversee the operations of the cabinet, and several sub-
committees were formed to oversee the oper~tions of the 
legislature and bureaucracy. Thus the RF was in fact an 
45 
organizational parallel of the government. 
Within the government and the RF organization, two 
features were evident. First, rural constituencies and 
interests were overrepresented withinthe parliament, the 
RF caucus membership contained a 35 percent farmer component; 
by law, at least 18 of the white constituencies were required 
to be rural and many members of the executive were full 
or parttime farmers. With the RF, there is a similar bias. 
Rural branches outnumber urban ones by 102 to 63, chairmen 
of urban branches often were closely linked to the farming 
community, and about one-third of the National Executive 
were members of rural branches. Second, the cabinet and 
45There are other national party bodies, such as 
the National Standing Committee (a smaller replica of the 
~ational Executive), the Party Finance Committee (responsible 
for party financial management) and the secretariat. Bowman, 
pp. 92-97. 
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executive had little discretionary power. The defeat of 
the Tiger and Fearless proposals and the ~haley report all 
indicate that Smith was largely deprived of decision-making 
initiative. Indeed, Smith represented himself in negotia-
tions as the captive of extremist institutions and opinion 
at home. 46 
In the period between 1965 and the Portuguese coup, 
the RF overwhelmed the political parties and forces of modera-
tion. The UFP was eclipsed in the 1965 election. Subse-
quently a Center Party was formed by remnants of opposition 
groups and opposed the 1969 constitution; one important 
supporter, Major General Putterhill (a former commander 
of the Zimbabwean armed forces) argued that it would increase 
guerrilla activity-and was attacked by Smith as an ''extreme 
leftist."47 By 1973 the most powerful pressure group in 
Zimbabwe was the bureaucracy. Between 1964 and 1969 public 
service employees increased in number from 40,000 to 78,000. 
White central government employees amounted to 24,000 by 
1973 who, with their spouses, comprised one-third of the 
white electorate. There were 13,000 tenured positions 
in the central bureaucracy; of these only 829 were filled 
46 Ibid., pp. 97-109 and Hodder-Williams, pp. 228-
235. The British government also regarded Smith as a moderate. 
Robert Good, pp. 186-193 and 262~265. 
47 Bowman, p. 139. 
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by blacks, as compared to about 1,700 in 1965. Blacks were 
better represented in untenured positions, with 23,000 
of the 35,000 positions filled by blacks. 48 
The control established over the governmental machi-
nery and the press49 provided the Smith regime with wide-
ranging means to respond to the guerrillas and to British 
proposals. Prior to 1974, moreover, there was little indica-
tion that the experience of guerrilla warfare had produced 
serious political divisions within the RF and the white 
population at large. It was nevertheless clear that there 
were practical difficulties in defending UDI, two of which 
require elaboration. 
1.3.1. Sanctions 
As previously discussed, the Zimbabwean economy was 
by 1965 diversified, but each economic sector was vulnerable. 
Agricultural output was dominated by whites who produced 
for export and, as the world market fluctuated, so did the 
government's foreign exchange reservoir. With regard to 
manufacturing, its contribution to the GDP increased, but 
it was geared to a small and relatively unsophisticated 
48 Nelson, p. 156. 
49 Ibid. , pp. 225-234 and Elaine Windrich, 1 'Rhodesian 
Censorship: The Role of the Media in the Making of a One-
Party State", pp. 523-534. 
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domestic market; it produced a limited range of low quality 
goods for the black market. High quality goods and indus-
trial equipment had to be imported. Over the first nine 
years o'f UDI, several changes occurred in this economic 
structure. 
First, the effort to counter sanctions brought the 
economy under full and direct state management. After 1964 
exports and imports were managed by the National Export 
Promotion Council (NEPCO), later called Universal Exports 
(UNIVEX), who were assisted by four committees, representing 
commerce, industry, agriculture and mining. Together these 
organizations limited imports through, for example, quotas, 
import ceilings and short-term licenses, encouraged produc-
tion by selected firms, stockpiled goods, and intervened 
in the internal labor and fiscal affairs of foreign and 
domestic firms. The government also placed a ban on revela-
tions or any public information about the state of the 
economy under the Official Secrets Act of 1919 and the 
Emergency Powers (Espionage) Regulations of 1969. Firms' 
compliance with regulations was ensured by the Emergency 
Powers (Control of Corporations) Regulations and the Emer-
gency Powers (Industrial Relations) Regulations of 1965. 
The Smith regime repudiated all of Zimbabwe's debt to the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the 
World Bank) and conducted agreements with South Africa and 
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Portugal to guarantee regional trade and access to ports, 
roads and rail facilities. Finally, the regime developed 
a network of trade commissioners who established covert 
economic ties with other nations. 50 
Second, sanctions and the effort to counter them 
resulted in further diversification. The ban on tobacco 
exports to Britain produced a major slump in the value of 
agricultural produce; tobacco production dropped from 246 
million pounds in 1965 to 145 million pounds in 1972, forcing 
50 percent of the white farmers to either go out of business 
or to change their crop production. The result was the 
diversification of agricultural production as tobacco ex-
ports were surpassed by especially cotton and sugar. Even 
with tobacco in a slump, the value of agriculture's contri-
bution to the GDP rose from Rh $128 million in 1965, to 
Rh $218 million in 1972. While agriculture's share of the 
GDP declined slightly, from 18.4 percent in 1965 to 17.3 
percent in 1972, 51 that of manufacturing increased form 
19.4 percent in 1965 to 23.2 percent in 1972. Manufacturing's 
expansion was not primarily due to the expansion of existing 
firms; rather, it was due to the government's program of 
50 For a good account, see Leonard T. Kapungu, The 
United Nations and Economic Sanctions Againsh Rhodesia--
(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 
103-122. See also Stephen Park, Business as Usual: Trans-
actions Violating Rhodesian Sanctions (Washington, D.C.; 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1973), pp. 1-33. 
51 . Nelson, pp. 250-251. 
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import substitution on the basis of "one product, one manu-
facturer."52 Mining output's share of the GOP declined 
slightly (from 6.9 percent in 1969 to 5.7 percent in 1972), 
but the value of it increased dramatically from Rh $48.3 
million in 1965 to Rh $72.2 million in 1972. One reason 
for this rise in value was that the mining industry was 
dominated by multinational firms and they had little diffi-
culty in evading sanctions through parent companies. 53 
Third, Zimbabwe's trading patterns shifted as trade 
with the former Central African Federation partners (Zambia 
and Malawi) and Britain was replaced with trade with South 
Africa. Imports from South Africa rose from Rh $54.9 million 
in 1965 to Rh $121.0 million in 1973, and exports to South 
Africa rose from 10.2 percent of total trade to 21.1 percent 
in 1972. 54 British trade with Zimbabwe dropped sharply 
as Zimbabwe was replaced by Zambia and Malawi as Britain's 
55 
central African trading partners. 
Most importantly, Zimbabwe was able to sustain 
52Ibid., p. 241. 
53 Ibid., p. 238. 
54 Guelke, p. 76. 
55Michael Williams and Michael Parsonage, "Britain 
and Rhodesia: The Economic Background to Sanctions", 
World Today 29 (September 1973): 382-383. 
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an average growth rate of 6.5 percent between 1965 and 
1972, 56 contradicting the predictions that sanctions would 
cause economic chaos--and political concessions. The growth 
rate led some observers to conclude that sanctions had a 
stimulating effect on the Zimbabwean economy, providing 
proof of the ability of a state-managed economy to sustain 
growth under·conditions of economic isolation by import 
substitution. Under those conditions the Smith regime 
b . 1 ld k 1. t. 1 . 57 o v1ous y wou rna e no po 1 1ca concess1ons. Other 
observers argued differently, noting that the diversifica-
tion of the Zimbabwean economy (not state management) allowed 
it to withstand sanctions, but that genuine growth was in-
hibited by restrictions on exports and the scarcity of foreign 
capital and investment. 58 Since there was a shortage of 
investment capital, moreover, the state made allocations 
on a priority basis to the sectors most productive in an 
immediate sense, like mining and manufacturing, with the 
result that sectors less profitable (like roads and railways) 
received inadequate funds and deteriorated. 59 There were 
56 Nelson, p. 246. 
57Timothy Curtin and David Murray, Economic Sanctions 
and Rhodesia (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1967) 
and T.R.C. Curtin, "Rhodesian Economic Development Ur:der 
Sanctions and 'The Long Haul'", African Affairs 67 (April 
1968): 100-110. 
58R.T. McKinnel, "Assessing the Economic Impact of 
Sanctions Against Rhodesia", African Affairs 67 (July 1968): 
227-232. 
59 Nelson, p. 257. 
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also indications that sanctions produced negative trends 
in state financial management. With limited domestic savings, 
a shortage of foreign capital and a narrow tax base, the· 
government could not meet its financial obligations as Zim-
babwe's major investor and was forced to borrow money. Thus 
the public debt of Zimbabwe increased by 40 percent between 
60 1965 and 1972. 
In economic terms sanctions thus had a mixed effect, 
but overall they tended to accentuate the structural features 
of the Zimbabwean economy, such as economic diversification, 
state intervention and dependency on exports (particularly 
to South Africa). The intended short-term political effects 
were most disappointing. Although public debt rose and 
some sectors of the economy, especially its infrastructure, 
deteriorated these difficulties were insufficient to cause 
a change in the political directions of the Smith regime. 
1.3.2. The Smith Regime and Black Zimbabweans 
Under UDI the Smith regime's policy toward the blacks 
underwent three changes: the political role of the tradi-
tional-tribal authorities were upgraded, a new land act 
was passed, and segregationist practices increased. 
With regard to the role of the traditional-tribal 
601bid., pp. 260-261. 
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authorities, both the 1965 and 1969 constitutions gave them 
representation in the national legislature, as they we~e 
viewed as the representatives of blacks as a whole. In 
addition, the local power of those figures were increased. 
In 1966 the chiefs became "peace officers" with legal dis-
cretionary powers over local matters of law and order, in-
eluding the power of arrest. In 1969 the African Law and 
Tribal Act extended this legal power as chiefs presided 
over most local civil and some criminal cases. Chiefs' 
powers to allocate land were restored by the Tribal Trust 
Land Act of 1967. The number of black local councils in-
creased steadily to about 153 in 1972 under the aegis of 
the community development approach of the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs, who created approximately 265 ad hoc bodies 
t . t th '1 . 1 1 . t 61 o ass1s e counc1 s 1n oca proJec s. 
By 1972 government expenditure on community develop-
62 
ment amounted to 8 percent of the GDP. Most of these 
funds went to civil administration; only 2 percent went 
towards black education. The government was chronically 
short of funds for black educational expansion to meet the 
needs of the black population, of which 50 percent is under 
the age of 15. This forced a reduction in the years required 
61 Holleman, pp. 316-357. 
62Nelson, p. 258. 
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for primary education and a cutback in the funding for mis-
sionary schools; finally, the government made black education 
a responsibility of the local councils, which were required 
to raise their own funds. 63 
In 1969, the Land Apportionment Act was replaced 
by a Land Tenure Act, which divided the total land area 
64 into African areas of about 46.6 percent of the total land 
and white areas, also of about 46.6 percent of the total 
land. National Land (wildlife reserves and forests) account-
ed for the remaining portion. The previous category of 
Unreserved Land, open to all races, was eliminated. 65 In 
terms of the amount of land allocated, the Land Tfnure Act 
of 1969 did not bring any fundamental changes in the patterns 
established by the Land Apportionment Act, but the regime 
was more determined to remove, by all the means available, 
66 blacks living in white areas. Moreover, there were indica-
tions that the blacks' lands were viewed as potentially 
autonomous economic-political units with, for example, 
63 Lester K. Weiner, "African Education in Rhodesia 
since UDI", Africa Today 14 (Special Issue 1967): 14-15. 
64 Reserves accounted for about 41.3 percent of the 
black land areas and the purchase areas for about 3. 8 percent. 
Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, p. 50. 
65Ibid. 
66
one example of this determination was the removal 
of the Tangwena branch of the Mashona. 
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separate legislative assemblies, and developed by an indus-
trial development council. This led some observers to con-
elude that the Smith regime had embarked on a policy simi-
lar to South Africa's separate developmentlbantustan policy. 67 
Finally, the Smith regime's policy toward urban blacks 
also invited comparisons with South African race policy. 
The MuniciP?-.1 Amendment Act of 1967 authorized local town 
councils to segregate public recreational facilities and 
other conveniences. Under the Residential Property Owners' 
(Protection) Bill of 1970, residents could have their resi-
dential area declared as "exclusive", i.e. blacks and multi-
racial suburbs could be prevented. Under the policy of 
urban renewal, black small businessmen were evicted from 
decayed urban areas. Multi-racial hotels found their 
licenses not renewed and multi-racial urban schools were 
68 
closed. 
Between 1965 and the Portuguese coup the environment 
within Zimbabwe thus witnessed the demise of moderating 
forces in the white political spectrum. The RF with its 
strong rural component dominated public life and the infor-
mation about it by centralized government control and a 
well-organized party of the populist mold. As regards race 
67
sir Robert Tredgold quoted by Jack Halpern, 
"Polarization in Rhodesia: State, Church and Peoples", 
World Today 27 (January 1971): 5. 
68 Bowman, pp. 143-144. 
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policy, there was little sign of moderating influences, 
whether in the form of "winning hearts and minds", "removing 
the causes of the discontent" or any other compromises. 
The changes that did occur seem rather to have accentuated 
existing problems, such as racial discrimination, educational 
opportunities for blacks and land segregation. Sanctions 
did produce neither political concessions nor political 
divisions. However, sanctions did have effects, in that 
they deepened the structural features of the economy. Most 
importantly, they revealed that, although the Smith regime 
used all the means at its disposal to maintain itself (i.e. 
total defense) its means were limited and unevenly dis-
persed. There was a shortage of foreign exchange, capital 
and investment, public debt rose and the priority planning 
it produced deprived certain economic and geographic areas 
of public funds. 
2. 1974-1979: The End of Guerrilla Warfare 
The second era of the Zimbabwean conflict ~as initi-
ated by the Portuguese coup of 1974 and ended in the latter 
half of 1979 with the Lancaster House conference and a cease-
fire. The events set in motion by the Portuguese coup 
brought dramatic international, regional and domestic changes, 
which together led to the negotiated ending to the conflict. 
315 
2.1. The International Environment 
Prior to the Portuguese coup British initiatives 
led to an agreement with the Smith regime, but the subs·e-
quent test of black opinion by the Pearce Commission met 
with opposition led by the ANC of Bishop Abel Muzorewa and 
the Reverend Canaan BanE.na and were defeated. This led 
the British.~overnment to conclude that it could not resolve 
the differences between the Smith regime and black opposi-
tion. A settlement, the British Foreign Secretary told 
the House of Commons, was now up to the Zimbabwean groups 
themselves; settlement proposals would be suspended until 
a "better climate" developed. In the meantime, sanctions 
would continue as an "atmosphere conducive to discussion", 
as well as ministerial-level contact. 
Even when the Portuguese coup occurred, the British 
policy continued to be one of avoiding any new initiatives. 
The Wilson government did announce, however, that sanctions 
would be increased and that the basis of the previous negoti-
ations--the six principles--were void. The onus in reaching 
a new settlement would henceforth rest with the Smith regime 
and Britain would only regard the dispute as resolved if 
it were convinced of black acceptance. 69 Between 1974 and 
69Previously the (Conservative) British government 
had blamed the nationalist leaders for the breakdown of 
the 1971 settlement. See Robert Good, pp. 292-327. See 
also, Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement, Cmnd. 4835 
and Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement of the Commission 
Qn Rhodesian Opinion under the Rt. Hon. the Lord Pearce, 
Cmnd. 4964. 
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1976, the British policy remained one of "no initiatives" 
as South African policy toward the Smith regime changed, 
Zambia exerted greater pressure for a settlement, as the 
Smith regime released the detained nationalist leaders and 
negotiated with the ANC and Nkomo, and as guerrilla actions 
increased. When the Smith regime proposed a bipartisan 
British panel to devise a settlement, the British government 
replied that they would only consent to a new constitutional 
conference if the Smith regime agreed to the principle of 
majority rule and held elections for it within an 18-month 
to two-year period. Smith rejected the proposals as 
"extreme". 70 
With the British policy options apparently exhaust-
ed, the United States for the first time took an active 
interest in the Zimbabwean situation. 71 In view of the 
70
"Not Rhodesia Again?" The Economist, March 27, 
1976: 12-13 and Martin and Johnson, pp. 229-230. 
71un1 occurred in the period when the United States 
was engaged in the Vietnam w~·.r and a gentleman's agreement 
existed between the British and American governments to 
the effect that the U.S. would support British actions in 
Zimbabwe and in return receive British support for American 
actions in Vietnam. The U.S. did express its support for 
United Nations sanctions by Executive Order 1132 and called 
on firms to comply with the ban on trade with Zimbabwe. 
The Nixon ad~inistration shifted the emphasis of American 
policy and under Secretary of State Kissinger the National 
Security Council produced a memorandum (NSSM 39) on policy 
options in southern Africa. As recommended by NSSM 39, 
the Nixon administration "partially relaxed" its measures 
against the Smith regime (although it closed its consulate 
in Salisbury in March 1970) and planned on backing away 
from sanctions, especially those related to strategic 
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termination of Portuguese rule in southern Africa, the 
presence of Cuban troops in Angola and South Africa's 
policy changes, the Ford administration announced a change 
in the previous policy. Speaking in Lusaka in April 1976, 
secretary of State Kissinger stated that American policy 
henceforth supported meaningful and negotiated change in 
Zimbabwe. Kissinger repudiated any support for the Smith 
regime, proposed progress toward majority rule on a strict 
timetable, and pledged to protect minority rights, provide 
technical and economic assistance to Zimbabwe during a transi-
tion period and assistance to refugees. Subsequently Kis-
singer arranged a series of meetings with the leaders of 
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, 
Tanzania and Zambia (the frontline states)--which on Septem-
ber 24, 1976 led to the Smith regime's acceptance of black 
majority rule under a five-point plan. 72 
minerals. The latter goal resulted in the Byrd Amendment 
to the Military Procurement Act of 1971, allowing the import 
of Zimbabwean chrome. The Byrd Amendment was criticized 
by independent African nations and became symbolic of the 
United States' tacit support of the Smith regime. See Anthony 
Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern 
Rhodesia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); W.A.E. 
Skurnik, "Recent United States Policy in Africa", Current 
History 64 (March 1973): 97-135; and Bruce Oudes, "Southern 
Afric:a Policy Watershed", Africa Report 19 (November-December 
1974): 46-50. 
72The five points were: the Smith regime's agreement 
to majority rule within two years; the establishment of 
a multiracial Council of State (with a white chairman); 
the creation of a Council of Ministers (with ~ black majority 
and chairman); an end to sanctions; and a ceasefire. Elaine 
Windrich, "Rhodesia: The Road from Luanda to Geneva", World 
Today 33 (March 1977): 107-109. 
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The American initiative floundered, however, when 
the Kissinger proposals were rejected by the frontline states, 
who called for renewed British participation in the settle-
ment. Britain responded by proposing a constitutional con-
ference attended by all parties concerned. This took place 
in Geneva in October, 1976, attended by Smith, Nkomo and 
Mugabe (united in the Patriotic Front), and Sithole and 
Muzorewa (as representatives of a United African National 
Council). The Geneva conference failed to produce an agree-
ment and was finally adjourned in December 1976. 73 The 
failure of the separate initiatives of the United States 
and Britain led to a coordinated Anglo-American effort at 
settlement. Their proposal was rejected, however, by the 
Smith regime and the frontline states. 74 
Having admitted the possibility of a black-ruled 
Zimbabwe, the Smith regime wished to have "moderate" black 
leaders (i.e. not Mugabe and the ZANU component of the Patri-
otic Front) installed as the future leaders of Zimbabwe. 
The Smith regime thus accused the Anglo-American plan as 
a device to bring Mugabe to power and, when the initiative 
failed, announced the convening of an internal constitutional 
73 Ibid. 
74For details of this plan, see Legum, Western Crisis, 
pp. 201-208. 
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conference. This constitutional conference resulted in 
an "internal settlement", signed by Muzorewa, Sithole and 
Chief Jeremiah Chirau (a traditional chief and leader of 
the Zimbabwe United Peoples' Organization or ZUPO) in March 
1978. Under the internal agreement the Zimbabwean cabinet 
was replaced by an E}:ecuti ve Counci 1, consisting of the 
black leaders and Smith, and the legislature was enlarged 
to a 100-seat lower house (with 72 black seats) and a 30-
seat upper house (with 20 black seats). Elections were 
held on two occasions, the first an all-white one which 
approved the settlement and the second an April 1979 election 
in which Muzorewa's UANC won the majority. Under the inter-
nal settlement and the Muzorewa regime the Land Tenure Act 
was abolished, a minimum wage policy adopted, educational 
segregation prohibited and Zimbabwe's name changed (from 
Rhodesia) to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 75 
The internal settlement led to the return of many 
of the exiled nationalist leaders. It also received support 
from abroad. In the United States the Carter administration 
was pressured to recognize the Muzorewa regime and end sane-
t . 76 1ons. Some British observers assessed the 1979 elections 
75
see Rotberg~ Suffer the Future, pp. 266-268. 
76
"Shift U.S. Policy on Rhodesia?" U.S. News and 
World Report, October 30, 1978, pp. 31-32; "Let's Make a 
Deal", Newsweek, October 30, 1978, pp. 41-42. 
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as "free and fair" and the newly-elected Thatcher government 
hinted that it would recognize the Muzorewa regime and lift 
t . 77 sane 1ons. At the Commonwealth conference in August 1979, 
however, the Thatcher government, under pressure from Common-
wealth members, suggested that ~ test should be devised 
that could electorally assess the clajms of the Muzorewa 
regime and its rivals, and demanded that the Zimbabwean 
groups participate in a constitutional conference in Septem-
ber 1979 at the Lancaster House in London. Pressured by, 
respectively, the frontline states and South Africa, the 
Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa regime participated in 
the Lancaster House conference and signed a set of agreements 
that drastically revised the constitution of the internal 
settlement, introduced a ceasefire and scheduled elections 
monitored by a Commonwealth Monitoring Force. In the interim 
period Britain would be responsible for public security. 78 
From 1974 to 1979 British policy thus changed from 
a stance of "no initiatives" to one that exercised the 
responsibilities it claimed when it declared Zimbabwe to 
be a crown colony. Similarly, the Smith regime moved from 
a rejection of majority rule to its acceptance. Two questions 
77R. W. Apple, Jr., "Tory Recognition of Rhodesia 
A Possibility", New York Times, April 8, 1979, p. 3. 
78 Rotberg, Suffer the Future, pp. 272-275. See 
also Henry Wiseman and Alastair M. Taylor, From Rhodesia 
to Zimbabwe: The Politics of Transition (New York: Pergamon, 
1981) pp. 3-44. 
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can therefore be raised: Why did the Smith regime accept 
majority rule in 1976 and why did the conflict end by 
an election when ZAPU and ZANU (the Patriotic Front) guerrilla 
actions were expanding? These questions can best be addressed 
by noting (a) the role of the regional patrons in the con-
flict and (b) the role of exhaustion in the policies of 
the regional patrons and the Smith regime. 
2. 2. The R(lgional Environment 
As discussed earlier, South Africa became the regional 
pattern of the Smith regime, while the black African nations 
close to Zimbabwe became the patrons of ZAPU and ZANU. As 
regional conditions changed, these regional patrons shifted 
the tone and direction of the Zimbabwean conflict. 
The Portuguese coup of 1974 radically altered the 
role of Zimbabwe in South Africa's strategic thinking. A 
FRELIMO government in Mozambique was more than a year away, 
but South P.frica wanted an amicable relationship with Mozam-
bique to guarantee its access to Mozambican ports, the labor 
supply of southern Mozambique and the electricity of the 
Cabora Bassa Dam. Contrastingly, Zimbabwe's liability in-
creased. ZANU's cooperation with FRELIMO would (it was 
accurately feared) lead to guerrilla infiltration into 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique could close its border with Zimbabwe 
and hence increase Zimbabwe's reliance on South Africa's 
already congested railways and ports, and Mozambique could 
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participate in sanctions. Under these conditions, the Smith 
regime could only survive if South Africa increased its 
support--at a time when the rationale for it disappeared. 
Instead, there now was a strong incentive for South Africa 
to pressure the Smith regime into a political settlement 
as a means to stabilize relations between South Africa and 
black southern African states. 79 
Publicly there was no sign of a South Africa-Zimbabwe 
rift. South Africa signed a new trade agreement with Zim-
babwe, maintained its para-military contingent and completed 
a railroad linking Rutenga with the Beitbridge-Johannesburg 
line (in the event that the Umtali-Beira line was closed). 
Privately, however, South Africa and Zambia devised a "detente 
scenario" for southern Africa whereby South Africa would 
pressure Smith into a political settlement and withdraw 
its para-military contingent. The scenario would include 
a constitutional conference, in preparation for which Smith 
would release the detained nationalist leaders, and a cease-
fire. Following public disclosure, the Victoria Falls con-
ference did take place, Smith released the detained nationalist 
leaders, and a ceasefire was announced. 80 
79
colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record: Annual 
Survey and Documents 1974-1975 (London: Rex Collings, 1975), 
pp. A3-Al5. 
80 Jbid. 
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The detente scenario stalled as political disunity 
between the nationalists persisted, guerrilla attacks in-
creased, and the release of detained leaders stopped. South 
Africa's policy change nevertheless had critical results: 
the nationalists' top political leaders were released and 
the South African para-military contingent was withdrawn 
by August 1975, opening a widening public rift between South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. In October 1975 Smith criticized South 
Africa's detente effort as futile and argued that it caused 
Muzorewa to balk at an internal settlement. Premier Vorster 
demanded an apology, which Smith made publicly. 81 Between 
August 1975 and August 1976 the South African incentive 
to abandon political support of the Smith regime increased. 
In August 1975 South African forces entered Angola on the 
presumption that they would receive American support but, 
while the United States criticized the Cuban presence, its 
support was not forthcoming. South African troops eventually 
withdrew under mounting international and domestic82 criti-
cism. In July 1976 South Africa came under further pressure 
81Martin and Johnson, p. 237. 
82
see Kenneth W. Grundy, Defense Legislation and 
Commlinal Politics: The Evolution of a White South African 
Nation as Reflected in the Controversy Over the Assignment 
of Armed Forces Abroad, 1912-1976 (Ohio University: Papers 
in International Studies, No. 3, 1978). 
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when the Soweto riots erupted. For South Africa a "worst 
case" scenario was clearly at hand: the Cuban presence 
raised the possibility of a conventional attack from ext.er-
nal sources, without western support for South Africa, and 
combined with a Soweto-like domestic uprising. 83 
South Africa's own difficulties thus discouraged 
a supportive role for the Smith regime when the Kissinger 
initiative took place in the latter half of 1976. Instead, 
there was a strong incentive to pressure the Smith regime 
to accept the American plan. With no regional patron and 
faced with increasing guerrilla activities, budget deficits, 
and manpower shortages, the Smith regime had no choice but 
t bl k . . t 1 84 to accep ac maJOr1 y ru e. 
The announcement that black majority rule was accept-
able changed the conditions of the Zimbabwean conflict. 
Whereas previous efforts were directed at the downfall of 
the Smith regime and although the Kissinger initiative failed, 
the self-acknowledged political demise of the Smith regime 
could henceforth be presumed. Efforts now focused on the 
black replacement of the Smith regime. There were several 
con tenders for pov!er-: within Zimbabwe there was the UANC 
of Muzorewa and ZUPO (led by Chief Chirau) and, externally, 
83
william Gutteridge, "South Africa: Strategy for 
Survival", Conflict Studies 131 (June 1981): especially 
14-21. 
84see John Day, "The Rhodesian Internal Settlement", 
World Today 34 (July 1978): 268-276. 
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there was ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI. Each of these groups 
had regional patrons and it is the role of the frontline 
states as patrons of ZAPU and ZANU that was critical to 
the ensuing power struggle. 
Before 1974 African nations supported ZAPU and ZANU 
through the OAU and the ALC. Since these bodies were unable 
to play a large role in the liberation effort in Zimbabwe, 
the burden of support fell on neighboring states and Zambia 
in particular. Between 1974 and 1979, African nations' 
support was characterized by three developments. 
First, the frontline states replaced the ALC as van-
guard of African liberation. The idea of regular contact 
between states bordering on liberation targets first sur-
faced during the Angolan confljct and the group intially 
consisted of fivE:.· members, Presidents Kaunda of Zambia, 
Mac:hel of Mozambique, Khama of Botswana and Nyerere of Tan-
zania. President Neto of Angola later joined, and, as host 
of the ALC, Tanzania assumed the leadership role within 
the frontline states. The staff of the ALC was incorporated 
with the respective foreign policy-making staffs of the 
frontline states. The frontline states became part of the 
"progressive" group within the OAU and, as their actions 
were often controversial, they relied on the support of 
Nigeria to sway the OAU as a whole. Co~pared to the old 
ALC, the frontline states were a far more effective lobbying 
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group. They were closely involved with ZAPU and ZANU as 
host states, most of the presidents were former guerrilla 
leaders, and they were skilled at influencing more powerful 
t 1 . k N. . d B . t . 85 S d th f 1. sta es 1 e 1ger1a an r1 a1n. econ , e ron t 1ne 
states (and the OAU) paid more attention to the role of 
extra-continental powers in southern Africa. One mani-
festation of this was pressure on the United States to repeal 
the Byrd Amendment. Another manifestation was the call 
for more stringent sanctions and observance of them. 86 
Third, the two closest frontline states, Mozambique and 
Zambja, were exposed to the adverse effectE of the Zimbabwean 
dispute. Zambia, for ex~mple, lost its access to the Beira 
pipeline and had to acquire its oil through other routes, 
its trade with Zimbabwe declined sharply, and hence was 
forced to rely on Southern trade, railways and ports. 87 
Mozambique, similarly, suffered from the border closure, 
the initiation of sanctions and border raids. 88 
From the beginning of the conflict it was clear that 
ZAPU and ZANU were wholly reliant on the frontline states. 
85 . ---
Cervenka, pp. 62-63. 
86 Legum, Western Crisis, p. 48. 
87Richard Hall, The High Price of Principles (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1969), especially pp. 161-177 and 
230-244. 
88The cost of one year of sanctions for Mozambique 
was estimated at between 70,000,000 pounds and 82,000,000 
pounds. Martin and Johnson, p. 226. 
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They, in effect, determined where ZAPU and ZANU headquarters 
and bases were located, influenced the training and equipment 
ZAPU and ZANU received, could (and did) close bases and 
political headquarters, and detained leaders. As discussed 
earlier, these factors played a critical role in the effec-
tiveness and indeed viability of ZAPU and ZANU. Although 
frontline states' support derived from principled support 
of majority rule, the escalation of hostilities and their 
adverse economic effects produced an incentive to end the 
conflict. The frontline states' support of a particular 
Zimbabwean organization was essentially based on self-
interest: support of the Muzorewa regime would not end 
the conflict, whereas ZAPU and ZANU, who were responsible 
for guerrilla actions and who were cooperating in the 
Patriotic Front, alone could end the conflict. Stated dif-
ferently, the frontline states opposed the Muzorewa regime 
not because it was "insufficiently black" but because its 
military establishment was controlled by the same personnel 
as the Smith regime and because it excluded the Patriotic 
Front. In fact, the war did escalate most under the Muzorewa 
regime with border raids on Mozambique and, for the first 
time, a raid on Zambia. More ominously, the Muzorewa regime 
launched an emergency recruitment camp~ign, aimed at produc-
89 ing a 25,000 man army loyal to Muzorewa by January 1980. 
89
"Rhodesia- the clearest outcome and the best", 
Manchester Guardian, March 16, 1980, p. 1. 
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In broad terms, the goals of the frontline states 
coincided with the Anglo-American proposals. There was 
still the question of any Zimbabwe regime's legal status, 
but British policy after the internal settlement came to 
view the cessation of guerrilla war as the overriding ques-
tion.90 When the British made an offer for an inclusive 
constitutional conference at the 1979 meeting of the Common-
wealth, the frontline states thus pressured the Patriotic 
Front to participate. 91 The expectations of the British 
government and the frontline states nevertheless diverged. 
Since Muzorewa's UANC won 64.9 percent of the black vote 
in the 1979 election, Britain thought it would defeat the 
Patriotic Front. The frontline states, however, expected 
the Patriotic Front to win the elections. 92 
2.3. The Domestic Environment 
As previously discussed, the initial UDI period eli-
minated the moderating influences from the white political 
spectrum and a hardened and cohesive Rhodesian Front used 
all the means at its disposal to maintain itself. Sanctions 
90Legum, Western Crisis, p. 210. 
91The PF was reluctant to en1:er negotiations, arguing 
that they were on the verge of military victory; they too, 
however, believed that they would win the elections. Martin 
and Johnson, pp. 315-316. 
92Martyn Gregory, "Rhodesia: From Lusaka to Lancaster 
House'', World Today 36 (January 1980): 11-18. 
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and the effort to counter them accentuated the structural 
features of the economy and, although it did not lead to 
the economic chaos Britain predicted, it did cause some·prob-
lems. After 1974, however, the economic, political and 
other problems of the Smith regime increased. 
First, the Smith regime experienced a financial cri-
sis. Defense expenditures rose from Rh $77 million in 1975 
to Rh $96 million in 1976, Rh $146 million in 1977 and Rh 
$197 million in 1978; in 1978 defense expenditures amounted 
to 40 percent of the total budget, as against 25 percent 
in 1976. 93 The rise in defense expenditures was combined 
with a declining growth rate; in real terms the GDP fell 
by 3 percent in 1976 and 7 percent in 1977. 94 With sanctions 
cumulatively exercisjng an adverse effect on trade and in-
vestment and hence the availability of foreign exchange 
and with the r~gime unable to raise revenues by taxation, 
the Smith regime was forced to devalue twice (in October 
1977 and April 1978) and to borrow money. Public debt 
between 1965 and 1974 amounted to Rh $590 million; in 1978 
alone the Smith regime was forced to borrow Rh $240 million, 
bringing its foreign indebtedness to Rh $189. 95 The ecor.omic 
93Grundy, "Social Costs": 456 and :V.ichael Raeburn 
Black Fire! (London: Julian Friedmann, Publishers, 1978), 
p. 238. 
94Roger Riddell,."What Economic Road", Africa Report 
(May-June 1978): 54 and Day, "The Rhodesian Internal Settle-
ment": 271. 
95Riddell: 53. 
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difficulties led to and were compounded by emigration by 
economically active whites. While white migration still 
showed a small annual net gain in 1972, a net loss started 
to occur in 1973. Between 1976 and 1977 the net outflow 
increased by 26 percent and included large numbers of white 
f . 1 96 pro ess1ona s. 
Second, the shortage of public funds increased the 
need for priority planning and it was clear that the rural 
black areas--the scene of the guerrilla actions--were de-
prived of funds. Under the policy of community development 
the black councils were entitled to raise their own funds 
when public support was insufficient, but when guerrilla 
actions increased most of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' 
funds went into the construction of protected villages. 
In addition, guerrilla actions prevented the generation 
of local revenue as ZAPU and ZANU urged blacks not to pay 
taxes and school and cattle-dipping fees and attacked govern-
97 
ment-owned stores and beerballs. Faced with a shortage 
of funds and local opposition, the regime's rural black 
administration disintegrated. By 1977 the black councils 
were being disbanded as district commissioners resumed direct 
98 
rule. Approximate:Iy 1,000 black schools were forced to 
96W'lk 1 enson, p. 307. 
97Hodges:- 16 • 
. 
9~Michael Bratton, Beyond Corr.munity Development: 
The Pol1t1cal Economy of Rural Administration in Zimbabwe 
(London: Catholic Institute for International Relations 
1978), pp. 34-45. ' 
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close and about 25 percent of the black educational popula-
tion left without educational access. By March 1979, 155 
of 450 black hospitals were closed. 99 Cattle diseases re-
appeared with the closing of about 6,500 of the 8,000 cattle-
dips which, combined with cattle seizures as collective 
fines, led rural blacks to lose one-third of the total 
h d 100 er • The rural situation was further worsened by popu-
lation instability. By 1979 about 750,000 blacks found 
themselves removed to protected villages, about 150,000 
blacks fled to Mozambique and Zambia, and 500,000 migrated 
to the security of urban areas. If the number of blacks 
who joined the guerrillas is added, almost a quarter of 
the black population was "directly uprooted by the war." 101 
Third, the strain of counter-guerrilla warfare pro-
duced political divisions within the Smith regime. To gain 
the support of the ANC the regime in 1975 appointed a Com-
mission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination which published 
a report that proposed, among other things, the repeal of 
certain forms of racial discrimination and the Land Tenure 
Act. 102 While the Smith regime did not accept this Quenet 
ggibid. 
100Anthony R. Wilkenson, "The Inipact of the War", 
in W.H. Morris-Jones and Dennis Aust1iJ (eds.), From Rhodesia 
To Zimbabwe (London: Frank Cuss, 1980), pp. 119-120. 
101Grundy, "Social Costs": 460. 
102Report of the Commission of Inqu~ry into Racial 
Discrimination (Salisbury: Government Pr1nter, 1976). 
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Report as a whole, it did implement some proposals, such 
as the ability of blacks to own urban property. In the 
critical Vorster-Smith meetings of September 1976, Smith 
still enjoyed the su~~ort of the RF-membership. Smith, 
however, did not fully· inform the RF of South African pres-
sure nor his acceptance of it and hence acquired a mandate 
to negotiate with Kissinger. 103 Following Smith's accept-
ance of majority rule, the support of the UANC gained new 
importance and Smith proposed the repeal of the Land Tenure 
Act. Although the Land Tenure Act was scrapped the RF 
divided and Smith had to rely on the support of black parlia-
mentarians to have it passed. The chairman of the RF resign-
ed and twelve members were expelled. They formed the 
Rhodesian Action Party (RAP), which advocated a more forceful 
counter-guerrilla campaign. Those who felt Smith did not 
go far enough in repealing offensive legislation formed 
the National Unifying Force (NUF). 
Except as factors causing the exhaustion of the Smith 
regime, these problems and their implications remained in 
the background at the Lancaster House conference. In the 
forefront were efforts to devise an acceptable and workable 
transition to a new regime. 
3. The Transitional Arrangement 
The Lancaster House conference produced several 
103Martin and Johnson, p. 250. 
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- . -
agreements. One agreement concerned the transitional period 
before.an independence date, wherein Britain assumed full 
colonial authority in Zimbabwe, represented by a governor 
(Lord Soames). Another agreement produced a ceasefire, 
effective on December 28, 1979, and under the authority 
of a Ceasefire Commission composed of a military aide to 
the governor, one senior commander of the security forces 
and one of the Patriotic Front. The contending parties 
were to disengage and the guerrillas to assemble in 16 assem-
bly points (APs) by January 4, 1980. This disengagement 
was to be supervised by a 1,200 man Commonwealth Monitoring 
Force. Britain would supervise internationally-observed 
elections after a two-month period. 104 
The conference also produced an independence consti-
tution. The most salient aspect of this constitution was 
that it created a legislature with a 100-member lower house, 
with 20 seats reserved for whites, and a senate. The head 
of state ~ould be a president, i.e. Zimbabwe would be a 
republic. The constitution can be amended by a two-thirds 
vote in the Senate and a 70 percent vote in the lower house. 
The existing judicial system was preserved, as was the civil 
service. The public service commissions were required to 
104
see Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Constitu-
tional Conference, Cmnd .• 7802 (September-December 1979) 
and Wiseman and Taylor, pp. 7-13 for more details. See also 
"It Seems Like A Miracle", Time, November 26, 1979, 
pp. 62-64 for an account of the conference itself. 
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pay civil service pensions and uphold internal regulations. 
With regard to the military establishment, the forces of 
the Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa regime would be demobi-
lized and then integrated, in equal proportions, into a 
conventionally styled military establishment under the 
authority of a High Command and the Ministry of Defense. 
Finally, the constitution recognized private property and 
land could not be acquired by compulsory means. The "land 
problem" would be solved by foreign (especially British 
and American) aid for development and settlement. 105 
The constitution was a product of 47 plenary sessions, 
in which major differences existed among the three parties 
(Britain, the Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa regime). 
The final product thus was a compromise; no single group 
fashioned the constitution to suit its own interests. With 
regard to the two Zimbabwean parties, their willingness 
to make compromises was undoubtedly influenced by uncertainty 
about the outcome of the elections. Although both were 
confident that they would win, there was no guarantee of 
victory arid either could in the future be an outvoted 
parliamentary minority. Considerations of power thus re-
quired a "neutral" constitution. Most conspicuously, the 
105The recognition of private property and guarantees 
against expulsion from it is contained in the Bill of Righto 
of the constitution under "Freedom of Deprivation of Pro-
perty." For a critique see "Shortcomings of British plan 
for compensation", Manchester Guardian, november 11, 1979, 
p. 9. 
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constitution was a victory of the political over the military 
leaders. While the senior comnianders participated in the 
Lancaster House conference, they were relieved of their 
operational command during the transition period106 and 
their armies would be demobilized. The new military estab-
107 
lishment would be a creation of the political leadership. 
In view of the fact that ZAPU and ZANU were armies 
rather than political parties, their assembly intc the 
assembly points was smoother than expected. The Commonwealth 
Monitoring Force was largely unarmed and could not enforce 
compliance by the estimated 16,000 guerrillas who were re-
quired to assemble within only seven days. Only a fraction 
of the guerrillas reported within the first five days, but 
thereafter the number increased and by January 7 there were 
18,500-20,000 people gathered in the assembly points. 
There were 219 violations of the ceasefire, with ZIPRA 
accountable for 36, ZANLA for 134 and the security forces 
108 for 14, which led Lord Soames to employ the regime's 
106operational command, the PF argued, would be a 
"recipe for a coup." Wiseman and Taylor, p. 9. 
107The new army would be composed of equal represen-
tation of those who fought the war, and training was started 
by officers of a British Military and Advisory Training 
Team. The regime security foTces, ZANLA and ZIPRA would 
each have a ~ember on military· high command. "rbid., p. 66. 
108uartyn Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980: Politic:tsation 
through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilization": 75. 
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security forces (in particular, the black Rhodesian African 
Rifles) against the guerrillas. This act was controversial, 
109 
as Britain was accused of bias against the Patriotic Front, 
110 but gradually a sense of trust was established. 
In the elections for the white parliamentary seats 
111 
in February 1980, the RF won all 20 seats. In the context 
for the remaining black seats, the Patriotic Front was at 
a distinct disadvantage. The UANC of Muzorewa had partici-
pated in the 1979 elections but neither ZAPU nor ZANU had 
operated as political parties within Zimbabwe since 1964. 
The Patriotic Front combining ZAPU and ZANU, moreover, was 
a negotiating construct; it had "no headquarters or offices, 
except the two co-chajrmen, no bureaucracy--in short no 
existence except as a negotiating construct or alliance 
112 
of convenience." The electoral campaign again revealed 
the divisions between ZAPU and ZANU. ZAPU changed its name 
109wiseman and Taylor, p. 20. 
110The most senior ZANLA commander, Tongogara, was 
killed in December 1979 in a car accident in Mozambique. 
111Throughout the elections there were rumors that 
the RF was about to oust Smith and replace him with David 
Smith (Finance Minister under the Muzorewa regime). The 
NUF boycotted the elections on the grounds that it was 
racially segregated. Martyn Gregory, "The ~9~0 Rhodesia~ 
Elections - a first-hand account and analys1s , World Toaay 
36 (March 1980): 181. 
112Rotberg, Suffer the Future, p. 263. 
337 
to Patriotic Front to stress unity and did not publicly 
criticize Mugabe or ZANU, but they could not establish a 
common electoral strategy or platform with ZANU. 113 ZANU's 
electoral strategy emphasized the importance of the rural 
vote. A large number of guerrillas remained in the rural 
114 
areas controlled by ZANLA to organize electoral support. 
ZANU (PF) under Mugabe's leadership won 63 percent 
of the votes, winning all the seats in Manicaland, Victoria 
and the northeastern areas of Mashonaland North. In the 
western areas of Mashonaland North and South, ZANU (PF) 
did slightly worse, winning 6 of 8 seats in the former and 
14 of 16 in the latter. Nkomo's PF (or ZAPU) did well in 
the west (Matabeleland North and South), winning 15 of 16 
seats. In the Midlands, ZANU (PR) won 8 seats and the PF 
(or ZAPU) 4. The UANC of Muzorewa won only 3 seats (in 
Mashonaland North and South). None of the other parties 
115 
won any seats. Thus Mugabe's ZANU (PF) won 57 of the 
113 Gregory, "The Rhodesian Elections--a first-hand 
account and analysis": 182-183. 
114This reduced the number of guerrillas that could 
gather at the assembly points. That the number of people in 
the points (20,000) exceeded the estimated number of guer-
rillas (15,000-16,000) is attributed to the fact that the 
guerrillas sent surrogates (mujibas and women) and the return 
of more than 200,000 refugees. Wiseman and Taylor, pp. 54 
and 59 and "Playing with guns" Newsweek, January 14, 1980, 
p. 51. 
115These included a ZANU party, led by Sithole, and 
a Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP) led by Chikerema. 
338 
80 black seats, Nkomo's PF (or ZAPU) 20 seats, and the UANC 
3 seats. In terms of the share of the vote, ZANU (PF) won 
at least 80 percent of the popular vote in the eastern 
provinces; in most of these areas, Nkomo's PF ( or ZAPU) 
was outvoted by the UANC. In the western areas, the position 
was reversed. In Matabeleland North and South, Nkomo's 
PF (or ZAPU) won at least 80 percent, while ZANU (PF) could 
only manage a 10.4 percent in the North and 6.85 percent 
in the ~outh. Only in the Midlands were there signs of 
greater balance, with ZANU (PF) winning a 60 percent share 
116 
and Nkomo's PF about 28 percent. 
Roughly speaking the electoral support of ZANU (PF) 
and the PF (or ZAPU) coincided with, respectively, the opera-
tional areas of ZANLA and ZIPRA, and the Mashona and Ma tabele 
living areas. Whether the electoral behavior of blacks 
is correleated with tribal or any other socio-economic factor 
is nevertheless difficult to establish witb certainty. 
The exact number of the Zimbabwean population, the number 
of voters and their areas of permanent residence were all 
unknown. For example, the only breakdown that was given 
was a provincial-regional one and this does not coincide 
with tribal patterns. The only significant factor appears 
116Martyn Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation 
through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilization": 62-65. 
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to be the guerrilla war itself. During it, ZANU (PF) 
established its influence in certain areas, had the organi-
zational resources to conduct a campaign there, and was 
untainted by any collaboration with the Smith regime. 
Nkomo's PF also established itself in certain regions, but 
these were less populous and Nkomo was tainted by charges 
of opportunism in his negotiations with Smith. The UANC 
seemed to suffer most from collaboration, as it was almost 
eclipsed in the election returns. 117 
Thus the negotiations, elections and arrangements 
that ended the Zimbabwean conflict both confirmed and denied 
the legacy of guerrilla warfare. The large guerrilla armies 
generated by the war were required to demobilize and a por-
tion integrated into a new conventionally-styled military 
establishment supervised by the civilian-political leader-
ship. Yet the armies provided the organizational resources 
and ready-made regional constituencies on which the respective 
groups contested the election. Thus ZANU (PF) won the elec-
tion and the Mugabe regime assumed power on April 18, 1980. 118 
117Ibid. Although there were many acts of intimida-
tion, especially in the northeastern areas, observers were 
satisfied that the elections were "free and fair." Wiseman 
and Taylor, pp. 93-94 and 155. 
118For an account of the proceedings, see "A Final, 
Priceless Reward", Newsweek, April 28, 1980, pp. 47-49. 
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The Mugabe regime operates under a constitutional order 
that preserved the police, judicial and bureaucratic appara-
tus; that the respective groups chose to operate under this 
order was a reflection of the political self-interest of 
their leaderships. 
The constitutional arrangements of the ending of 
the Zimbabwean conflict raise the question whether the 
experience of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare altered, 
in any fundamental sense, the structural features of Zimbab-
wean society. In this regard, four developments require 
elaboration. 
First, impoverished and overpopulated even before 
UDI, the black rural areas' experience of guerrilla warfare 
deepened the rural crisis. Land was either devoid of popu-
lation or heavily overgrazed, cattle (and thus social status, 
wealth and political power) lost, and schools, hospitals 
and Stores Closed. ll 9 Cl l l bl k "d d l ear y, rura ac s pa1 ear y 
for their role in the guerrilla war. Urban pressures also 
consequently increased as unemployed refugees crowded the 
urban areas in vast shantytowns. 120 
Second, while emigration reduced the number of whites, 
white farmers remained the most influential group through 
119
see Martin Meredith, The Past is Another Country: 
Rhodesia 1890-1979 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1979), pp. 305-309. 
120
"Whoever Says We're Safe Lies", Time, April 30, 1974, 
pp. 39-40. In Salisbury alene there were 60,000 uprooted black squatters. 
Richard Hull, '"!be Continuing Crisis in Rhodesia", CUrrent History 78 
(March 1980): 107-108. 
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their role in the RF and as one-fifth of the economically 
active whites. Sanctions and guerrilla warfare added to 
their importance. With regard to sanctions, the regime 
was forced to rely on agricultural exports as its manufactur-
ing trade flagged, giving farmers generous state aid and 
loans. As regards guerrilla war, farmers who wished to 
buy or develop land in tbe northeastern and eastern areas 
most affected by guerrilla actions were virtually subsidized 
121 
by the regime. 
Third, the regime's self-maintaining efforts led 
to the growth and centralization of the public sector. 
Expansion can be meG.sured in several ways. Public employ-
ment rose from about 40,000 in 1964 to 78,000 in 1969 and 
to about 118,000 in 1978. This made the public sector by 
far the largest single employer in Zimbabwe, and public 
servants' earnings about one-quarter of total economic earn-
122 
ings. The largest proportion of these employees were 
in the field of education (including black education), 
123 followed by internal affairs and then defense. Overall 
121wilkenson, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe", PP· 30::i-
304. 
122Bratton, "The Public Service in Zimbabwe": 448. 
123
wiseman and Taylor, p. 16. 
.... 
342 
there were 40 specialized civil service departments, resort-
ing under the authority of 20 ministries. These departments 
exercised "direct rule from the center" by withholding funds 
from local units, or by investing central government em-
ployees in local areas with quasi-judicial and para-military 
powers under the umbrella of martial law and emergency regu-
lations. The expansion of the public sector increased the 
number of black public employees, but in proportional terms 
they did not increase (about 74 percent of the whole) and, 
moreover, blacks were under-represented in the senior, 
124 
tenured positions (10 percent). 
Fourth, the effort to counter sanctions led to agri-
cultural and mineral diversification. In agriculture, 
tobacco was replaced by cotton and sugar as chief exports, 
and production of peanuts, tea, soybeans, maize and sorghum 
increased. In mining, copper became the major product, 
supplemented by chromium, nickel, silver, iron, asbestos 
and gold. With a few exceptions (such as the domestic tex-
tile industry), however, these products were exported and 
hence their value was subject to fluctuations. With regard 
to manufacturing, its share of the GDP increased from approxi-
mately 18 percent in 1965 to about 23 percent in 1977 but, 
as the 1974-1979 period showed, its development is contingent 
124Bratton "The Public Service in Zimbabwe": 450-
459. See also D.G. Clarke, "The Growth and Economic Impact 
of the Public Sector of Rhodesia", Rhodesian Journal of 
Economics 6 (September 1972): 48-60 • 
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on the availability of foreign capital and protection from 
125 
especially South African manufacturers. 
In short, the 15-year conflict accentuated and tpere-
fore more clearly revealed the structural features of Zim-
babwean society. While the Mugabe regime differs from pre-
vious regimes in that its political legitimacy is not dis-
puted, its policy options are, like those of previous 
regimes, effectively constrained by these structural 
features. In an immediate sense the constraining role of 
these structures is further complicated by the highly com~ 
petitive nature of the black elite and by the problems pre-
sented by the demilitarization of a people-in-arms. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter raised the question of why the war ended 
in an election. It was argued that this question can best 
be understood by noting (a) the role of the Smith regime's 
and the guerrillas' regional patrons and (b) the role of 
exhaustion of all parties concerned. In the first years 
of the conflict (1965-1973), the guerrillas posed no serious 
threat to the Smith regime and Britain thus was forced to 
resolve a dispute characterized by international-legal issues. 
Britain tried to force the Smith regime into negotiations 
by means of economic and diplomatic pressure but the 
125Rotberg, Suffer the Future, pp. 242-246 and Legum, 
Western Crisis, pp. 229-234. 
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hardened regime managed to evade this pressure by mobilizing 
its economy on a war footing and by relying on South African 
(and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese) aid. 
After 1973, the Zimbabwean conflict changed funda-
mentally as guerrilla actions progressively increased. Thus 
the Smith regime was severely weakened by its counter guer-
rilla operations and the cumulative effect of sanctions 
and, when its regional patron (South Africa) withdrew its 
support, it had no choice but to announce its own political 
demise. This announcement in 1976 again shifted the grounds 
of the conflict, as the search was now for a suitable black 
replacement. The Smith regime (and South Africa) wanted 
a "moderate" black group or at least not Mugabe's ZANU in 
power and thus drew Muzorewa (UANC), Sithole and Chirau 
into an internal settlement. The Muzorewa regime (or rule 
by the "modera t.es"), however, increased the level of hosti-
lities, which alarmed the frontline states and Britain which, 
for economic and political reasons, wanted an end to the 
conflict. Under the aegis of the Commonwealth the frontline 
states and Britain thus developed a plan to end the conflict 
and all the regional patrons involved pressured the concerned 
groups to participate. 
By the ending of the conflict in the latter half 
of 1979 and early 1980, none of the Zimbabwean cont€nders 
were thus masters of their own fate. The respecti-.;e leaders 
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behaved according to what they were, namely contenders for 
power who seek to maximize their power. These considerations 
did not produce extremism at the Lancaster House conference; 
rather they produced compromises as no group wanted to be 
a future victim of a biased legal order. The group that 
did win the following elections clearly did so on the basis 
of its orga~izational resources, particularly its military 
personnel. It inherited an order, however, in which those 
organizational resources are transformed and an order whose 
structural features (and hence problems) were accentuated 
by the experiences of the 15-year conflict. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This study has addressed the question why a particu-
lar kind of revolution occurred in Zimbabwe. The examination 
was informed by two theoretical traditions, namely the 
theoretical literature on revolutions in general and the 
theoretical literature on African upheavals, especially the 
work of those scholars who argue that African revolutions 
are not caused by nor lead to socio-economic transformations. 
Following the structural approach developed by Eisenstadt, 
Paige, Skocpol and Wolf, the analysis has then sought to 
determine whether.a crisis within the Zimbabwean regime coin-
cided with a rural uprising. 
The analysis pursued several avenues. First, it 
focused on the nature of the white community and its relation 
to the state (central political power and bureaucracy) and 
the economy, as well as to international pressure. Second, 
the nature of black political life since 1888 was examined, 
with particular attention paid to the socio-economic con-
straints and legal regulations under which blacks lived, what 
the political implications of those conditions were, and the 
organizational forms black collective action took in response 
to these conditions. Third, the struggle for power between 
1962 and 1979 was examined in order to determine the nature 
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and effectiveness of black collective action, which blacks 
were most active in the struggle and why, the organizational 
forms generated by the struggle for power, the nature of the 
black elite or leadership, and the nature and effectiveness 
of the regime's counteractions. Finally, the manner in which 
the conflict ended was examined. 
1. Zimbabwe 1888-1965: The Emergence 
of a Political Crisis 
The study shows that state power in Zimbabwe prior to 
1965 was the preserve of whites who systematically excluded 
blacks from electoral and other political power. This gave 
the successive Zimbabwean regimes in the period prior to 1965 
a very narrow support base. Although the regime's support 
was narrowly based on the whites, not all whites participated 
equally in thE· political process. Public policy-making was 
dominated by the executive, seen not as cabinet dominance but 
as the dominant role of the prime minister, and by the public 
bureaucracy. These political actors operated at some remove 
from the political parties and the legislature, as there was 
no populist political tradition in white politics, at least 
not until the 1960s. In the absence of such a tradition, 
some whites, (including white farmers and mining interests) 
exercised political leverage with the executive-bureaucratic 
alliance. The political prominence of these groups was 
largely a reflection of Zimbabwean society before the Second 
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World War but, although the changes brought by the war 
resulted in the rise of manufacturers and the decline in the 
number of miners, white farmers maintained their political 
leverage in the executive-bureaucratic alliance. The policy-
making alliance was highly susceptible to external political 
pressures, primarily because it was in agreement with f;ri tish 
imperial aims· in southern Africa. This voluntary cooperation 
with Br5tish aims was reflected in the opposition to the 
political developments of South Africa, particularly to the 
course of South Africa's public policy directions after the 
rise of Afrikaner nationalism since 1900. 
The Zimbabwean regime's opposition to South African 
policies is ironic, for there is a similarity and relatedness 
between Zimbabwean and South African political development. 
The arrival of the Matabele in the area north of South Africa 
and the initial white settlement, for example, was a direct 
outgrowth of the dynamics of South African society. Later 
developments in Zimbabwe, such as land apportionment and the 
systematic exclusion of blacks from state power, is also 
similar to South African practice. Yet Zimbabwean whites 
were opposed to South Africa's political directions, especi-
ally after the rise of Afrikaner nationalism after 1900. 
Before the Second World war Zimbabwe's economy was of 
the colonial export type. Initial white settlement was pre-
mised on the hope of discovering a "second Reef" but when this 
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failed to materialize white farming and mining became the 
mainstays of the economy. There were some secondary indus-
tries, but they were dominated by the activities surrounding 
the extraction and export of primary goods. The export-
oriented industries encountered several difficulties before 
the Second World War as they were subject to fluctuations 
in world market prices, overproduction and ecological disas-
ters. This led the state to aid and regulate economic pro-
duction; even before 1940 the state in Zimbabwe had adopted 
an interventionist posture as far as the economy was con-
cerned. 
During and after the Second World War Zimbabwe experi-
enced strong economic and political pressure. The political 
pressure to adopt racial reforms as a prelude to the creation 
of the Central African Federation soon evaporated, but the 
pressure for increased production was sustained throughout 
the 1950s. With its powerful bureaucracy and its interven-
tionist posture, the Zimbabwean regime embarked on a policy 
of modernization, aided by the enlarged market created by 
the CAF and the influx of capital from British and CAF sources. 
The policy of economic modernization was particularly aimed 
at increasing the number of secondary industries in Zimbabwe, 
as well as increasing the output of white and black farmers. 
By 1965 the economic results of this policy were mixed. 
Economic diversification did occur as the number of secondary 
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industries and the volume and value of agricultural produc-
tion increased. Yet each of the economic sectors was still 
vulnerable. Black agricultural output was steadily diminish-
ing as a result of political opposition to economic reforms 
and some questionable economic reasoning on the part of the 
regime. White farmers did increase the volume of their out-
put, but its dramatic rise in value was attributable to 
favorable world market conditions. These conditions would 
not necessarily prevail in the future, but white farmers 
increasingly relied on tobacco production which was geared 
to the export market. The contribution of manufacturing to 
the GDP increased, but production was of a limited range of 
low-quality goods geared to the needs of black consumers and 
. 
their limited buying power and still faced competition from 
high quality imports. 
The white regime's efforts to reform the economy 
encountered considerable opposition from whites and blacks 
alike. This opposition emanated mainly from the rural areas, 
where reforms threatened rural customs and security and 
undermined tribal political authority, threatening to deprive 
white farmers of their increasing demand for black laborers. 
The regime attempted to adjust to the loss of white political 
support by creating a black middle class of a moderate poli-
tical character, but this met with black disinterest and 
opposition in some instances. With its support base still 
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narrow, the regime in the early 1960s encountered renewed 
international pressure, this time in the form of pressure for 
racial reform in exchange for the granting of independence. 
This pressure radicalized the regime's reform program as it 
allowed blacks formal political participation in the legis-
lature and proposed to abolish the land apportionment legis-
lation. 
These proposals led to the demise of the UFP regime. 
The white rural-based opposition grew rapidly and, as the 
farmers alone or as a proportion of the electorate could not 
defeat the regime, they developed a potent party-organiza-
tion moulded by a populist philosophy. This Rhodesian 
Front organization defeated the UFP, transformed the mode 
of governing in Zimbabwe from the dominance of the executive 
bureaucratic alliance in policy-making to one where policy-
making was dominated by the extra-parliamentary role of the 
RF organization. The RF also abandoned the reforms of the 
1950s and was prepared to achieve independence by unilateral 
means, as was reflected in its Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in November 1965. UDI brought renewed interna-
tional pressure, but the RF seemed initially to thrive on 
such pressure; it remained cohesive, used all the state 
means at its disposal to maintain itself, and reversed many 
of the moderate and multi-racial features of Zimbabwean life, 
inviting comparisons with a one-party state and South African 
• 
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race policies. 
For all its power, the RF was actually in the grip of 
a political crisis. Its power was unevenly distributed and, 
like its predecessors, it had a narrow support base. Pre-
vious efforts to create a black middle class had failed and 
in the early 1960s blacks began to oppose participation in 
the white electoral process. With UDI this political crisis 
acquired international-legal proportions as the Smith regime, 
jud[ed by the standards of regime legitimacy prevailing in 
Africa since 1945, was found to be illegitimate. This in-
creased international pressure. As yet the regime suffered 
no obvious financial crisis. Although its public debt rose, 
the regime's survival now depended on the ability of its 
diversified economy to sustain a growth rate in the face of 
that international pressure and the ability of the regime to 
quell any revolt from the blacks. 
2. Black Zimbabwe 1888-1962: The 
Conditions of Pnlitical Action 
The study shows that the first 30 years of white rule 
introduced many of the changes that would leave black life 
as it was known before 1888 in a condition beyond recall. 
Many of the changes introduced came in the wake of black 
resistance to the imposition of white rule, ironically con-
ceived as actions that defended blacks against white encroach-
ments. 
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Black life in Zimbabwe between 1888 and 1962 functioned 
under the impact of at least three crises. First, there was 
a demographic crisis as the number of blacks increased from 
an estimated 500,000 in 1888 to 3,550,000 in 1961. The 
steadily increasing number of blacks occupied land whose 
supply was limited by law; this gave blacks in the reserves 
a density of 25 per square mile in 1961, as compared to 10 
per square mile in 1941. By the 1960s an estimated 30 per-
cent of the blacks entitled to land by custom were, indeed, 
landless. Second, blacks lived under the impact of an eco-
logical crisis. In Zimbabwe conditions for farming are 
generally harsh and suitable farmland is limited to the 
central highlands and the northeastern areas. The manner in 
which the reserves were created resulted in the allocation 
~ of land to blacks in areas where the quality of the soil was 
most questionable. With the best farmland allocated to whites, 
blacks lived only on the reserves where the combination of 
demographic pressure and soil quality resulted in the steadily 
diminishing ecological capacity of the soil and hence the 
diminishing productive capacities of black farmers of the 
reserves. Third, there was a political crisis as the politi-
cal authority of the tribal leadership was undermined and then 
re-introduced in a bureaucratic form. 
Is there a common denominator among these changes? 
Certainly the changes in the conditions of black life did not 
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result from their exposure to rampant commercialism. Blacks 
were threatened by the encroachments of whites, their desire 
for farmland, and their need of black labor. Blacks were 
also exposed to new notions, such as private property, wage 
labor, electoral politics and so forth. But the small 
number of local markets in which blacks successfully partici-
pated were soon replaced by a labor and production market 
regulated by an interventionist state. AGcording to govern-
ment regulations the entry of blacks to tte cash economy 
could come mainly as wage laborers. Entry as producers or 
owners of private property was limited to the small number 
of purchase farmers. By 1962 this left blacks in a situation 
in which where they had been exposed to notions associated 
with commercialism and capitalism, but in which few were 
actually commercialized owners of private property. 
As suggested by the above, the use of state power by 
the settlers is the common denominator of changes in black 
life. Initially the white regimes assumed that blacks would 
be progressively drawn into w~tge labor and enter the spiral 
of socio-economic progress associated with white life. Under 
this doctrine of economic assimilation, tribal life was 
beyond recall and reserved land only a temporary refuge. 
When the settlers achieved self- or responsible government, 
however, ·they used state power to reconstitute tribal life 
in a form that was politically understood and desired by the 
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whites in general and the Native Department in particular. 
After the Second World War state power was again used in 
an attempt to reconstitute tribal life as it was desired by 
the white regime for economic reasons. Clearly the changes 
in black life can, then, best be seen as a result of the 
use of state power to affect economic and political changes, 
rather than of blacks' exposure to the dislocations brought 
by rampant commercialism. 
3. The Struggle for Power: International 
Nationalism, Guerrilla War and the 
Response of the Regime 
Although blacks lived under the impact of three crises 
deriving mainly from the use of state power, the likelihood 
of spontaneous and locally-led political action was remote. 
Structurally the black population could be divided into the 
blacks of the reserves, the purchase area farmers, black 
laborers on white corporate and single-owned farms, and urban 
wage laborers. This structure was derived from methods of 
land apportionment and the need of blacks to supplement 
their subsistence needs with wage labor. In each of the 
black structures, conditions discouraged blacks from engaging 
in collective political action. 
In the reserves, local leadership and councils were 
avenues of bureaucratic control rather than local autonomy. 
Even if blacks were to seek alternatives for political expres-
sion and independence, these required government consent and, 
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should this requirement be ignored, the regime had a vast 
array of means to suppress local political initiatives. 
As regards farmworkers, their position was even worse·as 
they lived under the all-encompassing control of the employ-
ers and their assistants. Discontent did occur, but this 
tended to be expressed in non-political forms, such as 
damage to property and absenteeism, and could be mediated 
by employers in a variety of ways. Urban blacks had engaged 
in collective action but these were irregular and because 
of the realities of urban geography and regime repression 
they were difficult to sustain. Compared to the above, the 
purchase area farmers seemed to have the greatest scope of 
freedom of action, but their small number and the small size 
of the land they commanded militated against a powerful 
political role in guerrilla warfare. 
While blacks were unlikely to engage in spontaneous 
political action by the 1960s, the decade preceding it had 
produced a nationalist elite that abandoned the self-con-
scious elitism of earlier organizations and sought to ally 
itself with popular black action. Elsewhere in Africa, 
black nationalist leaders were assuming power and the 
nationalist elite of Zimbabwe was exposed to these develop-
ments in the Central African Federation by having contact 
with the leaders of the nationalist movements in Malawi 
(then Nyasaland) and Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia). 
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Zimbabwe's membership in the CAF, however, was also counter-
productive from the point of view of collective action in 
that the violence in the two northern territories led the 
Zimbabwean regime to take action that would preempt such 
action in the southern territory. Thus the leadership of 
the nationalist organizations were arrested and detained, 
the organizations declared illegal, and any black organiza-
tional activity beyond desired channels was restricted. 
This limited the tactical scope of the nationalist groups, 
particularly with respect to their access to rural areas. 
Although the 1950s brought rural based black discon-
tent in Zimbabwe, spontaneous black collective action in 
the early 1960s was unlikely. Most blacks, e.g., those in 
the reserves and rural and urban wage laborers, were for 
several reasons discouraged fr.om engaging in collective 
action and the elites that sought to encourage such action 
were decimated by regime repression. Eventually the black 
nationalist organizations were forced into exile, from which 
it was far more difficult to organize and lead guerrilla 
warfare. 
As Skocpol and others have suggested with regard to 
revolutionary conflict in the non-Western world, the conflict 
in Zimbabwe was initially highly asymmetrical. In Zambia 
the nationalist groups' action revealed their weaknesses. 
First, the nationalists were divided into two organizations 
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(ZAPU and ZANU) and there were divisions even within the 
respective organizations. Second, the nationalists were 
unsure as to whether they should concentrate their effo·rts 
on foreign-diplomatic activity or on a guerrilla struggle 
within Zimbabwe. Although they prepared for guerrilla 
struggle during the period between 1962 and 1970, they 
focused mainly in their international audience. Third, the 
groups were in a period of organizational transition as 
substitute leaders became the effective heads of the orga-
nizations and as they struggled to become entities capable 
of waging guerrilla warfare. Fourth, in Zambia the orga-
nizations were in exile condition, which produced morale 
and discipline problems, exaggerated claims and factionalism. 
Finally, Zambia had drawbacks as a base for infiltration, 
as it only allowed narrow corridors of infiltration into 
areas which were sparsely populated and had a harsh terrain. 
Thus the initial guerrilla attacks were clumsy and usually 
counterproductive. In contrast the Smith regime had a well-
organized defense establishment and an extensive intelli-
gence network that could alert it to guerrilla groups and 
their location. 
Given the nature of guerrilla infiltration and attacks 
during the initial period, the Smith regime scored only a 
qualified victory, but it saw this as decisive and became 
overconfident. Until 1970 the regime was indeed confident 
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of its ability to maintain itself. The Rhodesian Front, 
in which rural interests were still overrepresented, domi-
nated the legislature and the bureaucracy, overwhelmed the 
political parties and forces of moderation, and maintained 
its own cohesion. Sanctions and other international pres-
sures did not shake their confidence and produce political 
concessions. Thf~ regime brought the economy under full 
state management, encouraged agricultural diversification 
and the development of more secondary induatries, and 
replaced Britain with South Africa as its main trading part-
ner. As regards the blacks, the regime made no noteworthy 
attempts to "win the hearts and minds" of black Zimbabweans. 
In fact the regime felt confident enough to upgrade the 
political authority of the traditional-tribal leadership 
(seen as representatives of the blacks as a whole), passed 
a new land act which left much of the previous land appor-
tionment unaltered and increased segregationist practices. 
Yet the Smith regime was not wholly invulnerable. 
One vulnerability was the attrition factor of guerrilla 
warfare which, while still modest,were growing in scope. 
Another vulnerability was that the sanctions' cumulative 
effect deprived the Zimbabwean economy of foreign exchange, 
capital and investment. This produced priority planning in 
which certain societal sectors, like black education in the 
rural areas and the transportation infrastructure, were 
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deprived of funds and deteriorated. Finally and most impor-
tantly, the Smith regime became deeply dependent on the 
financial, military and political support of South Africa. 
After 1970 the asymmetry between the contending par-
ties disappeared but the contest still fluctuated. The 
Smith regime's intelligence network failed to alert the 
regime to an-important development, ZANU's links with FRELIMO 
and the switch in the focus of guerrilla actions from the 
western areas adjacent to Zambia to the northeastern areas 
adjacent to Mozambique. With the help of FRELIMO, ZANU then 
gained organizational access to the reserves and the purchase 
areas in the northeastern areas. When the Portuguese coup 
occurred, the scope of this organizational access increased 
dramatically. The regime security forces were still able to 
launch search and destroy missions against the guerrillas, 
but they were hampered by the support ZANU received in the 
area. 
In general, Skocpol's and Wolf's identification of 
the peasant groups, here simply seen as rural blacks most 
active in revolutions; are supported by the nature of revolu-
tionary activity in Zimbabwe. Rural blacks from all popula-
tion groups supported ZAPU and ZANU, but only after these 
organizations had acquired access to the rural areas. How-
ever, the support given to the organizations varied. In the 
reserves and the purchase areas the organizations enjoyed 
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freedom of movement because these areas were located in 
territory adjacent to Mozambique and Zambia, the guerrillas 
often acquired the loyalty and support of local authorities 
(i.e. tribal chiefs) and tribal solidarity discouraged counter-
guerrilla actions and, most importantly, because the regime 
until the early 1970s concentrated its repressive forces in 
the western regions. Contrarily, blacks employed on white 
farms could support the guerrillas mainly by supplying infor-
mation and not reporting their presence in the area, for they 
were within the repressive reach of their white employers. 
With regard to the nature of the nationalist elite, 
events in Zimbabwe show how devastating the loss of a leader-
ship element can be in developing an effective organization 
and opposition. Although leadership as a symbolic matter can 
be sustained while leaders are incarcerated, leadership also 
is a matter of daily administration of organizational affairs. 
While the loss of the leadership element may occur as a 
result of regime repression, the leadership may also destroy 
its own effectiveness by personal rivalry and factionalism. 
In this regard the nationalist elite in Zimbabwe was charac-
terized by its competitiveness. This competitiveness was 
related to a variety of factors, such as personal animosities, 
tactical and training differences, competition for a limited 
supply of organizational positions and the uncertainty of the 
exile environment, but the common demoninator seems to be 
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personal and organizational ambitions. For most of the Zim-
babwean nationalist elite the most formative experience was 
the struggle for power itself, which lasted from at least 
1955 (with the reconstitution of the ANC) to 1979. Competive-
ness is thus best seen as deriving from personal and organi-
zational desires to acquire and maintain power; whatever 
tribal, regional, socio-economic and other differences existed 
were manipulated to suit the pursuit of power. 
The organizational forms generated by the guerrilla 
struggle were loosely styled military organizations rather 
than political parties. As such the military leadership 
was antagonistic towards the civilian-political leadership 
and, in the case of ZANU, eventually led to the displacement 
of political leaders by military ones in the organizations' 
major decision-making body. During the struggle these 
military leaders dominated decisions about local actions and 
were interested mainly in securing freedom of action for 
the guerrillas rather than building alternative political 
structures. Because of the way the conflict ended, by 
negotiation and election, the organizational resources of the 
military commanders were crucial in mobilizing electoral sup-
port, but simultaneously the compromises made by the leader-
ship at the Lancaster House conference requires the demise of 
the military organizations as guerrilla entities. 
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4. Sanctions, Negotiations and the 
Effects of Guerrilla Warfare 
The ending of the Zimbabwean conflict underscores 
Gurr's caution not to expect clearcut military victories in 
revolutionary conflicts. By the end of 1979 ZAPU and ZANU 
actions were steadily increasing, but it was uncertain whether 
they would be capable of, for example, invading Salisbury by 
military foree. Moreover, the regional patrons of the 
respective groups, on whom the groups had become wholly 
dependent, were exposed to the adverse effects of the war 
and were willing to pressure Britain to devise a plan that 
would end the conflict by other than military means. When 
Britain then devised a plan for ending the conflict on elec-
toral grounds, the regional patrons pressured the respective 
groups to accept it. 
In the Lancaster House agreements the parties to the 
conflict chose to preserve most of the major aspects of the 
old order because it suited organizational and personal 
struggles for power. The structural features of the old order 
were, moreover, accentuated by the guerrilla war. First, the 
lands previously designated as reserves are heavily overgrazed, 
their population uprooted, property (cattle) destroyed and 
schools, hospitals and stores either destroyed or in a state 
of disrepair. This not only brings rural pressure but also 
urban pressure as blacks, unable to sustain themselves in the 
rural areas, crowd the towns in search of wage labor. Second, 
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ZANU as the major political party commands a bureaucracy that 
was expanded and centralized during the guerrilla struggle. 
It is by far the most important single employer in Zimbabwe 
(public servants' earnings are the largest proportion of all 
economic earnings) and it provides the Mugabe regime with a 
vast array of organizational resources. Third, the economy 
was further diversified as a result of the struggle, but each 
of the sectors are still dependent on the availability of 
foreign capital, exchange and investment. In particular, the 
struggle deepened Zimbabwe's dependence on South Africa. As 
was the case during the course of Zimbabwe's history, the course 
of its future development will be influenced by the dynamics 
of South African society. 
The Mugabe regime's policy options are, like those of 
its predecessors, constrained by the structural features of 
the Zimbabwean society. In an immediate sense the constrain-
ing role of these features is further complicated by the com-
petitive nature of the black leadership and by the problems 
presented by the demilitarization of a people-in-arms. The 
Mugabe regime differs from previous regimes, however, in that 
its political legitimacy is not questioned, except in Matabe-
leland, and that it had, as the election results show, a 
wide political support base, at least until the end of 1952. 
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According to the definition of revolution here adopted, 
namely a form of change simultaneously affecting several 
dimensions of society in a fundamental and progressive·manner 
over a period of decades and culminating in a violent strug-
gle for political control, the events in Zimbabwe can clearly 
be described as a revolution. But, in summary, what kind of 
revolution occurred in Zimbabwe? 
The preceding discussion shows that a revolution 
originated in a pre-1945 Zimbabwe which, while it had been 
exposed to some modern socio-economic and political forces, 
lacked fully modernized economic, social and political struc-
tures. In this transitional environment state power, charac-
terized by a highly bureaucratized internal composition and 
operating at some remove from popular white political pres-
sures, attempted to implement socio-economic reforms when it 
was faced with external pressures generated by the Second 
World War. These attempted reforms (or modernization) en-
countered black and white rural based opposition. The white 
opposition then captured state power, suspended the reforms, 
and with a narrow political support base attempted to maintain 
itself under increasing external pressure. This crisis in 
state power eventually coincided with black collective action 
led by a non-rural elite and based on the participation of 
rural blacks in gu€rrilla warfare. During the ensuing strug-
gle for state power the respective groups became dependent 
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on regional patrons and it is the pressure of these patrons, 
combined with that of Britain, that forced the struggle to 
an electoral conclusion. 
Thus the fundamental reality animating Zimbabwean 
political life was its lack of modernity manifested in, among 
others, a dependent role in the world economy, a domestic 
economy only partially industrialized and reliant on the 
export of a few primary products, a subservient political 
relationship with Britain, and the non-recognition of the 
principle of equality in political affairs. This lack of 
modernity rendered the Zimbawean regime vulnerable to exter-
nal pressure and it is a bureaucratized regime's response to 
that pressure that set in motion events that culminated in 
the instrulation of a black regime in 1980. To view the 
events in Zimbabwe as another case in the decolonization of 
Africa would, then, not be incorrect, for it illustrates the 
formal aspects of a subservient relationship with Britain. 
Similarly, the use of a perspective emphasizing racial exclu-
sivism can be useful insofar as it reveals the denial of 
political equality and its consequences. However, these 
perspectives fail to capture the extent to which a lack of 
modernity, in different guises, permeated Zimbabwean life, 
cannot explain the Zimbabwean regime's vulnerability to ex-
ternal pressure beyond noting the existence of anti-colonial 
forces in Zimbabwe and the desire of Britain to rid itself 
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of a troublesome territory, and cannot explain the post-1939 
reforms except as a decades-long act of hypocrisy by a regime 
expressing the racial fears and hatreds of whites. 
Since the revolution in Zimbabwe has yet to run its 
full course, it is important to note that the regime change 
of 1980 came about as a result of the recognition of the 
principle of equality in political affairs. But the funda-
mental reality of being an only partially modernized society 
faces the new regime as much as it did its predecessors. 
Indeed the struggle for state power deepended Zimbabwe's 
structural problems and it still faces external pressure, 
now chiefly from South African sources. 
5. Revolutions, African Revolutions, and the 
Structural Perspective: The Zimbabwean Case 
On the basis of the preceding description of its 
nature it appears that the Zimbabwean revolution comfortably 
resides in the category of revolutions that occur in non-
Western or transitional environments. The Zimbabwean case, 
moreover, demonstrates that it is impossible to understand 
the origins and, equally important, the course and nature 
of these reovlutions without systematically relating the 
attributes of the society, such as population structure, 
economy, geography, and political life, to revolutionary 
developments. 
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With regard to African revolutions, the Zimbabwean 
case shows that the relationship between socio-economic 
development and political participation is more problematic 
than suggested by the existing literature. While there are 
differences among the theoretical conceptions, a common pre-
sumption is that socio-economic development increases politi-
cal participation, whether in the form of class action or a 
desire of recently urbanized individuals to be absorbed by 
political institutions. While the socio-e~onomic development 
of Zimbabwe may have increased political awareness, the nature 
and extent of political participation and collective action 
was thoroughly influenced by regime repression, the avail-
ability of groups that seek to encourage political action, 
and the availability of regional patrons for such groups. 
As such the theoretical arguments that revolutions in Africa 
are rare because the requisite socio-economic developments 
have not taken place, such as arguments stressing class for-
mation, are less useful than those that systematically incor-
porate the effect of political conditions that discourage 
collective and individual participation. 
Knowledge generated by a comparative study of African 
revolutions would be useful to address the debates about 
the causes, course and consequences of revolutions such as 
those in Africa, Angola, and Mozambique. In the same vein, 
a comparative study of African and non-African re:volutions 
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(like that of Paige though, as will be argued, not using the 
categories suggested by him), could yield useful information. 
Broadly speaking the conflictual or violent latter period of 
the Zimbabwean revolution is similar to the Maoist conception 
of guerrilla warfare. However, while it was argued that this 
violence could not be understood without knowledge of the 
preceding sc)cio-economic and political ch'anges' the question 
arises whether the nature and extent of these changes is 
similar to that of, say, the French, Chinese or Russian 
revolutions. Were the changes affecting rural blacks' life, 
for example, similar to those affecting Chinese peasants? 
As regards the debate within the structural perspec-
tive concerning the place of peasants, this study tried to 
present the conditions of rural black life in Zimbabwe as 
fully as possible. Although, the Zimbabwean case illustrates 
the difficulty in generating reliable demographic data about 
peasant life, there are a variety of studies and supportive 
data to draw reasonably concrete conclusions. Studies on 
Zimbabwe showed, for example, that rural blacks had multiple 
sources of income, but proportional figures are unknown. As 
indicated earlier, the categories and theoretical predictions 
of Skocpol and Wolf were useful; rural blacks from all the 
population categories could be mobilized to participate in 
the revolutionary movement. In particular, Skocpol's emphasis 
on the role of regime repression and peasant autonomy and 
370 
solidarity is supported by the western geographic focus of 
the Smith regime's repressive forces which opened the way for 
mobilization in the eastern regions, by the proximity (or 
lack of autonomy) of black farmworkers to their white employ-
ers which made them less successful participants in the guer-
rilla struggle, and the role of solidarity among blacks in 
the reserves and the purchase areas in allowing ZAPU and 
ZANU freedom of mvoement in their areas. 
Since blacks in dissimilar positions participated in 
revolutionary activity, the availability of political groups 
that seek to encourage and ally themselves with collective 
action naturally becomes crucial. In this regard it is 
important to note that the emergence of such groups and their 
access to the rural population was strongly influenced by 
external factors. Black activists in Zimbabwe were influenced 
first by fellow activists from South Africa and then those 
from the northern territories of the Central African Federa-
tion; these activists could avail themselves of doctrines 
on guerrilla warfare and other tactics that were not locally 
developed and, most importantly, revolutionary groups later 
acquired regional patrons. The participation of rural blacks 
with dissimilar backgrounds also suggests that there are 
different modes of participation in revolutionary activity. 
This participation can range from simply not reporting 
guerrillas in the area to actually joining the guerrilla 
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armies; the theoretical development of these distinctions by 
structuralists can be most useful to resolve the debate 
about which peasants are most revolution-prone. 
For Zimbabwe the last point is particularly important, 
for, as the structural literature suggests, the role of 
peasants in revolutions is often a tragic one. The political 
support of peasants is crucial in causing the downfall of 
the old regime but, especially if they are not fully mobilized 
by the revolutionaries and incorporated in revolutionary 
organizations, their political demands are often forgotten 
by the new regime. Hitherto the support of rural blacks was 
crucial to the development of the revolution in Zimbabwe; 
its remaining development will show whether these rural blacks' 
role is also a tragic one. 
372 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ahmed, Eqbal. "Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency." 
In National Liberation, pp. 137-213. Edited by Norman 
Miller and Roderick Aya. New York: The Free Press, 1971. 
Akpan, Moses E. "African Goals and Strategies Toward Southern 
Africa." African Stuedies Review 14 (September 1971): 
243-263. 
Arendt, Hanna·h. On Revolution. New York: Viking Press, 
1965. 
Arrighi, Giovanni. "Labor Supplies in HJstorical Perspec-
tive: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African 
Peasantry in Rhodesia." In Essays on the Political 
Economy of Africa, pp. 180-234. Edited by Giovanni 
Arrighi and John S. Saul. 
"The Political Economy of Rhodesia. Essays on the 
Political Economy of Africa, pp. 336-377. Edited by 
Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1973. 
Barber, James. Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1967. 
Barrows, Walter L. "Ethnic Diversity and Pnlitical Instabi-
lity in Black Africa." Comparative Political Studies 9 
(July 1976): 139-170. 
Berman, Bruce J. "Bureaucracy and Incumbent Violence: 
Colonial Administration and the Origins of the "mau Mau' 
Emergency in Kenya." British Journal of Political 
Studies 6 (April 1976): 143-175. 
Bell, J. Bowyer. "The Frustration of Insurgency: The 
Rhodesian Example in the Sixties." Military Affairs 35 
(February 1971): 1-5. 
"The Future of Guerrilla-Revolution in Southern 
Africa." Africa Today 19 (Winter 1972): 7-15. 
The Myth of the Guerrilla. New York: Knopf, 1971. 
Bowman, Larry W. Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an 
African State. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1973. 
373 
Bozeman, Adda B. Conflict in Africa. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1976. 
Bratton, Michael. Beyond Community Development: The Polj-
tical Economy of Rural Administration in Zimbabwe.· 
London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 
1978. 
"Structural Transformation in Zimbabwe: Compara-
tive Notes from the Nee-Colonisation of Kenya." Journal 
of Modern African Studies 15 (December 1977): 591-611. 
"The Public Service in Zimbabwe." Political 
Science Quarterly 95 (Fall 1980): 441-464. 
Brinton, Crane. The Anatomy of Revolution. Revised and 
expanded edition. New York: Vintage Books, 1965. 
Brown, Ken. Land in Southern Rhodesia. London: African 
Bureau, 1959. 
Bruton, James. "Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia." Military 
Review 59 (March 1979): 26-39. 
Calvert, Peter. Revolution. New York: Praeger, 1970. 
Cefkin, J. Leo. 
Naitons." 
649-669. 
"The Rhodesian Question at the United 
International Organization 22 (Summer 1968): 
Cervenka, Zdenek. The Unfinished Quest for Unity. London: 
Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1977. 
Chailand, Gerard. Armed Struggle in Pfrica. Translated by 
David Rattray and Robert Leonhardt with an introduction 
by Basil Davidson. New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1969. 
Revolution in the Third World: Myths and Pros-
pects. With an introduction by Immanuel Wallerstein. 
Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1977. 
Chanock, Martin. Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa 1900-45. 
Totowa, New Jersey: Frank Cass, 1977. 
Chorley, Katherine. Armies and the Art of Revolution. 
London: Faber and Faber, 1943. 
Christie, Roy. For the President's Eyes Ouly. Johannesburg, 
South Africa: Hugh Keartland Publishers, 1971. 
374 
Clarke, D.G. Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia. 
Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1977. 
"The Growth and Economic Impact of the Public 
Sector of Rhodesia." Rhodesian Journal of Economics 6 
(September 1972): 48-
Clements, Frank. Rhodesia: A Study of the Deterjoratian of 
a White Society. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. 
Cobbing, Julian. "The Absent Priesthood: 
the Rhodesian Risings of 1896-1897." 
African History 18 (1977): 61-64. 
Another Look at 
The Journal of 
Cohen, Barry. "The War in Rhodesia: A Dissenter's View." 
African Affairs 76 (October 1977): 483-494. 
Curtin, Timothy R.C. "Rhodesian Economic Development Under 
Sanctions and the 'Long Haul!" African Affairs 67 
(April 1967): 100-110. 
and David Murray. Economic Sanctions and Rhodesia. 
London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1967. 
Davies, James C. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." In James 
C. Davies, ed. When Men Revolt and Why, pp. 134-147. 
New York: The Free Press, 1971. 
Day, John. International Nationalism. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1967. 
"The divisions of the Rhodesian African Nationalist 
Movement." World Today 33 (October 1977): 385-394. 
"The Rhodesian Internal Settlement." World Today 34 
(July 1978): 268-276. 
Dotson, Floyd and William Dotson. The Indian Minority of_ 
Zambia, Rhodesia, and Mal~wi. New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yales Unive~sity Press, 1968. 
Duggan, William R. "The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and 
the Rural African Middle Class of Rhodesia." African 
·· Affairs 79 (April 1980): 227-239. 
Eckstein, Harry. "Theoretical Approaches in Explaining- Col-
lective Political Violence.'' In Handbook of Political 
Conflict, pp. 135-136. Edited by Ted R. Gurr. New Yor.k: 
The Free Press, 1980. 
375 
Ellis, John. Armies in Revolution. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1974. 
Eisenstadt, S.N. Revolution and the Transformation of 
Societies. New York: The Free Press, 1978. 
Frank. Andre G. "The Df~velopment of Underdevelopment." In 
Imperialsim and Underdevelopment: A Reader, pp. 89-100. 
Edited by Robert I. Rhodes. New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1970. 
Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Prac-
~- -New York: Praeger, 1964. 
Galtung, Johan. "A Structural Tehory of Imperialism." 
Journal of Peace Research 8 (1971): 81-117. 
Gann, Lewis H and M. Gelfand. Huggins of Rhodesia. London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1964. 
and Thomas H. Henrikson. The Struggle for Zimbabwe. 
New York: Praeger, 1981. 
Gibson, Richard. African I.ibera tion Movements. Lc,ndon: 
Oxford University Press, 1972. 
Goldstone, Jack A. "Theories of Revolution: 
tion." World Politics 22 (April 1980): 
The Third Genera-
425-453. 
Good, Kenneth, "Settler Colonialism: Economic Development 
and Class Formation." Journal of Modern African Studies 
14 (December 1976): ·597-620. 
• "Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia." African Affairs 
------73~(January 1974): 10-36. 
Good, Robert C. UDI: The International Politics of the 
Rhodesian Rebellion. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1973. 
Gray, Richard. The Two Nations. New Ycrk: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1960. 
Gregory, Martyn. "Rhodesia: From Lusaka to Lancaster House." 
World Today 36 (January 1980): 11-18. 
"The 1980 Rhodesian Elections -- a first-hand 
account and analysis." World Today 36 (May 1980): 180-
188. 
376 
"Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation through Armed 
Struggle and Electoral Mobilisation." Journal of Com-
monwealth and Comparative Politics 19 (MOrch 1981): 
62-94. 
Grundy, Kenneth W. Confrontation and Accommodation in 
Southern Africa. Berkeley, California: University of 
Californai Press, 1973. 
"The 'Class Struggle' in Africa: An Examination 
of Conflicting Theories." Journal of Modern African 
Studies 2 (October 1964): 379-393. 
"The Social Costs of Armed Struggle in Southern 
Africa." Armed Froces and Society 7 (Spring 1981): 
445-~66. 
Guelke, Adrian. "Africa as a Market for South African Goods." 
Journal of Modern African Studies 12 (March 1974): 
69-98. 
Gurr, Ted R. "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict." In 
Handbook of Political Conflict, pp. 238-294. Edited by 
Ted R. Gurr. New York: The Free Press, 1980. 
Why Men Rebel. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1970. 
Gutteridge, William F. "Rhodesia: The Use of Military Force." 
World Today 21 (December 1965): 499-503. 
Hagopian, Mark N. The Phenomenon of Revolution. New York: 
Dodd, Mead and Company, 1975. 
Hall, Richard. The High Price of Principles. London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1969. 
Halpern, Jack. "Polarization in Rhodesia: State, Church 
and Peoples." World Today 27 (January 1971): 1-8. 
Hazelwood, Arthur. "The Economics of Federation and Dissolu-
tion in Central Africa." In African Integration and 
Disintegration, pp. 185-220. Edited by Arthur Hazelwood. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. 
Hill, Christopher R. "UDI and South African Foreign Policy." 
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 7 (July 1969): 
96-103. 
377 
Hodder-Williams, R. "Rhodesia's Search For a Constitution: 
Or, Whatever Happened to Whaley?" African Affairs 69 
(July 1970): 217-235. 
Hodges, Tony. 
Blacks." 
15-20. 
"Counterinsurgency and the Fate of Rural · 
Africa Report 22 (September-October 1977): 
Holleman, J.F. Chief, Council and Commissioner. Assen, The 
Netherlands: Royal VanGorum, 1969. 
Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. 
New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1968. 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (!ISS). The 
Military Balance, 1975-1976. Lcffidon: !ISS, 1977. 
The Military Balance, 1977-1978. London: !ISS, 
1979. 
Johnson, Chalmers. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1966. 
Autopsy on Peoples' War. Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, 1973. 
Kapungu, Leonard T. "The OAU's Support for the Liberation 
of Southern Africa." In ·The Organization of African 
Unity After Ten Years: Comparative Perspectives, pp. 
135-151. Edited by Yassin El-Ayouty. New York: 
Praeger, 1975. 
The United Nations and Economic Sanctions Against 
Rhodesia. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 
1973. 
Kay, George. Rhodesia: A Human Geography. London: Univer-
sity of London Press, 1970. 
The Distribution of African Population in Southern 
Rhodesia: Some Preliminary Notes. Lusaka: Rhodes-
Livingstone Institute, 1964. 
"Towards a Population Policy for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia." 
African Affairs 79 (January 1980): 95-114. 
Khapoya, Vincent B. The Politics of Decision: A Comparative 
Study of African· Policy Toward the Liberation Movements. 
University of Denver: Monograph Series in World Affairs, 
12, 1974-75. 
378 
Kirk, Tony. "Politics and Violence in Rhodesia." African 
Affairs 74 (January 1975): 3-38. 
Kornhauser, William. 11Rebellion and Political Development." 
In Internal War, pp. 142-156. Edited by Harry Eckstein. 
New York: The Free Press, 1964. 
Kosmin, Barry. "The Inyoka Tobacco Industry of the Shangwe 
People: The Displacement of a Pre-Colonial Economy in 
Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1938." In The Roots of Rural 
Poverty in Central and Southern ~frica, pp. 268-288. 
Edited by Robin Palmer and Neir Parsons. Berkeley, 
California:.· University of California Press, 1977. 
Krammick, Issac. "Reflections on Revolution: 
and Explanation in Recent Scholarship." 
Theory [~ (January 1972): 26-63. 
Definition 
History and 
Lake, Anthony. The 'Tar Baby' Option: American Policy 
Toward Southern Rhodesia. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1976. 
Legum, Colin, ed. Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey 
and Documents 1974-1975. London: Rex Collings, 
1975. 
Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and 
Documents 1976-1977. · London: Rex Collings, 
1977. 
Western Crisis Over Southern Africa. New York: 
Africana Publishing Company, 1979. 
Leiden, Carl and Karl M. Schmitt. The Politics of Violence: 
Revolution in the Modern World. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968. 
Leites, Nathan and Charles Wolf Jr. Rebellion and Authority: 
An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts. Chicago: 
Markham, 1970. 
Leys, Colin. European Politics in Southern Rhodesia. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1959. 
Lofchie, Michael F. Zanzibar: Background to Revolution. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965. 
Loney, Martin. Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response. 
Baltimore, M~a-r-y~l-a-n~d~:--~P~e~n~g~u~i~n~B~o~o~k~s=,~l~9~7~5~.~~==~~~==~· 
379 
Mack, Andrew. "Sharpening the Contradictions: Guerrilla 
strategy in Imperialist Wars." Race and Class 17 
Autumn 1975): 161-177. 
Mao Tse-tung, Guerrilla Warfare. Translated by Samuel ·B. 
Griffith. New York: Praeger, 1961. 
Marcum, John A. "The Exile Condition and Revolutionary 
Effectiveness: Southern African Liberation Movements.'' 
In Southern Africa in Perspective, pp. 262-275. Edited 
by Christian P. PothoJm and Richard Dale. New York: 
The Free Press, 1972. 
Martin, David and Phyllis Johnson. The Struggle for Zimbabwe. 
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981. 
Mason, Phillip. The Birth of a Dilemma. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1958. 
Maxey, Kees. The Fight for Zimbabwe. London: Rex Collings, 
1975. 
Mazrui, Ali A. and David Gordon. "Independent African States 
and the Struggle for Southern Africa." In Southern 
Africa Since the Portuguese Coup, pp. 183~193 .. Edited 
by John Seiler. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980. 
McCuen, John J. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War. 
London: Faber and Faber, 1966. 
McKinnel, R.T. "Assessing the Economic Impact of Sanctions 
Against Rhodesia." African Pffairs 61 (July 1968): 
227-232. 
Meredith, Martin. The Past Is Another Country Rhodesia 1890-
1979. London: Andre Deutsch, 1979. 
Moorcraft, Paul. A Short Thousand Years. Salisbury, Zim-
babwe: Galaxie Press, 1979. 
Moore, Barrington Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. 
Morris, Michael. Armed Conflict in f.outhern Africa. Cape 
Town, South Africa: Jeremy Spence, 1974. 
Mtshali, B. Vulindelela. Rhodesia: Background to Conflict. 
New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967. 
Murray, D.J. 
Oxford: 
380 
The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia. 
Clarendon Press, 1970. 
Nelson, Harold D. et. al. Area Handbook for Southern 
Rhodesia. . First edition. Washington, D.C. : . United 
States Government Printing Office, 1975. 
Nehwati, Francis. "The Social and Communal Background to 
'Zhii': The African Riots in Bulawayo, Southern 
Rhodesia in 1960." African Affairs 69 (July 1970) 
250-266. 
Nkemdirim, Benard A. "Reflections on Pc•li tical Conflict, 
Rebellion, and Revolution in Africa." Journal of Modern 
African Studies 15 (March 1977): 75-90. 
Nyangoni, Christopher and Gideon Nyandoro, eds. Zimbabwe 
Independence Movements: Select Documents. New York: 
Barnes and Noble, 1979. 
O'Meara, Patrick. "Rhodesia: From White Rule to Independent 
Zimbabwe." In Southern Africa in Crisis, p.· 15-47·. 
Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara. Bloom-
ington, Indiana:_ Indiana University Press, 1977. 
Opello, Walter C. Jr. "Pluralism and Elite Conflict in an 
Independence Movement: FRELIMO in the 1960s." Journal 
of Southern African Studies 2 (October 1975): 66-8~. 
Oudes, Bruce. "Southern African Policy Watershed." Africa 
Report 19 (November-December 1974): 46-50. 
Paige, Jeffery M. Agrarian Revolution. New York: The Free 
Press, 1975. 
Palley, Claire. The Constitutional History and Law of 
Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1966. 
Palmer, Robin. "The Agricultural History of Rhodesia." In 
The.Roots ·of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa, 
pp~ 221-254~ Edited by Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons. 
Berkeley, California: University of C~lifornia Press, 
1977. 
"Wa~ and Land in Rhodesia." In War and Society 
in Africa, pp. 85-107. Edited by Bethwell A. Ogot ... 
Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1972. 
381 
and Neil Parsons. "The Hoots of Rural Poverty: 
Historic a 1 Back ground • " In _T_h....;.e__;;.R....;.o:,_o:,_t..:...,s-:--::::o-:::f:---'-R_u-=r=-a-=-1:-:-P-:::-o....:..v-="'e.::.r....;t'""'-y 
in Central and Southern Africa, pp. 1-32. Edited by 
Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons. Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, 1977. 
Park, Stephen. Business· As Usual: . Transactions Violating 
Rhodesian Sanctions. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, 1973. 
Parent, Peter and John Shy. Guerrillas in the 1960s. New 
York: Praeger, 1962. 
Phimister, ·Ian. "Peasant Production and underdevelopment in 
Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1914, with Particular Reference 
to the Victoria District." In The Roots of Rural Poverty 
in Central and Southern Africa, pp •. 255-257. Editea by. 
Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons. Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, 1977. 
"Zimbabwean Economic and Social Historiography 
Since 1970." Afri.can Affairs 78 (April 1979): 253-268. 
Pollak, Oliver B. "Black Farmers and White Politics." 
African Affairs 74 (july 1975): 263-277. 
Popper,. Frank J. "Internal W~.r as a Stimulant of Political 
Devleopment." Comparative Political Studies 3 (January 
1971: 413-423. 
Pustay, J.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare. New York: The Free 
Press, 1965. 
Raeburn, Michael. Black Fire! With an introduction by 
Anthony R. Wilkenson. London: Julian Friedmann pub-
lishers, 1978. 
Ranger, Terence 0. Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-97. 
Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1967. 
The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia 1898-1930. 
Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970. 
"The Death of Chaminuka: Spirit Mediums, National-
ism and the Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe." African Affairs 
81 (July ~982): 349-369. 
Rao, P.C. "The Rhodesian Crisis and the Use of Force." 
Africa Quarterly 6 (January-March 1967): 285-296. 
382 
Reid, Inez S. "African Nationalism in South Africa ~-nd 
Zimbabwe." In Southern Africa in Perspective, pp. 31-
45. Edited by Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale. 
New York: The Free Press, 1972. 
Rejai, Mostafa. 
Strategy. 
The Comparative Study of Revolutionary 
New York: David McKay Company, 1977. 
Rogers, Cyril and Charles Frantz. Racial Themes in Southern 
Rhodesia: The Attitudes and Behavior of the White Popu-
lation. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 
1962. 
Rothberg, Robert I •. Suffer the Future. Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980. 
and Ali A. Mazrui, eds. Protest and Power in Black 
Africa. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 
Sarkesian, Sam C. "Revolutionary Guerrilla We.rfare: An 
Introduction." In Revolutionary ·Guerrilla Warfare, 
pp. 1-21. Edited by Sam C. Sarkesian. Chicago: 
Precedent Publishing, 1975. 
Skocpol Theda. "A Critical Review of Barrington M(.lore's 
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy." Politics 
and Society 4 (Fall 1973): 1-34. 
States and Social Revolutions. London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979. 
"What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" Comparative 
Politics 14 (April 1982): 351-375; 
Smiley, Xan. "Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and the Rise of 
Robert Mugabe." Foreign Affairs 85 (Summer 1980): 
1060-1083. 
Sprack, John. Rhodesia: South Africa's Sixth Province. 
London: International Defence and Air Fund, 1974. 
Stone, Lawrence. "Theories of Revolution." World Politics 
18 (January 1966): 159-176. 
Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI). Southern 
Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict. New York: 
··Praeger, 1976. 
383 
Tabe~, Robert. The War of the Flea. Bungay, Suffolk: The 
Chauncer Press, 1970. 
Thompson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency: The 
Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1967. 
Tilly, Charles. "Collective Violence in European Perspective." 
In Violence in America, pp. 83-118. Edited by Hugh D. 
Graham and Ted R. Gurr. Revised edition. Beverly Hills, 
California: Sage, 1979. 
From Mobilization to Revolution. R ading, Massa-
chusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1978. 
Trimberger, Kay. Revolution From Above: Military Bureaucrats 
and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru. New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978. 
Van Velsen, J. 
Rhodesia." 
"Trends in African Nationalism in Southern 
Kroniek van Afrika 4 (June 1964): 139-157. 
Walter, Eugene V. Terror and Resistance. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969. 
Waterman, Peter. "On Radicalism in African Studies." :EQll-
tics and Society 3 (Spring 1973): 261-281. 
Weinrich, A.K.H. Black and White Elites in Rural Rhodesja. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1973. 
"Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia." Journal of 
Southern African Studies 2 (April 1977): 207-229. 
"The Impact of the War." In From Rhodesia to 
Zimbabwe, pp. 110-123. Edi-ted by W .H. Morris Jones and. 
Dennis Austin. London: Frank Cass, 1980. 
Williams, Michael and Michael Parsonage. "Britain and Rhode-
sia: The Economic Background to Sanctions." World 
Today 29 (September J 973); 379-388. 
Windrich, Elaine. 11 Rhodesian CHnsorship: The Role of the 
Media in the Making of a One-Party State." African 
Affairs 78 (October 1·979): 523-534. 
384 
"Rhodesi.a: The Road From Luanda to Geneva." 
World Today 33 (March 1977): 101-111. 
Wilson, Harold. The Labour Government J964-J970: A Personal 
Record. London: Michael Joseph, 1971. 
Wisemann, Henry and Alastair M. Taylor. From Rhodesia to 
Zimbabwe: The Politics of Transition. New York: 
Pergamon, 1981. 
Wolf, Eric R. "Peasant Rebellion and Revolution." In 
National Liberation, ·pp. 48-66. Edited by Norman Miller 
and Roderick Aya. New York: The Free Press, 1971. 
Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. New YorK: 
Harper and Row, 1969. 
Wolin, Sheldon. "The Politics of the Study of Revolution." 
Comparative Politics 5 (April 1973): 343-358. 
Yudelman, Montague. 
Massachusetts: 
Africans on the Land. Cambridge 
Harvard University Press, 1964. 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The dissertation submitted by Annette Seegers has been read . 
and approved by the following committee: 
Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian, Director 
Professor, Political Science, Loyola 
Dr. Allan Larson 
Professor, Political Science, Loyola 
Dr. Vincent Mahler 
Professor, Political Science, Loyola 
Dr. John Paden 
Professor, Political Science, Northwestern 
Dr. James L. Wiser 
Professor, Political Science, and 
Chairman, Political Science Department, Loyola 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the 
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies 
.the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated 
and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the 
Committee with reference to content and form. 
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
··kc~ 
Director's Signature 
